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Abstract 
This thesis examines the cultures of shame in the latter half of the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Britain. It offers a critical response to two oversimplified accounts 
of shame in the current non-historical literature: the traditional view, which identifies 
shame as a socially-constructed and morally-problematic emotion, and the recent 
revisionist view, which claims that shame is virtuous and entirely autonomous. By 
identifying shame as an emotion, a sense of honour, a moral sanction, a commodity, 
and a disciplinary weapon, and scrutinising it through the lens of religion, politeness, 
print, and law, this thesis explores how contemporaries experienced, interpreted, 
represented, and utilised shame for spiritual, moral, commercial, and judicial purposes 
over time. It demonstrates that shame, within different historical contexts, could be 
social as well as personal, morally virtuous as well as morally irrelevant or even bad. 
Shame was an essential religious emotion. Religious shame was a self-imposed and 
morally-virtuous emotion; it was desired and embraced by early modern Protestants, 
who saw it as a sign of piety and a means to come nearer to God. While religious shame 
was an emotion primarily concerning personal salvation, shame in a secular context 
was a socially-constructed concept dealing with a person’s public honour. Early modern 
people regarded shame as something of great moral and disciplinary value, which 
functioned as an inward restraint keeping people away from sin, and a form of 
community and judicial punishments. However, the moral and disciplinary 
characteristics of shame were not immutable; in the eighteenth century, shame faced 
the danger of being abused and reduced to a superficial and detrimental concept. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Over the past six decades or so, shame has emerged as an important subject of 
discussion among psychologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and sociologists. Their 
exploration is centred on the nature of the emotion of shame, the legitimacy of shaming 
practices, and the moral, psychological, cultural, and social implications of shame. 
Scholars generally regard shame as a social emotion which occurs as a consequence of 
other people’s judgment.1 The stress placed on externally generated judgement and the 
potential harmful psychological and behavioural implications of shame, such as anger, 
depression, revenge and suicide, leads scholars to argue that shame is not only a morally 
superficial, but also a morally ‘ugly’ emotion that people would be better off without.2 
The pessimistic view of shame can also be found in criticisms of using shame as a 
disciplinary weapon in the judicial system. Many scholars argue that shaming 
punishments should be banned in modern liberal society because they involve forms of 
public humiliation and stigmatisation, which would degrade human dignity and risk the 
danger of mob justice.3 However, this completely negative explanation of shame is not 
                                                             
1 See for example, June Price Tangney and Rhonda L. Dearing, Shame and Guilt (New York, 2002); 
Richard Wollheim, On The Emotions (New Haven, 1999); June Price Tangney and K. W. Fische 
(eds), Self-Conscious Emotions: Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment and Pride (New York, 1995); 
Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, 1993); Helen Block Lewis, Shame and Guilt in 
Neurosis (New York, 1971). Essays and books listed here and after are not exhaustive. The first 
section of this chapter will offer a detailed examination of current scholarship on shame. 
2  See for example, Tangney, ‘Moral Affect: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 64 (1991), pp. 598-607; Tangney and et al, ‘Relation of 
Shame and Guilt to Constructive versus Destructive Responses to Anger across the Lifespan’, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 70 (1996), pp. 797-809; Andrew P. Morrison, 
The Culture of Shame (New York, 1996). 
3 See for example, Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law 
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without opponents. Recent years have witnessed a growing number of works which aim 
to defend the moral nature of shame.4 In particular, the authors of In Defense of Shame: 
The Faces of an Emotion (2011) highlight the morally virtuous characteristic of shame, 
and argued that shame is essentially an autonomous emotion immune to social opinion 
and values.5 
In contrast to the substantial studies of shame undertaken by psychologists, 
philosophers, and anthropologists, it is surprising that the meanings and cultures of 
shame in early modern Britain have received little focused attention from historians. 
And hitherto little early modern historical evidence has been used to probe any of the 
argument made by the non-historical. The historical explorations thus far undertaken 
by medievalists are confined predominantly to the themes of chivalry, Christianity, and 
the female body.6 The study of early modern shame is even more limited in scope. 
Besides Gail Kern Paster’s 1993 examination of the connection between the early 
modern concept of shame and representations of the body in contemporary drama in 
the light of humoral medical theory,7 the majority of works – including David Nash 
and Anne-Marie Kilday’s excellent and timely monograph Cultures of Shame (2010), a 
                                                             
(Princeton, 2004); James Q. Whitman, ‘What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?’, The Yale 
Law Review, vol. 107 (1998), pp. 1055-92. 
4 See for example, Daniel James Turnbull, ‘Shame: In Defence of an Essential Moral Emotion’ 
(PhD thesis, Birkbeck, University of London, 2012); Krista Karbowski Thomason, ‘Rethinking 
Shame’ (PhD thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2009); John Sabini and Maury 
Silver, ‘In Defense of Shame: Shame in the Context of Guilt and Embarrassment’, Journal for the 
Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 27 (1997), pp. 1-15. 
5 Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an 
Emotion (Oxford, 2011). 
6  Mary C. Flannery, ‘The Concept of Shame in Late-Medieval English Literature’, Literature 
Compass, vol. 9 (2012), pp. 166-82. 
7 Gail Kern Paster, The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern 
England (New York, 1993). 
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book which represents the first and perhaps the only substantial study of shame in early 
modern Britain8 – tends to treat shame as a social practice and penal weapon, and 
discusses it in legal and judicial contexts.9 
As a basic human emotion, social practice, and cultural phenomenon which were 
familiar to early modern people and society, shame is certainly a subject worthy of its 
own history. This thesis aims to broaden the current historical research field of shame, 
and investigate the meanings and cultures of shame within a variety of contexts over a 
broad period between 1650 and 1800. More importantly, this thesis offers a critical 
response to the modern scholarship on shame, arguing that its static, all-or-nothing 
mode of explanation – which defines shame as completely socially constructed and 
morally bad, or as entirely private and morally virtuous – has over-simplified the 
potentially complex and dynamic concept of shame. In this introductory chapter, I first 
offer a brief overview of the major non-historical works on shame during the past 
decades and, in particular, highlight the two opposite modern discourses of shame. In 
the second section, I examine the historiography on shame thus far undertaken by 
medievalists and early modernists. The final section sets out the research fields and 
scope, chapter outline, and the source material that will be used in this thesis. 
 
The Modern Scholarship on Shame 
                                                             
8 David Nash and Anne-Marie Kilday, Cultures of Shame: Exploring Crime and Morality in Britain, 
1600-1900 (Basingstoke and New York, 2010). 
9 Another important and recently published study of the concept of shame in the criminal context 
is Judith Rowbotham, Marianna Muravyeva, and David Nash (eds), Shame, Blame, and Culpability: 
Crime and Violence in the Modern State (Oxford and New York, 2013). Other works which discuss 
shame in the criminal and judicial contexts will be examined in the latter part of this chapter. 
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What is shame? Historians have seldom attempted to conceptualise it, but shame and 
its related human emotions and concepts have been the subjects of frequent discussion 
among scholars from a wide range of disciplines for decades. Many works have sought 
to explore the nature of shame and its implications for the psychological and moral 
states of individuals, and also the cultural identities of different societies. Given the 
complexity of the concept, and in order to show the gap in the existing scholarship on 
shame, it will be instructive to provide a brief overview of non-historical works, prior 
to reviewing shame within existing social, cultural and criminal history contexts. 
The traditional scholarship on shame in the modern context identifies shame as a 
social emotion which requires others’ judgement in order to occur. In her famous 
monograph The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946), the American anthropologist 
Ruth Benedict argues that shame occurs when a wrongdoer is disapproved of, or fears 
for being disapproved of, by others. Here the presence of an audience and the externally 
generated judgement are crucial for evoking shame. Regarding shame as ‘a reaction to 
other people’s criticism’, Benedict identifies Japan as a shame culture and America as 
a guilt culture since ‘true shame cultures… reply on external sanctions for good 
behaviour, not, as true guilt cultures do, on an internalised conviction of sin.’10 For 
                                                             
10 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Boston, 1946), 
pp. 222-3. However, Benedict has been criticised for her assertion that the Japanese shame culture 
relies on external sanctions of control, while Western guilt culture relies on internal sanctions of 
control. Opponents argue that internal/external criteria should not be used to distinguish guilt from 
shame because in traditional Japanese thought, shame comes from the internal consciousness of 
ethics, nurtured through custom and etiquette, and people’s notion of shame is the result of self-
control rather than external discipline. Another criticism is that Benedict violates cultural relativism. 
Nevertheless, Benedict’s work is enlightened in that it sees shame as a group-oriented and social 
emotion, and defines shame and guilt in terms of multi-cultural backgrounds. See Millie R. 
Creighton, ‘Revisiting Shame and Guilt Cultures: A Forty-Year Pilgrimage’, Ethos, Vol. 18 (1990), 
pp. 279-307. 
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Benedict, shame is thus not only a psychological activity but also a powerful means of 
individual and social control; as an emotion, shame involves how a person feels others 
think of him or her, and is therefore socially constructed and externally imposed. 
Benedict’s research has played a significant role in popularising the social 
construction of shame. In 1953, Gerhart Piers and Milton Singer scrutinised shame and 
guilt in psychoanalytic and cultural contexts, and argued that there exists a causal 
relationship between social exclusion and the emotion of shame: 
Behind the feeling of shame stands not the fear of hatred, but the fear of contempt 
which, on an even deeper level of the unconscious, spells fear of abandonment… 
Accordingly, on a higher, social and more conscious level of individual 
development, it is again not fear of active punishment by superiors which is 
implied in shame anxiety, but social expulsion, like ostracism.11 
In his prominent book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), the American 
sociologist Erving Goffman also emphasised the close connection between shame and 
social bonds. He argued that shame is felt because people fail to preserve or boost their 
public image and esteem within social interactions. 12  Psychologist Paul Gilbert 
similarly regards shame as an emotion associated with a loss of social attractiveness; as 
he writes, shame is ‘part of the affective consequences that accompany detrimental 
changes in social status and belongs to a rich group of affects and experiences that 
pertain to losses of social standing, being demeaned or diminished’. 13  Frederic 
                                                             
11 Gerhart Piers and Milton Singer, Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study 
(Toronto, 1972), p. 29. 
12 See Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (London, 1959), and his Stigma: 
Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Harmondsworth, 1963). 
13 Paul Gilbert, ‘The Evolution of Social Attractiveness and Its Role in Shame, Humiliation, Guilt 
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Gibbons also claims that ‘violations of social norms or transgressions of normative 
expectations produce feelings of embarrassment or shame for a person who is in the 
presence of others’.14 In 2002, an empirical analysis carried out by June Tangney and 
Rhonda Dearing suggested that shame is ‘most often experienced in the presence of 
others’.15 It is explicit that in these accounts shame is explained within the context of 
social relationship between the self and others, and is defined as a socially constructed 
emotion, dependent on public exposure or social disapproval. 
The social nature of shame leads many psychologists and philosophers to hold a 
negative attitude toward the emotion of shame. They argue that shame is a superficial 
emotion without moral depth because its utter reliance on external value not only 
excludes the important role of autonomous moral agency in assessing and disciplining 
the self, but makes people merely care about their appearance or dress and how others 
look upon them rather than true moral virtue or learning. Besides, critics of shame 
compare it with guilt, and argue that shame is not only a painful but also inferior and 
morally bad emotion. According to psychologists Helen Block Lewis and Tangney, for 
example, guilt is a negative evaluation of a specific misbehaviour according to a 
person’s own moral value; a man obsessed with guilt always feels sorry for what he has 
done, and seeks to apologise and compensate. But in a state of shame, they argue, the 
individual feels pain not only because of the transgression he or she has made, but also 
because of a realisation that he/she is a bad person. Thus, while guilt promotes self-
                                                             
and Therapy’, British Journal of Medical Psychology, vol. 70 (1997), p. 113. 
14 Frederic X. Gibbons, ‘The Evolution and Manifestation of Social Anxiety’, in W. Ray Crozier 
(ed.), Shyness and Embarrassment: Perspectives from Social Psychology (Cambridge, 1990), p. 119. 
15 Tangney and Dearing, Shame and Guilt, p. 14. 
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reformation and empathy, shame is associated with feelings of shrinking or being small, 
which lead one to hide and escape.16 As Stephen Garvey writes: 
The shamed self is thus either passive and helpless, or enraged. In contrast, guilt 
prompts the self to try to make amends for the wrong doing. Because guilt 
preserves some distance between the self and its wrongful act, it enables the self 
to become active and engaged in an effort to repair the damage the offence has 
caused. Shame supplies one such motive to repair.17 
What makes the emotion of shame even more notorious and ‘morally ugly’ in the eyes 
of its critics is that shame (and fear of shame) potentially leads to a variety of immoral 
or destructive emotional and behavioural responses, such as depression, anxiety, flattery, 
anger, hatred, revenge, and even suicide. As Paul Gilbert writes:  
Shaming people can lead to various unhelpful defensive emotions, such as anger 
or debilitating anxiety, concealment or destructive conformity. Moreover, in a 
shame system, people can behave very immorally in order to court favour with 
their superiors and avoid being rejected for not complying with requests or orders. 
Prestige seeking and shame avoidance can lead to some very destructive 
behaviour indeed.18 
                                                             
16  June Price Tangney and et al, ‘Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior’, Annual Review of 
Psychology, vol. 58 (2007), pp. 345-72; Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, ‘Putting the Self 
into Self-Conscious Emotions: A Theoretical Model’, Psychological Inquiry, vol. 15 (2004), pp. 
103-25; June Price Tangney, ‘Self-Relevant Emotions’, in Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney 
(eds), Handbook of Self and Identity (New York, 2003), pp. 384-400; Tangney and Dearing, Shame 
and Guilt, chapter 2; Lewis, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis. 
17 Stephen P. Garvey, ‘Can Shaming Punishments Educate?’, Cornell Law Faculty Publications, 
vol. 7 (1998), p. 766, cited in Nash and Kilday, Cultures of Shame, p. 6. 
18 Paul Gilbert, ‘Evolution, Social Roles, and the Differences in Shame and Guilt’, Social Research, 
vol. 70 (2003), p. 1225. Also see Tangney and et al, ‘Shamed into Anger? The Relation of Shame 
and Guilt to Anger and self-reported Aggression’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
vol. 62 (1992), pp. 669–75; Tangney, ‘Moral Affect: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, pp. 598-607. 
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The negative attitudes toward shame are apparent in the criticisms of shaming 
punishments. The American criminologist James Whitman writes that ‘the chief evil in 
public humiliation sanctions is that they involve an ugly, and politically dangerous, 
complicity between the state and the crowd’.19 Martha Nussbaum, in her book Hiding 
from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law (2004), argues that ‘shame is likely to be 
normatively unreliable in public life’ and that ‘a liberal society has particular reasons 
to inhibit shame and to protect its citizens from shaming’.20 Like Whitman, Nussbaum 
claims that shame has demonstrated itself not only ‘an unreliable way to punish, but 
one that is intrinsically problematic, for invites the mob to tyrannize over whoever they 
happen not to like’.21 
Not all theorists regard shame as a socially-constructed and morally-problematic 
emotion, of course. Some scholars maintain that the presence of an audience is an 
important but by no means a necessary reason for feeing shame because shame can 
always take place when the individual accepts the fact that he or she has done something 
wrong according to the own ethical values, even if that wrongdoing is kept in secret. 
Thus Rom Harré argues that ‘in shame, I accept the presence of the Other and the 
restrictions that are imposed’;22 or, as Nathan Harris says, ‘acceptance of having done 
wrong is just as essential as exposure, with non-acceptance leading to different 
emotions.’23 Similarly, moral philosopher Bernard Williams argues that it is wrong to 
                                                             
19 Whitman, ‘What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?’, p. 1059. 
20 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity, p. 15. 
21 Ibid., p. 235. 
22 Rom Harré, ‘Embarrassment: A Conceptual Analysis’, in W. Ray Crozier (ed.), Shyness and 
Embarrassment: Perspectives from Social Psychology (Cambridge, 1990), p. 203. 
23  Eliza Ahmed, Nathan Harris, John Braithwaite and Valerie Braithwaite (eds), Shame 
Management through Reintegration (Cambridge, 2001), p. 82. 
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see shame as simply a consequence of public exposure: ‘if everything depended on the 
fear of discovery, the motivations of shame would not be internalized at all.’24 
A few scholars defend the moral and disciplinary value of shame. Psychologists 
John Sabini and Maury Silver, for example, argue against Tangney for identifying guilt 
as a positive emotion and shame as a destructive one, pointing out that ‘guilt and shame 
in people’s experience can not be so easily segregated and that, if there was a shameless 
guilt, it would be anemic and unable to fulfil any important social or moral function’. 
Therefore, they claim that ‘without the bite of shame, guilt lacks force’.25 In his recent 
research on the emotion of shame, Daniel Turnbull likewise argues: 
Shame can spur us to go beyond the minimum requirements to perform 
supererogatory actions, by making us reflect on the type of person we want to be. 
Shame can also help us recognise wrongs done in our name by groups of which 
we are members, leading us to demand that restitution is made and say ‘never 
again’.26 
Supporters of shaming punishments argue that the desire to banish shame altogether 
from modern judicial system is neither realistic nor feasible, and that certain degrees of 
shame are an inextricable part of any satisfactory punishment regime.27 While some 
scholars debate as to whether a modern judicial system should employ shaming 
punishments, others focus on how to appropriately use shame as a disciplinary weapon 
                                                             
24 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, 1993), p. 81. 
25 Sabini and Silver, ‘In Defense of Shame’, p. 6, 12.  
26 Turnbull, ‘Shame: In Defence of an Essential Moral Emotion’, conclusion. 
27 Richard J. Arneson, ‘Shame, Stigma, and Disgust in the Decent Society’, The Journal of Ethics, 
vol. 11 (2007), pp. 31-63; Henry S. Richardson, ‘Rawlsian Social-Contract Theory and the Severely 
Disabled’, The Journal of Ethics, vol. 10 (2006), pp. 419-62; John Deigh, ‘The Political of Disgust 
and Shame’, The Journal of Ethics, vol. 10 (2006), pp. 383-418. 
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without resulting negative effect. John Braithwaite distinguishes the stigmatising use of 
shame and what he terms ‘reintegrative shaming’, arguing that reintegrative shaming 
sanctions would be a desirable means to punish misdemeanours because shaming the 
particular act instead of the person ‘communicates the disapproval of an act with respect, 
and uses rituals to terminate disapproval with forgiveness, whilst encouraging the 
offender back to the community’.28 
One of the most recent and powerful critical response to the traditional negative 
explanation of shame comes from Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice 
Teroni’s In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion (2011). The authors regard the 
long-accepted view that shame is essentially a social and morally ugly emotion as 
‘dogmas’. They argue that shame is not a socially-constructed or externally-imposed 
emotion since it doesn't require a real or imagined audience in order to occur. People 
feel shame simply because they fail to meet the goal or norm of their own. In this sense, 
the emotion of shame is entirely autonomous, immune to social opinion or value. In 
addition, although shame may sometimes involve negative behavioural and 
psychological effects, it is nevertheless an emotion with great moral values which serve 
to promote virtuous behaviour and social integration, and to guard and foster personal 
values.29 
Through this overview of the non-historical scholarship on shame, what becomes 
striking is that the modern definitions and evaluations of shame differ drastically. The 
                                                             
28 Braithwaite and et al (eds), Shame Management Through Reintegration (Cambridge, 2001), p. 
39; also see John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge, 1989). 
29 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame, esp. chapter 3 and 4. 
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traditional thinking on shame is negative. The majority of anthropologists, philosophers, 
and psychologists hold that shame is essentially a social emotion, which utterly relies 
on the presence of an audience and externally generated judgement. The heteronomous 
nature of shame leads shame to suffer a bad reputation. Modern scholars generally 
regard shame as a self-destructive and morally-ugly emotion that people should try to 
get rid of. This negative view on shame is not without criticism, especially in recent 
years, as Julien Deonna and his colleagues’ volume In Defense of Shame indicates. They 
contend that shame is a positive emotion of great moral values. They also refute the 
traditional explanation of shame as a social emotion; however, they go from one 
extreme to the other, arguing that shame is completely autonomous and immune to any 
social opinion. Leaving aside the question of which discourse has better captured the 
nature of shame, the substantial divergence of views not only indicates the complexity 
of the concept of shame, but implies that, as I shall argue, any sweeping or all-or-
nothing mode of explanation would be problematic. 
 
The Historiography of Shame 
Substantial studies of shame thus far undertaken by historians are limited in scope and 
amount. Inspired by the work of cultural anthropologists and in particular Ruth 
Benedict, some classicists and medievalists have tried to explore whether the ancient 
period and the Middle Ages of western society were a shame or a guilt culture, and how 
shame was represented in classic, chivalric, and courtly literature.30 In Eric R. Dodds’s 
                                                             
30 I am indebted to Ellen Wehner Eaton and Mary Flannery in this and the next paragraphs. See 
Ellen Wehner Eaton, ‘Shame Culture or Guilt Culture: the Evidence of the Medieval French 
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The Greeks and the Irrational (1968) and Arthur W. H. Adkins’s Moral Values and 
Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century 
(1972), both authors identify the Homeric poems as the product of a shame culture, 
because ‘fame’ or honour, a concept which they believe to be closely associated with a 
sense of shame, played an important role in regulating behaviour and rewarding 
heroism in ancient Greek society.31 Similarly, Bernard Williams suggests that ancient 
Greece belonged to a shame culture, but he points out that this shame culture was mixed 
by guilt since Greek epic highlighted the issues such as personal moral value and 
responsibility.32  
Medieval chivalric culture and literature have been recognised as a fertile area for 
the study of shame. The codes of shame and honour played a central role in establishing 
chevaliers’ identity and motivating their actions. The proverb that it is ‘better to die 
with honour than live with shame’ had long been one of the most important motifs of 
medieval chivalric and courtly literature; as Mary Flannery remarks, ‘the word ‘shame’ 
appears approximately two hundred times in Sir Thomas Malory’s Morte Darthur.’33 
Medievalists interested in the study of shame have explored literature such as the Song 
of Roland and the legends relating to King Arthur, his Knights of the Round Table such 
as, and especially, Sir Gawain. They argue that these texts were produced in the spirit 
of a shame culture because of their preoccupation with, and praise for, Roland, Arthur 
                                                             
Fabliaux’ (PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 2000), chapter 1; Flannery, ‘The Concept of Shame 
in Late-Medieval English Literature’, pp. 166-82. 
31 Eric R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkley and Los Angeles, 1968); Arthur W. H. 
Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece from Homer to the End of the Fifth 
Century (London, 1972). 
32 Williams, Shame and Necessity, Chapter 3. 
33 Flannery, ‘The Concept of Shame in Late-Medieval English Literature’, p. 168. 
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and his Knights’ virtuous characters – honesty, braveness, loyalty, and the love of 
honour. 34  Some historians focus on the questions of whether and when the west 
European society transferred from a shame culture to a guilt one. While they generally 
agree that this transition took place during the Middle Ages, they don’t reach a 
consensus on exactly when and why it occurred. Some attribute the shift to ‘the rise of 
interiority’ and the growing importance of self-knowledge under the impact of the 
Renaissance; others attribute the rise of guilt culture to the elevation of Christianity in 
regulating individuals and society during the Protestant Reformation.35 
However, historians such as Ewan Fernie reject the over-simple division between 
so-called ‘shame cultures’ and ‘guilt cultures’. In his Shame in Shakespeare (2002), 
Fernie demonstrates the close link between shame and interiority, and opposes the 
traditional explanation of shame as a consequence of an external sanction and guilt as 
an inward conviction, claiming that ‘less shame is found in cultures with a debased 
view of the self; it is societies where individual integrity and dignity is prized most 
highly that corruption and disgrace are most lamented’.36 Other historians, such as 
Stephanie Trigg, by investigating medieval shame in the context of courtly rituals, 
demonstrate that ‘there is a substantial degree of continuity’ in shame cultures in 
                                                             
34 J. A. Burrow, Essay on Medieval Literature (Oxford, 1984), especially pp. 117-31; Robert L. 
Kindrick, ‘Gawain’s Ethics: Shame and Guilt in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight’, Annuale 
Mediaevale, vol. 20 (1981), pp. 5-32; Loretta Wasserman, ‘Honor and Shame in Sir Gawain and 
the Green Knight’, in Larry D. Benson and John Leyerle (eds), Chivalric Literature: Essays on 
Relations Between Literature and Life in the Later Middle Ages (Kalamazoo, 1980), pp. 77-90; 
Mark Lambert, Malory: Style and Vision in ‘Morte d'Arthur’ (New Heaven, 1975), pp. 176-94; 
Eugene Vance, Reading the Song of Roland (New Jersey, 1971), pp. 36-8. 
35  Eaton, ‘Shame Culture or Guilt Culture’, chapter 1; Jean Delumeau, Sin and Fear: The 
Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture, 13th-18th Centuries, trans. Eric Nicholson (New York, 1990); 
R. Howard Bloch, ‘Tristan, the Myth of the State and the Language of the Self’, Yale French Studies, 
vol. 51 (1974), pp. 61-81; Vance, Reading the Song of Roland, pp. 36-8. 
36 Ewan Fernie, Shame in Shakespeare (London, 2002), p. 24. 
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England from the mid-fourteenth century advent of the motto of the Order of the Garter 
through to the early modern period.37 
Besides studying shame in chivalric and courtly literature, medievalists explore 
shame in a religious context. In her Martyrs, Saints, and Other Abject Subjects (2008), 
Virginia Burrus refutes the conventional view that Christianity had led to a conversion 
of western culture from a shame one to a guilt one, arguing that ‘Christianity innovates 
less by replacing shame with guilt than by embracing shame shamelessly’.38 Burrus’s 
argument is particularly illuminating for my research. It is intriguing to ask whether 
eighteenth-century British Christians embraced feelings of shame along with their early 
medieval ancestors. Besides religion, other areas such as blushing and bodily shame are 
also touched upon by historians. For example, Valerie Allen has investigated the 
relationship between shame, blushing, and bodies in a gendered context. She finds that 
while ‘feminine blushes tend to converge on moments of sexual impropriety or of fear 
of it’, male blushes ‘express a wider, less specific range of cultural experience’.39 
Compared to the work undertaken by medievalists, the detailed study of shame in 
the early modern (British) context is rare. An important monograph that concentrates 
on shame is from Gail Kern Paster. In his The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the 
                                                             
37 Stephanie Trigg, ‘“Shamed be…” Historicizing Shame in Medieval and Early Modern Courtly 
Ritual’, Exmplaria, vol. 19 (2007), p. 84. Also see his Shame and Honor: A Vulgar History of the 
Order of the Garter (Philadelphia, 2012). 
38 Virginia Burrus, Martyrs, Saints, and Other Abject Subjects (Philadelphia, 2008), p. 7. 
39 Valerie Allen, ‘Waxing Red: Shame and the Body, Shame and the Soul’, in Lisa Perfetti (ed.), 
The Representation of Women’s Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Culture (Gainesville, 
2005), p. 192, cited in Flannery, ‘The Concept of Shame in Late-Medieval English Literature’, p. 
174. Other work that concerns medieval body and shame includes Mary C. Flannery, ‘A Bloody 
Shame: Chaucer’s Honourable Women’, The Review of English Studies, vol. 62 (2011), pp. 337-57; 
Clifford Davidson, ‘Nudity, the Body, and Early English Drama’, in his History, Religion, and 
Violence: Cultural Contexts for Medieval and Renaissance English Drama (Aldershot, 2002), pp. 
149-79. 
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Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern Britain (1995), Paster explores the female’s 
bodily fluids and their cultural implications for shame, arguing that the contemporary 
representations of the incontinent and leaky characteristic of women’s body as 
something ‘disgusting’ increased the threshold of shame, and promoted ‘an emergent 
ideology of bodily refinement and exquisite self-mastery’.40 Some historians begin to 
realise the potential value of shame as an approach to enlightening and interpreting 
other historical themes. For example, in his 2014 essay Farid Azfar points out that 
underlying the 1720 legal actions against homosexuality and in particular Mother 
Clapp’s molly house in London, was a deep social anxiety about the shameless urban 
future.41 
One book I wish to single out as representing the first substantial study of the 
British cultures of shame over a long chronological period from the early modern to the 
Victorian period is that of David Nash and Anne-Marie Kilday. In their Cultures of 
Shame: Exploring Crime and Morality in Britain, 1600-1900, the authors examine how 
shame was utilised, interpreted, and evolved as community, domestic, moral, and 
judicial disciplinary practices over time. In general, they demonstrate ‘the longevity 
and the continued potency of cultures of shame’, arguing that although shaming as a 
penal weapon was coming to be seen as unacceptable and gradually disused, shame was 
‘not marginalised by modernising societies’ but ‘incorporated within them’ and ‘had 
become an intrinsic component’ of modernity, by integrating itself with new regimes of 
                                                             
40 Paster, The Body Embarrassed, p. 14. 
41 Farid Azfar, ‘Beastly Sodomites and the Shameless Urban Future’, The Eighteenth Century, vol. 
55 (2014), pp. 391-410. 
16 
 
politeness, etiquette, and popular media. Nash and Kilday’s study thus offers new 
evidence against the traditional argument about ‘the modernising transition from shame 
to guilt cultures’.42 Cultures of Shame is an important work, which for the first time 
examines the general history of shame in Britain.43 While I agree with the broad thrust 
of Nash and Kilday’s argument, namely the longevity and continual importance of the 
cultures of shame in Britain, I nevertheless think it needs further refinement and 
supplement. It should be acknowledged that the authors consider shame predominantly 
in the contexts of law and social control. The consequence of this approach is that their 
study regards shame mainly as disciplinary practices and the ideas associated with them, 
rather than a human emotion or feeling experienced by contemporary individuals and 
social groups; and consequently, they do not offer detailed investigation of the 
meanings of shame in other historical contexts such as religion and polite culture. 
Indeed, shaming is important but by no means the whole of shame; without examining 
the emotion, or exploring shame in other contextual themes or fields, we are unable to 
gain a whole picture of the cultures of shame. Thus, this gap constituted part of the 
inspirations for the present thesis. 
 
Thesis Outline, Methodology, and Source Material 
                                                             
42 Nash and Kilday, Cultures of Shame, p. 20, 172, 177. 
43 Another recently published book on shame is Rowbotham, Muravyeva, and Nash (eds), Shame, 
Blame, and Culpability. This book confirms Nash and Kilday’s argument about the longevity and 
continual importance of shame in modern penal system that they have made in Cultures of Shame. 
It should also be noted that, as Nash and Kilday have pointed out, shame can be found in three 
detailedly studied areas, namely victimology, community-based rituals, and officially-sanctioned 
punishments. Historians dedicated in these areas don't offer direct or detailed investigation of shame, 
but their works nevertheless offer valuable insights on how shame was used in judicial system in 
early modern society. For the detailed review and secondary sources regarding these areas, see Nash 
and Kilday, Cultures of Shame, pp. 8-12. 
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In view of the gap in current modern and historical scholarship on shame, this thesis 
sets two targets. First, it aims to refute the two oversimplified accounts of shame carried 
out by modern theorists. Second, it aims to broaden the research scope of the existing 
historical study of shame, and offer an illuminating and more comprehensive account 
of early modern British cultures of shame. My focus is that of the cultural and social 
historian. The basic strategy of this thesis is to examine shame within four different 
historical contexts, namely religion, polite culture, print culture, and crime and 
punishment. By identifying shame as an emotion, a sense of honour, a moral sanction, 
a commodity, and a disciplinary weapon, I seek to explore how early modern people 
experienced, interpreted, represented, and utilised shame for devotional, moral, 
commercial, and judicial purposes. 
That Christian spirituality was preoccupied with feeling of shame has long been 
recognised. However, it is surprising that no substantial study of the early modern 
religious culture of shame has yet been undertaken.44 This neglect leaves significant 
gaps not only in the history of Protestant spiritual lives and psychology, but also in the 
study of shame itself. To begin with, shame was surely an important contributing factor 
in constructing the Protestant psyche. Without considering the role of shame, it would 
not be possible to gain comprehensive insights into the inner world of Protestants. 
                                                             
44  By contrast, other aspects of religious psychology, especially those relating to melancholy, 
despair, and madness, and the associated emotions including guilt, fear, anxiety, and sorrow 
experienced by Protestants in early modern old and New England, have received detailed attention 
from historians. See Charles L. Cohen, God’s Caress: The Psychology of Puritan Religious 
Experience (Oxford, 1986); John Stachniewski, The Persecutory Imagination: English Puritanism 
and the Literature of Religious Despair (Oxford, 1991); Julius H. Rubin, Religious Melancholy and 
Protestant Experience in America (New York and Oxford, 1994); Katharine Hodgkin, Madness in 
Seventeenth-Century Autobiography (Basingstoke and New York, 2007); Jeremy Schmidt, 
Melancholy and the Care of the Soul: Religion, Moral Philosophy and Madness in Early Modern 
England (Ashgate and Burlington, 2007). 
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Secondly, historical and non-historical scholars seldom examine shame in a religious 
context. As we have seen, historians interested in shame largely confine their research 
to the British and European history of crime and punishment, and therefore treat shame 
mainly as a disciplinary action, rather than as an emotion. Moreover, psychologists’ 
work on shame makes no reference to the Christian religion. The consequence of this 
omission is that modern scholars are inclined to see shame as a social, externally-
imposed emotion that arises from other’s judgment of the self. This social perspective 
risks reducing shame to a morally superficial and psychologically detrimental emotion 
because of its utter dependence on external values, and its potentially negative 
consequences, leading to depression, suicide, violence, and revenge. 
 Chapter two seeks to fill this gap by scrutinising how early modern Protestants 
experienced and interpreted shame. Of course, it is neither easy, nor necessary, to assess 
the inward feelings of shame experienced by people from all Protestant groups 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Therefore, I selected Calvinists, 
Quakers, and Methodists as the main subjects of research. Calvinist is an inclusive term; 
under the umbrella of Calvinism were different religious groups such as Anglicans, 
Presbyterians, and Puritans, who were often not in agreement with each other. However, 
it should be noted that the things Calvinists had in common about shame were more 
significant than their disagreement over ecclesiastical, theological, and political issues. 
Moreover, different Calvinists possessed similar features of spirituality because of their 
general beliefs about the doctrine of predestination. I will pay particular attention to the 
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writings of Puritan Calvinists.45 By the end of the sixteenth century, most Puritans were 
Calvinists. In the mid seventeenth century, Calvinism still made up the dominant part 
of Puritan thinking, though its hold was beginning to wane by the end of the century. 
More importantly, as ‘the hotter sort of Protestants’,46 these Puritans represented, and 
indeed magnified, the Calvinist way of experiencing and interpreting shame. The reason 
for examining early Quakers and Methodists lies in their anti-Calvinism position, and 
in particular their denial of predestination. 47  Furthermore, since Quakers and 
Methodists had in many respects found their root in Puritanism, researching these three 
groups provides a way to see the continuity and change of the religious notion of shame. 
While all these groups agreed that experiencing shame was vital to repentance and 
salvation, it is noteworthy that Quakers were characterised by their unique sense of 
shamelessness after conversion or when they were ‘going naked for a sign’, and that 
Methodists were notorious for their emotional religiosity and intense inculcation of 
shame. 
In the second chapter I don’t seek to study Protestant theology through the 
examples of shame, but aim to investigate the religious meaning of shame more directly, 
and to explore when, why, and how Calvinists, Quakers, and Methodists felt shame, 
and how people from each group interpreted this emotion. The main sources used in 
                                                             
45 In chapter two, I adopt an inclusive definition of Calvinistic Puritans of the second half of the 
seventeenth century. These Puritans comprise those from the Anglican Church, and also Separatist, 
Independent, Presbyterian, and Baptist denominations. One reason for adopting this broad historical 
approach is that these Puritans, while holding different ecclesiastical and theological ideas, 
possessed similar features of spirituality. 
46 Patrick Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement (London, 1967), p. 27. Collinson also 
describes English puritans as ‘Forward Protestants’. See Patrick Collinson, English Puritanism 
(London, 1983), p. 16. 
47 There were, it is true, some Calvinistic Methodists but there is not space to consider them here. 
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this chapter include ‘ego-documents’, such as diaries, memoirs, conversion narratives, 
and spiritual autobiographies, and also hymns, sermons, treatises, prescription, and 
manuals produced by prominent religious writers. Despite nuanced understandings of 
shame among three Protestant groups, the chapter nevertheless demonstrates that, first, 
shame was the essential religious emotion and constituted a part of the Protestant 
psyche; second, religious shame was primarily (though not entirely) a private, self-
imposed emotion that always occurred in introspection and repentance, without the 
involvement of external judgement or the presence of an audience; and third, rather 
than being a negative emotion, as has often been argued by modern scholars, shame 
was wholeheartedly desired and embraced by Protestants as a penitential and devotional 
affection in their everyday spiritual life. By situating shame within the context of 
religion, and arguing for the private, moral nature of it, the thesis not only sheds light 
on the history of religious psychology, but corrects the dogma that has falsely judged 
shame to be a completely social, negative emotion. 
The third chapter moves on to a more secular context, and investigates how shame 
was interpreted, experienced, and refined in the eighteenth-century polite culture. 
Historians have talked much about the nature of politeness and its social, cultural, and 
gender implications. They have told us a lot about what manners would be seen as polite 
and honourable, and what sorts of behaviour would be considered as indecent or boorish 
in polite society. Besides, historians have demonstrated that the eighteenth-century 
ideal of politeness was a synthesis of outward polish with inner virtue.48 These findings 
                                                             
48 See for example, Philip Carter, Men and the Emergence of Polite Society (Harlow, 2001); Anna 
Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility: Changing Codes of Conduct in Early Modern England (Oxford, 
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are illuminating to my research basically because the senses of honour and dishonour 
were closely linked. Yet so far, few historians of polite culture have yet made direct or 
detailed investigation of the emotion and conceptions of shame. Therefore, I seek to 
build on their research by exploring how codes of politeness, decorum, and honour 
reflected and influenced the contemporary notion of shame. Moreover, I draw on the 
argument made by Faramerz Dabhoiwala, who has reminded us that the concept of 
honour or reputation should be understood as ‘a compound of moral and social factors’. 
According to Dabhoiwala, in contrast to the absolute standards of morality, reputation 
and honour were relative terms because in practice social opinions or subjective social 
considerations could be separate from and even at odds with moral norms in assessing 
a person’s reputation. 49  This opinion is particularly important for the research of 
chapter three. It implies that moral norms were an important but by no means the only 
or necessary criterion for making judgment, or constructing the notion, of shame. In 
addition, the chapter also examines a particular aspect of the emotion of shame, namely 
bashfulness, shamefacedness, or excessive modesty. Modesty and bashfulness were 
dispositions that belonged to the sense of shame since they all involved a low self-
esteem and an awareness of weakness, incompetence or inferiority of the self. Self-
                                                             
1998); John Brewer, The Pleasures of the Imagination: English Culture in the Eighteenth Century 
(2nd edn, London and New York, 1997); Lawrence E. Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of 
Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century England 
(Cambridge, 1994); Christopher J. Berry, The Idea of Luxury: A Conceptural and Historical 
Investigation (Cambridge, 1994); Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England, 1727-
1783 (Oxford, 1989); J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History (Cambridge, 1985); Michael 
Curtin, ‘A Question of Manners: Status and Gender in Etiquette and Courtesy’, Journal of Modern 
History, vol. 57 (1985), pp. 395-423;  
49 Faramerz Dabhoiwala, ‘The Construction of Honour, Reputation and Status in Late Seventeenth- 
and Early Eighteenth-Century England’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, vol.6 (1996), 
pp. 201-213. 
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abasing and blushing had long been regarded by religious and moral writers as a sign 
of virtue. However, in polite society they were coming under criticism and becoming a 
target of refinement. 
In chapter three, I consider shame as an emotion and an idea associated with the 
concept of honour. Drawing on an intellectual approach, the first section offers a 
detailed examination on the works of eighteenth-century philosophers including John 
Locke, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Bernard Mandeville, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume 
and Adam Smith, and seeks to explore how their explanations of shame differed from 
each other and the religious ones. In the following section, I explore how polite writers 
talked about bashfulness and modesty, and why shamefacedness were increasingly 
considered as a false sense of shame that polite man and woman should try to get rid 
of. The final section, ‘Banish false shame, this monster of vanity and arrogance’, 
regards shame as a moral sense in crisis. By drawing on a variety of sources, ranging 
from essay periodicals, newspapers, and conduct manuals to dramas, this section 
investigates how polite society undermined the moral characteristic of shame, and 
reduced it to a superficial concept without moral depth. Overall, chapter three argues 
that the culture of politeness played an important role in elevating social factors to a 
place of significance in interpreting and experiencing shame. Eighteenth-century 
philosophers regarded shame as a social emotion, requiring the presence of others or 
social communication in order to occur. They also agreed that shame was an emotion 
of great moral value in promoting virtues and preventing sins. Besides, the expansion 
of polite sociability required people to be modest in communication, without involving 
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the self-abasing elements of shame such as excessive humility, unworthiness and 
bashfulness. Finally, although polite writers repeatedly emphasised the centrality of 
moral virtue in establishing personal reputation, they could not prevent many 
contemporaries from indulging themselves in the vain glory of the trivial fashion and 
the praise of others. The material consumption and superficial sociability in polite 
society distorted the notion of honour, and accordingly led to a growth of what 
contemporaries termed ‘false shame’. People with this false sense of shame, as many 
moral writers observed, blushed for virtuous behaviour, and felt ashamed for being 
counted unfashionable. 
Chapter four examines shame in the context of print culture. This chapter draws 
on learning from the existing historiography of print culture and crime literature. 
Historians of this area have talked much about how early modern media reported and 
commented on crime, and how print contributed to shaping the public knowledge of 
crime. They agree about the generally moralistic perspective of crime writings before 
the eighteenth century, arguing that publications such as criminal biographies, gallows 
literature, trial reports, and murder pamphlets, though always lurid and sensational in 
form, were didactic and normative in intent. The moral function of crime literature was 
reflected in the fact that it often placed greater emphasis on the confession and 
penitence of the convicted criminal than on the sensationalism of the crime itself.50 
                                                             
50 J.A. Sharpe, ‘“Last Dying Speeches”: Religion, Ideology and Public Execution in Seventeenth-
Century England’, Past and Present, vol. 107 (1985), pp. 144-167; Lincoln B. Faller, Turned to 
Account: The Forms and Functions of Criminal Biography in Late Seventeenth- and Early 
Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1987), p. 46; Joy Wiltenberg, Disorderly Women and 
Female Power in the Street Literature of Early Modern England and Germany (Charlottesville and 
London, 1992), p. 211; Joad Raymond, Making the News: An Anthology of the Newsbooks of 
Revolutionary England 1641–1660 (Moreton-in-Marsh, 1993), p. 295; Peter Lake and Michael 
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Historians have pointed out that from the late seventeenth century onwards the crime 
literature, although never abandoning its moral function, began to distance itself from 
the didactic, conservative tone.51 This shift is particularly evidenced by scandalous 
publications dedicated to reporting the sexual scandals of aristocrats and social elites. 
David Turner notices an innovation of language which was used to describe illicit 
sexual behaviour; that is, formerly harsh and negative words such as ‘adultery’ and 
‘whoredom’ were replaced by more soft, forgiving ones like ‘gallantry’, ‘intrigue’, or 
‘amour’.52  Other historians such as Dabhoiwala and Donna Andrew focus on the 
impact of the growing sensational and ambiguous tone in representing crimes and 
scandals. They argue that the increasing printed material about the extra-marital liaisons 
                                                             
Questier, The Antichrist’s Lewd Hat: Protestants, Papists and Players in Post-Reformation England 
(New Haven and London, 2002). 
51 Lincoln Faller notes a contradictory and ambivalent portrayal of highway robbers, and shows 
how such romantic representation of highwaymen as courageous, daring, and courteous anti-heroes 
fascinated the mass audience and, to some extent, softened the public’s attitudes towards criminal 
roguery. Robert Shoemaker attributes the remarkably positive image of the ‘gentleman highwayman’ 
which emerged in the mid-eighteenth century to the impact of the rising print industry and the 
popularity of ideals of civility and politeness. John Brewer in his study of the famous case of the 
murder of Martha Ray in 1779, mistress of the Earl of Sandwich, observes a growing sentimental 
and commiserative tone in portraying even the most brutal murderers in the popular press of the 
time. Historians have also noted a shift in the representation of female criminals from being a target 
of condemnation to a subject worthy of sympathy and reform. See Faller, Turned to Account, 
chapter.8; Robert Shoemaker, ‘The Street Robber and the Gentleman Highwayman: Changing 
Representations and Perceptions of Robbery in London, 1690-1800’, Cultural and Social History, 
vol. 3 (2006), pp. 381-405; also see Gillian Spraggs, Outlaws and Highwaymen: The Cult of the 
Robber in England from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century (London, 2001) and J.A. Sharpe, 
Dick Turpin: The Myth of the English Highwayman (London, 2004). John Brewer, Sentimental 
Murder: Love and Madness in the Eighteenth Century (London, 2005), Chapter 3; Sandra Clark, 
Women and Crime in the Street Literature of Early Modern England (New York, 2003), pp. 39-61; 
Katherine Binhammer, The Seduction Narrative in Britain, 1747-1800 (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 40-
71, 161-7; Robert Shoemaker, ‘Print and the Female Voice: Representations of Women’s Crime in 
London’, Gender and History, vol. 22, 1 (2010), pp. 75-91; Jennie Batchelor, ‘“Industry in Distress”: 
Reconfiguring Femininity and Labour in the Magdalen House,’ Eighteenth-Century Life, vol. 28 
(2004), pp. 1-20; Tim Hitchcock, English Sexualities, 1700-1800 (New York, 1997), Chapter 7; 
Vivien Jones, ‘Scandalous Femininity: Prostitution and Eighteenth–Century Narrative’, in Dario 
Castiglione and Lesley Sharpe (eds), Shifting the Boundaries: Transformation of the Languages of 
Public and Private in the Eighteenth Century (Exeter,1995), p. 55. 
52  David M. Turner, Fashioning Adultery: Gender, Sex and Civility in England, 1660-1740 
(Cambridge, 2002), chapter 1 and 2.  
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of the nobility offered an expanded forum in which aristocratic vice and their sexual 
affairs could be openly talked about by the populace.53 Vic Gatrell’s study of visual 
satire which flourished in the second half of the eighteenth century has increased our 
knowledge of how impolite matters of sex became a major subject of representation in 
this genre, and how they were exploited for the purposes of both shaming the upper 
classes and amusing the reading public.54 
The above-mentioned works only sporadically mention shame, but they are 
illuminating because they imply a close connection between shame and crime or 
scandal literature. Indeed, crime and scandal are associated with shame, insofar as they 
are behaviours deemed infamous and shameful. It is therefore worth asking how shame 
was represented in criminal and scandalous prints between the mid-seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, and how these prints in turn reflected and influenced the 
contemporaries’ senses of shame. Did the audience feel embarrassment and shame 
when reading the stories of those conventionally disgraceful sexual misconducts such 
as prostitution, seduction, and adultery? Did the popularity of printed media materials 
about aristocratic vice and the extensive representations of sexual matters lead to a 
growth of an unblushing readership and a culture of shamelessness? How did people 
                                                             
53 Faramerz Dabhoiwala, The Origins of Sex: A History of the First Sexual Revolution (London, 
2012), Chapter 6; Donna T. Andrew, Aristocratic Vice: The Attack on Duelling, Suicide, Adultery, 
and Gambling in Eighteenth-Century England (New Heaven, 2013), chapter 4. 
54 Vic Gatrell, City of Laughter: Sex and Satire in Eighteenth-Century London (London, 2006). 
Also see Lynda M. Thompson, The ‘Scandalous Memoirists’: Constantia Phillis, Laetitia Pilkington 
and the Shame of ‘Public Fame’ (Manchester, 2000); Cindy McCreery, ‘Keeping up with the Bon 
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(London, 1997), pp. 207-29; Peter Wagner, ‘The Pornographer in the Courtroom: Trial reports about 
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comment on these scandalous prints? These questions, drawn from the implications of 
the above works, lie at the heart of chapter four. 
In order to answer these questions, I regard shame as a general reference to 
shameful transgressions, a form of public humiliation through print, a news commodity, 
and an emotion or sentiment that the perpetrator expressed, the writer intended to 
reinforced, and the reader experienced. The chapter sets out to examine printed ballads, 
criminal pamphlets, and trial accounts between the mid-seventeenth and early-
eighteenth centuries. It then concentrates on materials about sexual scandals in high 
circles before and after the mid-eighteenth century; in particular, the chapter explores 
how newspapers, magazines, and satires engaged in ‘a shame economy’. In the final 
section of chapter four, I investigate contemporary attitudes to the rise of scandal 
journalism and its impact on contemporary notions of shame. Overall, this chapter 
demonstrates that the eighteenth century witnessed a growing sensationalism of crime 
and scandalous prints and the commodification of shame. While seventeenth-century 
criminal prints were characterised by their general moral and didactic perspectives, and 
aimed to inculcate readers with a moral sense of shame, their eighteenth-century 
counterparts were becoming notorious for the writers and publishers’ shameless 
preoccupation with the sensational details of upper-class corruption. This shameless 
representation of conventionally shameful subjects raised anxiety and criticism among 
contemporary writers, making them believe that they were living in an era without 
shame, in which, as they observed, the audience no longer blushed to read the stories 
about crime and depravity, which they should have treated with abhorrence and shame. 
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In the fifth chapter, I return to the theme which is familiar to historians interested 
in shame, namely shaming penalties. One important question that this chapter seeks to 
explore is why offences such as adultery, sodomy, and different sorts of cheating like 
fraud and perjury were more likely to incur shaming punishments. This is an important 
but rather neglected topic, though recent scholarship does shed some light on it. For 
example, Jörg Wettlaufer finds that breakdowns in mutual trust and cooperative 
relationships constituted the largest amount of offences leading to shaming 
punishments in historical French and German societies.55 Nash and Kilday also argue 
that in pre-modern Britain ‘challenges to the authority and reputation of the 
community’s infrastructure and machinery were those most likely to be punished 
through the sentence of the pillory’.56 Their discussions imply that, as I shall argue, 
shaming punishments were mostly constructed in the context of a social relationship. 
Through investigating the link between concepts of infamy and shame in the contexts 
of both community and court, I argue that there existed a causal relationship between 
the nature of crime and the form of punishment in early modern society. The use of 
public shaming was not random or indiscriminate; crimes that were usually deemed 
‘shameful’ or ‘infamous’ by the populace were more likely to be punished by shame. 
This close association between the nature of crime and the pattern of punishment 
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indicates that shame as a consequence of moral judgment was socially constructed, and 
that shame as a judicial sanction was a product of negotiation between the authorities 
and the communities. This finding is important, since it helps to explain why judicial 
shaming punishments encountered a crisis in the eighteenth century, and particularly in 
London. As we shall see, the infliction of shaming punishment on offenders whose 
transgression were not commonly deemed ‘shameful’ or ‘infamous’ always led to 
popular protest and violence at the site of the pillory. Besides, judicial shaming penalties 
were becoming unable to effectively evoke offenders and spectators’ moral senses of 
shame, and even risked the danger of turning them into shameless monsters. These 
problems made shaming punishments a subject of debate. While reformist 
commentators criticised the excessive and stigmatising use of shaming devices, many 
authors acknowledged the important role of shame in the judicial and penal system. In 
essence, therefore, this chapter offers a further example of the importance of social 
factors in interpreting and deciding shame, and the uncertainty of the moral and 
disciplinary value of shame. 
Collectively, by scrutinising shame through the lens of religion, politeness, print 
culture, and punishment, this thesis demonstrates that in early modern Britain shame 
could be social as well as personal, morally virtuous as well as morally irrelevant or 
even bad. While in a religious context, shame was primarily a private, self-imposed 
emotion concerned with personal salvation, shame in a more secular context was always 
interpreted and experienced as a socially-constructed emotion or idea dealing with a 
person’s public honour. Early modern contemporaries praised the great moral and 
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disciplinary value of shame. Religious, polite, and legal writers emphasised the 
importance of keeping a moral sense of shame; they saw shame as a sign of penitence 
and piety, an inward restraint keeping people away from temptation and sin, a means to 
define and enforce codes of behaviour and shared social or legal values, and a powerful 
weapon to chastise and deter deviance. However, the moral and disciplinary 
characteristics were not immutable. Shame could be harmful to personal reputation and 
polite communication when it was expressed as a timid, bashful disposition. Besides, 
the superficial sociability, the pursuit of trivial fashion and vain-glory, the popularity of 
scandalous publications, and the abuse of shaming punishments were factors that threw 
the moral and disciplinary value of shame into crisis. 
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Chapter Two 
Experiencing Shame in Spiritual Lives 
 
Introduction 
In his well-known spiritual autobiography, Grace Abounding to Chief of Sinners (1665), 
John Bunyan recalled that he once experienced ‘continual affliction and shame’ when 
he thought of the saints who ‘did both in their words, their carriages, and all their 
expressions of tenderness, fear to sin against their precious Saviour’. This sense of 
‘great shame and astonishment’ occurred again when Bunyan realised that his sin was 
a ‘most barbarous, and a filthy crime’, which ‘had horribly abused the holy Son of 
God’. 57  Similarly, the eighteenth-century Irish Methodist preacher Thomas Walsh 
wrote in his diary, ‘I felt much shame before the Lord today, for my unfaithfulness and 
unfruitfulness’. After a few days Walsh lamented again: ‘sorrow and concern, and with 
shame, and much brokenness of heart bowed my soul before the Lord.’58 
Bunyan and Thomas Walsh’s examples represent the typical way in which early 
modern Protestants experienced the religious emotion of shame. As we shall see in this 
chapter, countless Christians recorded their exercises of self-humiliation and feelings 
of shame in spiritual diaries. In Protestant devotional lives, shame was a recurrent 
emotion that was mostly felt in self-examination and repentance. It arose from a 
negative judgement on the self with regard to the grievous apprehension of personal sin, 
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negligence of religious duty, failure to procure the assurance of salvation, and being 
underserving of the mercy of God. Moreover, shame was a continual disposition or 
psychological state that was closely connected with self-abasement and a sense of 
unworthiness. People who were prone to shame in this way acknowledged the 
omnipotent nature of God and the lowliness of the self, and tended to regard themselves 
as a ‘worm’ or ‘dust’.59 Although always grievous, religious shame was nevertheless, 
I shall argue, considered to be a moral emotion that everyone should have in order to 
come nearer to God. Preachers, clergymen, and theologians saw shamefacedness as a 
sign of piety, and praised feelings of shame as proof of true repentance, a means to resist 
temptation and sin, and a way to bring glory to God. People without a sense of shame 
would bring ruin upon themselves. Thus, seeing shame as ‘one of the greatest restraints 
from sin which God hath laid upon humane nature’, John Tillotson, the late 
seventeenth-century archbishop of Canterbury, warned that ‘there must be shame, 
without which there is no hope of amendment’.60 
 
‘Let Us Shame Ourselves’: the Calvinist Sense of Shame 
Before scrutinising real examples of Calvinists’ feelings of shame, it is necessary to 
provide an overview of general features of their beliefs and spirituality. The most 
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important question for Calvinists is, as John Bunyan put it, ‘How can I be saved?’61 
Acknowledging total depravity of human beings and their inability to save themselves 
through their own merits, Calvinists stressed the necessity of God’s divine grace as the 
only way for salvation. According to the Calvinist doctrine of double predestination, 
before the creation of the world God has already predestined some people for salvation, 
and at the same time ordained the remainder to eternal damnation for their sins.62 As 
redemption entirely depended on the will of God rather than human efforts, Calvinists 
found it difficult to enjoy certainty about the assurance of election. The anxiety over 
whether the self had been saved by God thus led Calvinists to strict introspection and 
self-discipline, through which they examined their lives in detail in order to search for 
evidences of sin and mercy. Calvinists emphasised the significance of purging the soul 
and confession of sins through strict self-examination and repentance because they saw 
such spiritual exercises as the result of the work of the Holy Spirit and proof of an act 
of divine grace. Besides, Calvinists insisted on the ultimate authority of the Bible, 
seeing reading Scripture as an important way to communicate with God and gain 
knowledge for self-reformation. These private devotions were more rigorously 
practiced by Calvinistic Puritans. And these Puritans were further noted for their zeal 
for familial and public worship, and especially their insistence on strict sabbatarianism. 
Self-examination, Bible reading, and public worship thus not only constituted the major 
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forms Calvinists’ devotional exercises, but also shaped the central aspects of Calvinist 
spirituality. 
The characteristics of Calvinist spirituality – their acknowledgement of total 
depravity, their great watchfulness for sins, their emphasis on the direct revelation of 
God, and their rigorous introspection and commitment to domestic and public worship 
– helped to decide when, why and how Calvinists experienced shame. Thus, we find 
that Calvinists always felt shame when they became aware of their sins. In his diary, 
Michael Wigglesworth, a Puritan minister and poet who lived in seventeenth-century 
New England, recorded that ‘I am afraid and asham’d and unable to see God still loving 
me’ when he found himself was encompassed by ‘innumerable evils’. 63  Henry 
Newcome, an English non-conformist preacher of the mid to later seventeenth century, 
also lamented that ‘I am much ashamed and confounded for my sin’.64 A more detailed 
description of the inward affliction of shame comes from his contemporary, Bunyan, 
who once felt too ashamed of his sins and backsliding to ‘look God in the face’: 
[It] was hard for me now, to have the face to pray to this Christ for mercy, against 
Whom I had thus most vilely sinned: ‘twas hard work, I say, to offer to look Him 
in the face, against Whom I had so vilely sinned; and indeed, I have found it as 
difficult to come to God by prayer, after backsliding from Him, as to do any other 
thing. Oh! the shame that did now attend me! especially when I thought, I am 
now a-going to pray to Him for mercy, that I had so lightly esteemed but a while 
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before! I was ashamed; yea, even confounded, because this villainy had been 
committed by me.65 
While Calvinists stressed that ‘shame and sorrow ever follow sin’, we should be 
aware that it is wrong to judge the ‘sin’ simply in the light of our modern values. In fact, 
the religious definition of sin was much broader than that of today: it not only included 
crime and moral wrongdoings, but could refer to the slightest slip in deed or perception. 
For Calvinists, even natural affections relating to love could be dangerous and sinful, 
and could excite a deep emotion of shame, if they stood in the way of a godly life. 
Samuel Rogers, a young diarist and a later Puritan minister, saw his frequent contact 
and association with a certain ‘M. S.’ – most probably a woman who was ‘attractive to 
Rogers’ and at the same time ‘charmed by him’ – as a ‘snare’ and ‘bait’ that he felt 
‘ashamed’ to mention in his diary.66 Rogers considered his ‘amorous affections’ for her 
as ‘lascivious thoughts’, possibly because matters of love prevented him from engaging 
in religious duties. Thus, many times after he had met or thought of ‘M. S.’, Rogers felt 
that he required ‘a great deal of humility and shame’, which made him ‘overwhelmed 
with melancholye’ and ‘ashamed to looke up to God’.67 
The ‘coldness’ or ‘dullness’ of a private religious service and the neglect of public 
worship were further recurrent reasons for experiencing shame. As the Anglican 
theologian and leading puritan Richard Sibbes (1577–1635) wrote, ‘there was never a 
child of God of a dull temper and disposition, but he was shamed that he should yet not 
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have a heart more enlarged to bless God.’68 In June 1635 Samuel Rogers recorded in 
his dairy that ‘my services so weake I am ashamed to write’, and that ‘I am ashamed to 
consider this weeke past, I am wholly undeserving, dead, dull, unsavory’.69 In April 
1662, Henry Newcome similarly wrote that he was much ‘ashamed and weary’ of the 
‘deadness’ and ‘feebleness’ of his spirit.70  Wigglesworth, furthermore, recorded in 
1653 that he wanted to ‘hang down my head with shame before god’.71 Ralph Thoresby, 
an antiquarian and non-conformist diarist, repeatedly recorded his self-accusation and 
intense experience of ‘shame and grief’ for neglecting godly exercises with his families. 
On the Sabbath in April 1680, Thoresby attended a sermon on the necessity of singing 
psalms, and was overwhelmed with a deep experience of sorrow and shame: 
[T]hough it has formerly been the constant practice of this family… I must 
confess the neglect of it now, it being an aggravation of sorrow, and bringing my 
inexpressible loss more freshly to remembrance. Methinks, I hear his very voice, 
that with renewed pangs I am constrained to crouch to the bottom of the pew, and 
there vent my sorrow in plenty of tears; so that, never yet, to my shame do I record 
it, was I able to sing one line in public or private.72 
Thoresby was not idle or impious; as a scholar and local councilman, he spent much of 
his time writing and involved in community affairs. Like Samuel Rogers, Thoresby was 
greatly troubled when he saw that this social activity had impeded his spiritual service. 
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On 25 April 1702, spending all morning on the memoirs which were being prepared for 
the press, Thoresby ‘deferred family prayer till noon’. In the afternoon, he was 
‘unhappily sent for by Alderman Dixon and Mr. Barker, under colour of business, but 
indeed to engage my vote for the next election of an alderman’. Seeing that all-day 
business ‘prevented my attendance at the prayers’, Thoresby wrote that he was unable 
to ‘reflect upon it without shame and grief’.73 Once again, the entry for the Sabbath on 
14 September 1712 reads that ‘I was also much troubled at the prospect of too much of 
this holy day’s being unsuitably spent’.74 
While shame had always occurred as an immediate and temporary emotion upon 
the self-awareness of personal sins and spiritual laxity, the Calvinist sense of shame 
was also a continual psychological state, or inner disposition closely connected with a 
sense of lowliness, impotence, and unworthiness. This sort of shame was essentially an 
inward practice of self-humiliation or abasement; unlike the sense of guilt that entailed 
specific sins, the self-abasing experience of shame involved a negative judgement about 
the self, requiring people to keep a humble heart, to abhor themselves, and to 
acknowledge their depraved nature and inferior status in everyday spiritual lives.  
While shame and humiliation are considered as synonymous inward experiences, 
what were the relationship and differences between them in Calvinists’ spirituality? 
Simplified greatly, shame was one of the major outcomes of humiliation; a person 
overwhelmed with inward humiliation would experience a cluster of emotions, 
including not only shame, but also guilt, sorrow, and fear. As Richard Sibbes 
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commented, ‘Inward humiliation, besides spiritual conviction, is when there are 
affections of humiliation. And what be those? Shame, sorrow, fear, and such like penal 
afflictive affections.’75 The Puritan clergyman Thomas Manton also wrote that ‘True 
humiliation is begun in fear, continued in shame, carried on by sorrow, and endeth in 
indignation’.76 The experience of humiliation and the consequent affection of shame 
led to a ‘humblenesse of minde’, which was, as John Preston claimed, ‘a base esteeming 
of a man’s selfe in an acknowledgement of his unworthinesse to receive any grace with 
a high esteeme of God’s love.’77 
A typical example of this self-abasing experience of shame is found in the dairy 
of Cotton Mather (1663-1728), a puritan minister in America: ‘sensible that I am 
nothing, have nothing, do nothing, but in an entire Dependence upon Him. I confessed 
before the Lord, my exceeding Unworthiness of all His Favours; and how unworthy I 
am to be accepted or assisted in His Praises. I went over the Articles of my Vileness, 
with all Self-Abasement.’78 The vicar of Earls Colne in Essex Ralph Josselin (1617 – 
1683) repeatedly wrote in his diary, ‘I am nothing in my owne eyes, nay Lord worse 
then nothing.’79 Bunyan saw himself as low, and even lower than ‘a toad’: ‘I was more 
loathsome in mine own eyes than was a toad, and I thought I was so in God’s eyes too… 
I thought now, that everyone had a better heart than I had… I fell therefore at the sight 
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of my own vileness deeply; for I concluded, that this condition that I was in, could not 
stand with a state of grace.’80 Similarly, Elizabeth White, a godly woman living in the 
mid-seventeenth century, recorded her sense of humiliation and abasement in her 
spiritual autobiography The Experiences of God’s Gracious (1669): ‘when I have seen 
a Spider, which of all Things is most loathsome to me, I have been ready to wish myself 
such a one, esteeming of it to be in a far happier Condition than I was’.81 
The willingness to maintain a humble heart in spiritual lives means that pride – an 
emotion which was at odds with shame and humility – should be suppressed. An 
investigation into Calvinists’ diaries reveals their great sensitivity and watchfulness 
with regards to pride. More importantly, in order to combat a proud heart, Calvinists 
desired spiritual humility and embraced that self-abasing emotion of shame. Thus, on 
12 November 1636, realising that ‘the Lord is angry for the base pride of my heart, for 
my lightness, selfe seeking’, Samuel Rogers begged God to humble him.82 In Michael 
Wigglesworth’s diary, we find that for a very long time he was obsessed with ‘pride and 
vain thoughts’, and had been at great pains to curb his proud heart. An entry for 
February of 1653 reads ‘pride I feel still again and again abounding, self-admiration, 
though destroying myself daily… ah Lord I am vile, I desire to abhor myself before 
these things’.83 The next day, he confessed that his pride and vain thoughts were 
‘remarkably prevailing’, and that he was ‘unable to beat into my heart any great 
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affection of sorrow or shame’. 84  Wigglesworth’s pride continued and sometimes 
became acute. At the end of May 1653, he recorded that ‘I find pride so beset to trample 
upon my spirit in all I do (even this day I feel it) that with confusion of face I confess 
myself to be above measure vile’.85 On 8 July 1655, Ralph Josselin desired to loath 
himself when he found that his ‘heart exceeding vain, full of foolish wanderings after 
things that cannot profit’.86 Similarly, Cotton Mather desired to be humbled each time 
he found his heart ensnared in pride; as he wrote in 1681: ‘I did endeavour to humble 
myself this Day, as for my Unprofitableness in every Relation and my other manifold 
Corruptions, thus especially for my PRIDE, with the several Manifestations of it.’87 On 
another occasion, Mather wrote in 7 November 1711 that ‘upon a proud Thought, I will 
immediately form a Thought that shall carry the greatest Self-abasement, and Self-
abhorrence in it’.88 
The above examples suggest that shame – whether as a psychological response to 
sins, and spiritual laxity, or as an inward disposition to self-abasement and humiliation 
– was an individual, private emotion experienced by Calvinists in self-examination and 
repentance, without the actual presence of others’ external judgement. This refutes the 
traditional view that shame is entirely a social emotion. The question, however, is why 
people still felt shame, even if they were able to hide their secret sins from the eyes and 
knowledge of men. One explanation is that Christians believed that God could see 
everything. Thus, Thomas Gouge, a Presbyterian clergyman, wrote in 1661 that ‘we 
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may hide our secret sins from the eyes of men, yet it is impossible to hide them from 
the all-seeing Eye of God, who seeth all… But seeing God is present in all places, it is 
impossible thou shouldest hide thy sins from his all-seeing Eye; and therefore never be 
encouraged to sin in hope of secrecy’.89 Tillotson likewise warned, ‘whenever we 
commit any Wickedness, we do it under the Eye of the great Judge of the World, who 
steadfastly beholds us, and whose Omnipotent Justice stands by us ready armed and 
charge for our Destruction, and can in a moment cut us off.’90 
Examples of feelings of shame provoked by the omniscient eyes of God are 
prevalent in Calvinists’ dairies and spiritual autobiographies. Bunyan recorded that one 
day, when he was ‘in the midst of a game of Cat’: 
[A] voice did suddenly dart from heaven into my soul, which said, Wilt thou leave 
thy sins and go to heaven, or have thy sins and go to hell? At this I was put to an 
exceeding maze; wherefore leaving my cat upon the ground, I looked up to 
heaven, and was, as if I had, with the eyes of my understanding, seen the Lord 
Jesus looking down upon me, as being very hotly displeased with me, and as if 
He did severely threaten me with some grievous punishment for these and other 
ungodly practices.91 
Bunyan did not mention whether he was ashamed at that moment, but the ‘hotly 
displeased’ God surely created a highly unpleasant atmosphere in which emotions such 
as fear, shame, and guilt would be stirred up. Seeing that John Reads ‘fell to dronkennes, 
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to neglect God in ordinances, the communion of his people, followed idle company’, 
and that he ‘keepes out of mans sights in regard of the shame’, Ralph Josselin pleaded 
with God: ‘but thy eye is every where oh God, rebuke him that he may returne and 
live’.92 On 2 October 1648, Josselin wrote, ‘the Lord discover truth, shame us in our 
selves and preserve us from reproach’.93  Similarly, in June 1684 Ralph Thoresby 
acknowledged that he was ‘often most deeply affected in meditation, and had reason to 
ascribe all disappointments and afflictions’ to his sins, which ‘though not many visible 
to carnal eyes, are all open to the All-seeing.’94 
Besides fearing the all-seeing eyes of God, Calvinists regarded the witness and 
judgement of conscience as another reason for arousing the emotion of shame. The 
significant role of conscience in Calvinist and especially Puritan spirituality was 
repeatedly emphasised by contemporary theologians. They argued that conscience was 
God’s watchman and spokesman in a man’s soul, and could take notice and bear witness 
to a man’s every sinful thought, word, and deed, and fill him with shame and confusion. 
William Fenner, an early seventeenth-century Puritan divine, wrote that ‘we have 
conscience as a continuall watch-man, espying out all our ways, setting down whatever 
we do amisse, checking us for it for the present, and one day accusing us before God 
and setting all things in order before our faces.95 According to Sibbes, ‘God hath set 
and planted in man this court of conscience… wherein he keeps his first judgement, 
wherein he keeps his assizes. And conscience doth all the parts. It registereth, it 
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witnesseth, it accuseth, it judgeth, it executes, it doth all.’96 As a register, ‘conscience 
keeps diaries’ and ‘sets down whatsoever we have done exactly.’97 As a witness, it 
beholds everything and ‘telles me what I think… what I desire, as well as what I speak, 
and what I do’.98 Since ‘God’s spy in our bosoms’ could discover all sins in the dark, 
He would impose painful feelings of shame and sorrow on people whenever they 
committed any wickedness in its sight.99 Comparing the affections and conscience to 
the executioners and judge, Sibbes argued that when ‘conscience accuseth of any sin, 
either of omission or commission’, it would ‘take revenge and correction by our own 
affections’ such as ‘grief, sorrow, and shame’. 100  William Fenner believed that a 
wronged conscience would pull down people who lived in sin, and ‘then their affections 
are stirred exceedingly: they may weep, and sigh, and groan, and tremble, and be 
ashamed of their doings; they may be humbled thus before they are turned.’ 101 
Similarly, Thomas Manton wrote that ‘conscience is whipped with a scourge of six 
strings: fear, horror, distrust, grief, rage, and shame’.102 John Flavel, a seventeenth-
century Presbyterian clergyman, warned people never to sin in the hope of concealment, 
because ‘shame ariseth from the turpitude of discovered actions’, and ‘the shaming of 
conscience are insufferable torments.’103 ‘Oh what a shame will cover our Faces, when 
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Conscience shall Reproach us’, wrote Henry Stubbes, a non-conformist preacher.104 
Despite being grievous and painful, the emotion of shame arising from the judgement 
of conscience was valuable; thus Stubbs suggested, ‘Repent of that before the Lord, 
which Conscience reproacheth you for, mourn for it, be ashamed of it, judge and 
condemn your selves for what is past, resolve against it for the time to come; this is a 
good course.’105 
Shame was a painful and unavoidable emotion that arose from the self-awareness 
of sin, impiety, and unworthiness. But in a spiritual context, shame was by no means a 
morally bad or harmful emotion, as has been often asserted by modern scholars. We 
have seen that Calvinists embraced shame and self-humiliation through diligent and 
rigorous introspection in their everyday spiritual lives. How, then, did they evaluate this 
emotion? 
To begin with, all Calvinist theologians accepted shame as a moral, reformative 
emotion. The Puritan divine John Howe (1630-1705) asserted that the emotion of shame, 
‘if by proper application… would contribute more to the reforming a vicious world, 
than most other methods’.106 A practical function of experiencing shame was to resist 
and prevent sin. As Sibbes wrote, ‘sin brings forth sorrow, shame, and grief, which are 
a means to cure sin.’107 The Anglican clergyman John Wilkins (1614-1672) regarded 
shame as ‘one of the most powerful curbs to restrain men from unworthy courses’, and 
argued that if a man lost all sense of shame, ‘there is little hope that any thing else 
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should prevail’.108 Another Anglican clergy William Gurnall (1617-1679) similarly 
saw shame and sorrow as ‘a gracious soule’ that everyone should ‘feele in his bosome 
for his sinful miscarriage’.109 When people had committed any sinful behaviour they 
should at once inculcate a deep sense of shame, sorrow, and abhorrence: ‘when thou 
hast found the sin that has done thee the mischief, then labour to fill thy heart with 
shame for it, and indignation against it, and so go big with sorrow, and cast it forth 
before the Lord in a heart-breaking confession.’ 110  The Puritan divine Stephen 
Charnock (1628-1680) saw shame a ‘holy emotion’, and argued that ‘the greater the 
shame, the greater the hatred of the occasion of that shame, and the more exact the 
watchfulness against it’.111 Therefore, in order to break with sins, and to magnify the 
mercy of God, Charnock urged people to look back upon former sin with ‘anger and 
shame’. 112  Moreover, theologians argued that a prompt self-inculcation of shame 
helped to prevent greater shame in the future. As Sibbes wrote, ‘is it not better to take 
shame to ourselves now, than to be shamed hereafter before angels, devils, and men? 
How careful is God to us, by this private way to prevent future shame!’ But to those 
who sought to conceal sin in the dark and refused to shame themselves, Sibbes warned 
that they ‘shall be ashamed before God and his angels at the day of judgment, and shall 
be tormented in hell for ever’. 113  Other writers, such as John Tillotson and the 
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Presbyterian minister William Bates, argued that the timely and sorrowful confession 
of sin with deep shame ‘will prevent the exposing the sinner to public shame 
hereafter’.114 In view of the reformative nature of shame, therefore, Richard Baxter 
remarked: ‘it is better to go to heaven with the shame of a penitent confession, than to 
keep your honour till you are in hell.’115 
Besides seeing shame as a reformative power that helped to combat and prevent 
sins, theologians regarded the self-abasing emotion of shame, or what they commonly 
termed ‘self-humiliation’, as a penitential and devotional experience. They emphasised 
the significance of self-humiliation in devotional lives, arguing that only if people 
brought themselves low and vile in their own eyes and acknowledged their 
unworthiness could they surrender to God, glorify Him, keep holiness of life, and 
receive unspeakable joy and surpassing peace. In order to humble the self, the first step 
is to acknowledge the omnipotence of God. Stephen Charnock claimed that ‘the 
thoughts of his glory would put our low and sordid souls to the blush, and shame our 
base and unworthy affections, so unsuitable to the glory of our head’. 116  Sibbes 
encouraged people to ‘consider His wisdom, holiness, power, and strength, with our 
own’, since ‘it will make us abhor ourselves, and repent in dust and ashes’.117 Self-
abasement was a preparation for receiving grace. Sibbes further stated as follows: ‘Let 
us labour to work our hearts to humility, into true sorrow, shame, true fear, that so we 
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may have God to pity and respect us, who only doth regard a humble soul.’118 Baxter 
encouraged people to humble and demean themselves, since ‘humility is to other graces 
as the morning star is to the sun, that goes before it, and follows it in the evening. 
Humility prepares us for the receiving of grace’. 119  But if people refused to ‘be 
converted and become as little children’, as Baxter warned, ‘they shall not enter into 
the kingdom of heaven.’120 For Baxter, therefore, self-humiliation is a daily, repeated, 
and continually inward practice which people should seize every opportunity to 
exercise: ‘Make use of humbling occasions to exercise your self-denial and lowliness 
of mind, for God will give you humbling occasions enough, when he seeth good; but 
when he doth it, be sure that you improve them to the abasing of yourselves.’121 
The most important way of provoking and experiencing spiritual shame was 
rigorous self-examination and sincere repentance in everyday devotional life. Thomas 
Gouge argued that ‘a frequent confession of a sin will make a man ashamed thereof, 
and more watchful over himself, that he fall not into the same sin again’.122 Seeing that 
‘a deep humiliation is necessary for salvation,’ John Preston claimed that in order to be 
‘thoroughly humbled’ and ‘fully broken hearted’, people should examine themselves 
often: ‘seeing your life to abound with actual sins, then look into your heart and nature, 
which is wholly corrupted, and the root of all evil.’123 According to Baxter, ‘a free, 
self-abasing confession’ was crucial for experiencing shame, and that through 
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meditation of heaven and confession of sins, people would feel a series of ‘contrary and 
more mixed passions’, including ‘hatred and detestation’, ‘godly fear’, ‘grief’, ‘godly 
shame’, and ‘holy anger or indignation’.124 Tillotson saw private confession as a more 
important means to embrace shame and humiliation than attending public worship; 
therefore, he suggested, ‘we should do well, on the Day before the public Fast, or at 
least the Morning before we go to the public Assembly, to humble ourselves before God 
in our families, and especially in our Closets; confessing to Him, with great shame and 
sorrow, all the particular Sins and Offences.’125 
While theologians pointed out that shame could not occur without self-examination 
and repentance, they also emphasised that repentance would not be sincere or effective 
without experiencing holy shame. ‘There could be no sincere Confession of sin and 
Repentance for it,’ wrote Tillotson, ‘without testifying their shame, and Confusion of 
Face upon the remembrance of their sins.’ 126  Puritans likewise argued that ‘the 
confession of sin must be mixed with shame’.127 As Sibbes claimed, ‘the way to cover 
our sin is to uncover it by confession… And this confession must be serious, thorough, 
humble, with grief, shame, and hatred.’128 John Owen advised that people should fill 
themselves with ‘shame and self-abhorrency’ through meditation because this ‘holy 
shame’ is ‘one ground of all those severe self-reflections’. Only if a man ‘is ashamed 
of, and abased in, himself for every sin’, as Owen claimed, ‘doth faith evidence itself 
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and its own sincerity’.129 Thomas Gouge urged people to confess their evil nature and 
practices before the Lord, and ‘give not over until thou feel shame to cover thy face, 
and sorrow to fill thine heart’.130 
Besides diligent self-examination and repentance, Calvinists saw diary keeping as 
another important way to experience and express the emotion of shame. As an extension 
of introspection, spiritual writings described the individual devotional exercises of 
meditation and confession, and recorded one’s sorrow for sin and signs of God’s mercy. 
As in meditation and repentance one ‘cannot reflect upon without the shame of face’,131 
in diaries people should also take note of their shame and humiliations. In his The 
Journal or Diary of A Thankful Christian (1656) John Beadle emphasised the 
significance of keeping a journal, arguing that in order to write a spiritual diary, one 
should examine himself every day: 
There is a book of three leaves thou shouldest read dayly to make up this Diary; 
the black leaf of thy own and others sins with shame and sorrow; the white leaf 
of Gods goodnesse, mercies with joy and thankfulnesse; the red leaf of Gods 
judgments felt, feared, threatned, with fear and trembling.132 
Reading this ‘book’ was, in fact, a process of self-examination; the spiritual dairy was 
a transcript of this book.133 Keeping a faithful account of every day devotional exercise 
was by no means an easy task; people often found themselves highly embarrassed and 
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ashamed to write down their sinful thoughts and deeds for fearing that this ‘sin-list’ 
would be one day used against them. Samuel Rogers wrote that ‘I am almost ashamed 
to set to writing concerning any thing… What shall I then? spunge out, this day out of 
the booke of my remembrance… or scratch the eyes of this days out; with Jobs Nailes 
of cursing’.134 Nehemiah Wallington, a Puritan artisan, also worried that ‘these my own 
hand writing shall be broght against mee’ in the final judgement.135 However, Beadle 
insisted that keeping such a diary was necessary: 
The keeping of such a Journall, especially if we look often into it, and read it, 
over will be a notable means to encrease in us that self-abasement & abhorrency 
of spirit that is most acceptable in the sight of God. The more we look upon the 
loving kindness of the Lord, the more vile shall we be in our owne eyes…Oh! 
how will the serious survey of such a Journal abase the soul before the Lord!136 
Keeping a faithful diary, and recording personal sins in it, would not only contribute to 
holiness of life, but bring glory to God. ‘I am ashamed in some kind’ to write down ‘the 
corruption of my nature, and filthynesse and deceitful of my hart’, as Wallington 
claimed, ‘yet my intent is to bring Glory to God by shaming myselfe’.137 
This evidence suggests that the religious sense of shame was individual and self-
imposed. However, it would be incorrect to think that social factors played no part in 
provoking or inculcating shame. It is in the nature of human beings that shame always 
occurs to some extent as a result of external judgements or the public exposure of 
                                                             
134 Rogers, The Diary, p. 6.  
135 Nehemiah Wallington, The Notebooks of Nehemiah Wallington, 1618-1654: A Selection, ed. 
David Booy (Aldershot and Burlington, 2007), p. 264. 
136 Beadle, The Journal or Diary of A Thankful Christian, p. 179.  
137 Wallington, The Notebooks, p. 29. 
50 
 
personal wrongdoing. But one question is worth considering, namely in what 
circumstance externally-imposed shame was necessary and valuable. Richard Baxter 
argued that if one found ‘difficulty in forsaking any disgraceful sin’, he should expose 
that sin to the public and desire to be shamed by ‘beholders’, because to lose others’ 
good opinion is ‘an easy price to prevent the loss of salvation’. Baxter acknowledged 
the usefulness of ‘the eye of others’ since human beings were always ‘dark and partial’ 
and inclined to ‘cover of all vices’.138 Thus he wrote, ‘Secrecy is the nest of sin, where 
it is kept warm, and hidden from disgrace; turn it out of this nest, and it will the sooner 
perish. God’s eye and knowledge should serve turn; but when it will not, let man know 
it also, and let the love of reputation help to subdue the love of lust.’139 Other Calvinist 
theologians agreed with the positive role of outside judgement, and regarded the fear of 
shame imposed by others as a means of self-restraint. For example, John Wilkins 
suggested that in order to preserve the self from being despised, one should keep his 
esteem ‘in the hearts of others’.140 
Although external judgements were important, Calvinist theologians nevertheless 
insisted that shame should, first and foremost, be a private emotion experienced through 
diligent self-examination. Acknowledging the benefit of the judgement of others, 
Baxter reminded people to be sure ‘not to make this a pretence to put off thy own duty 
of examining, but only use it as one of the last remedies, when thou findest thy own 
endeavours will not serve’.141 Other writers warned that people should never try to 
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criticise or shame others before examining and reforming themselves. In a sermon 
preached in 1675, Tillotson lamented that there are many Christians busy themselves 
‘in observing the errors and miscarriages of neighbour, and are forward to mark and 
censure the faults and follies of other men’, without turning their eyes inward and 
asking themselves ‘what have I done?’142  Thomas Manton claimed, ‘if we are to 
reprove others, let us take care that we be innocent ourselves, not culpable, but 
blameless. They that are faulty themselves cannot reprove others without blushing and 
great shame.’143 
Early modern Calvinists not just experienced, but embraced the emotion of shame 
through strict self-examination and repentance in their day-to-day spiritual life. 
Although it is common that shame often occurred as the result of outside disapproval, 
Calvinists inclined to interpret it as a private, self-imposed emotion. Shame always 
arose from the apprehension of personal sins and impiety. It was also a continual inner 
disposition or psychological state, in which the pious abased themselves and 
acknowledged their lowliness and unworthiness of the love of God. Shame was a 
grievous emotion, but in a spiritual context we find wholehearted approval of it. 
Christians recorded in diaries their willingness to be shamed in order to cleanse the soul 
and walk with God. Calvinist theologians described shame as a ‘penitential’, 
‘devotional’, ‘moral’, and overall, ‘holy’ emotion since it signified faith and piety. The 
private, positive nature of shame was largely defined by the Calvinist doctrines and 
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spirituality. Considering that Quaker theologies were at direct odds with Calvinism, an 
intriguing question thus arises, namely how early Quakers experienced and interpreted 
shame, and to what extent their sense of shame differed from Calvinists. It is these 
questions which the next section discusses. 
 
The Quakers’ Senses of Shame and their Shamelessness 
In order to understand the early Quaker sense of shame and how it differed from that of 
other Christian groups, we should first consider the main characteristics of Quaker 
spirituality. In essence, the Quakerism that emerged in the 1650s constituted a part of 
the Protestant movement, and in many respects had its roots in radical Puritan tradition. 
Like other sectarian groups of the time, Quakers were dissatisfied with the established 
church, and aimed to convert Christians to a more authentic, original form of 
Christianity. George Fox, the founder of the Quaker movement, after years of religious 
searching, had a revelation in 1647 that ‘there is one, even Christ Jesus, that can speak 
to thy condition.’144 The idea that everyone could have direct communion with God, 
and that the spiritual truth lay completely in God’s direct revelation, was essential for 
Quakerism. Believing that ‘Christ has come to teach his people himself’, the first 
Quakers denied all forms of outward sacrament, and regarded priests and their teachings 
as an obstruction that lay between humanity and God. They even denied the authority 
of the Bible, seeing it as a secondary rule, rather than the word of God itself. Quakers 
believed that the light of God was in every single person, and emphasised that the only 
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way to be saved was remain obedient to the guide of divine illumination. Salvation was 
available to everyone and could be experienced immediately in this world. The process 
of salvation was often described as ‘a return to the state of innocence of the Garden of 
Eden’; re-generated Quakers believed that they were reconciled with God, had purged 
their sins, acquired the power to resist temptation, and had entered into a state of 
perfection resembling, or perhaps even going beyond ‘the state of Adam which he was 
in before he fell’.145 
This transformative experience, or what early Quakers termed ‘convincement’, 
was crucial to understanding the Quaker sense of shame. Pink Dandelion generalises 
the process of Quaker convincement into six stages: 1) an in-breaking of God’s power, 
2) a realisation of how sinful the believer’s life had been, or a sense of conviction of 
sin, 3) a choice of hearty repentance, 4) being born again into perfection, or a measure 
of perfection, 5) gathering with other convinced Quakers, 6) calling ‘the world’ towards 
a new mode of religious experience.146 The first three stages can be seen as a process 
of convincement of sin and self-denial. That was a time of sorrow and agony, in which 
Quakers would experience a mixture of painful emotions, of which shame surely 
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constituted a major part. Here the Quaker experience of shame was much like that of 
Calvinists. It occurred as a result of the exposure of sins, and was considered as the 
prerequisite and impetus for sincere repentance. The in-breaking light of Christ played 
a critical role in provoking feelings of shame, because it was able to expose Quakers’ 
‘inadequacy, emptiness of purpose, or well buried guilt’, and compel them to repent 
sinful past and deny their totally-depraved selves.147 As George Fox claimed, ‘As the 
Light appeared, all appeared that is out of the Light, darkness, death, temptations, the 
unrighteous, the ungodly; all was manifest and seen in the Light.’148 
Francis Howgill, an early leader of the Quaker movement, recorded his inward 
sense of trouble during the early stages of convincement: 
As soon as I heard one declare that the Light of Christ in man was the way to 
Christ, I believed the eternal word of truth, and that of God in my conscience 
sealed to it… We all stood as condemned in our selves, and all saw our nakedness, 
and were all ashamed, though our glory was great in the world’s eye, but all was 
vanity… As I turned my mind within to the Light of Jesus Christ, all the things 
that I had ever done were brought to remembrance… And all that ever I had done 
was judged and condemned, all things were accursed. My eyes were dim with 
crying, my flesh did fail of fatness, my bones were dried and my sinews shrunk. 
I became a proverb to all... I sought to cover myself any way, or with anything, 
but could not. I would have run anywhere to have hid myself, but there was 
nothing but weeping, and gnashing of teeth, and sorrow, and terror I roared out 
                                                             
147 Barbour, The Quakers in Puritan England, pp. 98-9. 
148 The Journal of George Fox, p. 14. 
55 
 
for the disquietness of my heart; and the kingdom was full of darkness.149 
Howgill felt ‘ashamed’ because the in-breaking light illuminated his sinful past and 
made him aware that he was ‘a proverb to all’, and had no place to hide himself. The 
feeling of shame, together with other painful emotions such as sorrow and fear, led 
Howgill to a state of powerlessness and despair, which made him determine to suppress 
his carnal self and to surrender to God. 
Similarly, in October 1654, John Banker, a sixteen year old young man, attended 
a Quaker meeting in Pardshaw, during which he experienced spiritual agony during 
convincement: 
[T]he Lord’s Power in the meeting, so seized upon me, that I was made to cry out 
in the bitterness of my soul, in a true sight and sense of my sins, that appeared 
exceeding sinful… I was smitten to the ground with the weight of God’s judgment 
for sin and iniquity, that fell heavy upon me; and I was taken up by two friends. 
And Oh! the godly sorrow that did take hold of me, and sized upon me that night 
in the meeting; so that I thought in myself, everyone’s conditions was better than 
mine… I being very much bowed down and perplexed, my sins being set in order 
before me; and the time I had spent in wildness and wantonness, out of the fear 
of God, in vanity, sport, and pastime, came into my view and remembrance.150 
In this case, the author did not directly express whether he was feeling shame at the 
moment that God visited, but his inward agony and physical seizures did imply that he 
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was overwhelmed by a deep sense of humiliation, since he considered that God had 
discovered all of his sins and iniquities, and that ‘everyone’s condition was better’ than 
his. 
Many early Quakers kept similar accounts of this type of experience during the 
initial stages of convincement, and often used words and phrases such as ‘smite down’, 
‘wound’, ‘pierce’, and even ‘burn’ to describe the in-breaking light of God. George 
Canby, for example, wrote that ‘I fell down on the house floor as dead to all appearance 
as any clog or stone. When I came to sense again he had got me up in his arms; so that 
I can truly say I was smitten down to the ground by the living power of the Lord’.151 In 
1657, Richard Davies, a Welshpool hatter, wrote that the word of Lord ‘was as a 
hammer and a fire, it was sharper than any two-edged sword, it pierced through our 
inward parts, it melted and brought us into tears, that there was a scarcely a dry eye 
among us.’152 In his letter to Fox, the early Quaker preacher Richard Hubberthorne 
described ‘the hand of the Lord’ as the ‘devouring fire’, which was so ‘hot and 
unquenchable’ that ‘nothing could live or pass through it’.153 In these texts, Quakers 
did not directly mention the emotion of shame, and the inward and outward afflictions 
they described were not typical symptoms of shame. However, these examples 
demonstrate the power of the all-seeing light of Christ in spotlighting and reproving 
sins, and the painful nature of the early stages of convincement, which surely implied 
that shame was an unavoidable emotion of transforming Quakers. 
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Like Calvinists, the Quaker feeling of shame was not merely the result of 
understanding one’s own sin, but also derived from an inward disposition to humiliation 
and abasement. Quaker writers taught that in order to be saved, people should first 
humble themselves and acknowledge their lowly status. George Fox urged people to 
‘keep thy mind down low, up to the Lord God; and deny thyself’.154 Isaac Penington 
(1616-1679), an influential member of early Quaker movement, taught that ‘when the 
meek, the lowly, the humble spirit is reached and raised, then the true love, the 
sweetness, the tenderness, the meekness must go forth over that’.155 The early Quaker 
leader James Naylor claimed that God only favoured shamefacedness: ‘your lofty looks 
shall be humbled, and your haughtiness bowed down; for now the Lord will exalt the 
humble and meek ones, that you have trodden upon; He will seek that which is lost, but 
will destroy the fat, and feed the strong with judgment.’156 In 1688, William Dewsbury 
attended a Quaker meeting in London, in which he beseeched people ‘to be meek and 
lowly’ when waiting for the light of Christ, because God ‘dwells with the humble, but 
he beholds the proud afar off’.157  Elizabeth Bathurst, a second-generation Quaker 
apologist, also argued that during the visitation of the divine light, people should 
‘exercise in fear and trembling, together with Humility, Patience and Self-denial’. She 
saw this inward exercise of humiliation as a preparation for the remission of sin: 
Before Remission of Sins comes to be known, there must be a centring down into 
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the Manifestation of the Spirit of God within, which will bring down every 
exalted Imagination, and every high Thing, and lay it Low, even to the Ground; 
that so every Thought may be brought into Subjection to Jesus Christ.158 
The idea that in order to unite with God in a state of glorification people should first 
afflict themselves with shame and humiliation was continually emphasised by 
eighteenth-century Quakers. 159  As this evidence reveals, Quakers seldom directly 
mentioned shame, but their discussions emphasising the necessity of self-abasement 
indicated that the emotion of shame, which was closely connected to a low self-esteem 
and a feeling of shrinking or of being small, a sensation that had to be experienced 
before one could be saved. If there was no shame, or if Quakers did not acknowledge 
their depraved and debased nature, they would not be able to purge their sins or fill 
themselves with the light of God. 
Quakers often felt shame in the early stages of convincement because the light of 
Christ uncovered their sins, and made them aware that they were depraved and lowly 
individuals. An important question thus arises, namely how far the Quaker’s inner light 
differed from conscience. Indeed, this is a question worthy of book-length research; 
even early Quakers themselves had ‘split hairs into imperceptible slivers when trying 
to explain that, when they talked about the universal light in the conscience.’160 Both 
Quakers and Calvinists saw conscience as the law of God engraved in the heart of 
human beings. The Calvinist writer Henry Stubbes regarded conscience as ‘God’s 
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Deputy’ and ‘a Power of the soul’, ‘taking Notice, and bearing Witness of all Mans 
Thoughts, Words, and Actions’.161 Similarly, the prominent Quaker theologian Robert 
Barclay defined conscience as ‘knowledge which arises in man’s heart from what 
agrees, contradicts, or is contrary to anything believed by him, whereby he becomes 
conscious to himself that he transgresses by doing that which he is persuaded he ought 
not to do’. 162  While both Quakers and Calvinists argued that a good conscience 
represented the law of God, they stressed the fallible nature of the conscience, arguing 
that it could be defiled and corrupted, and therefore should not be relied upon as ‘the 
source of man’s power’ or an agent of salvation.163 As Barclay claimed, ‘the smiting 
of the conscience is sufficient to convince the heathen of sin and so to condemn and 
judge them: but not at all to help them to salvation’ since conscience is essentially a 
natural facility related to human soul and self-will.164 Like Calvinists who argued that 
human conscience should follow the guide of the Holy Spirit, Quakers claimed that 
conscience should be filled with the light of Christ. They all accepted the intellectual 
and moral values of a rightly enlightened conscience in leading people to a holy life. 
Thus, the relationship between human conscience and divine illumination is somewhat 
similar to content and container. Conscience is a site where the divine light should dwell. 
As a common Quaker phrase ‘to the light of God in thy conscience’ illustrates, ‘the 
Light could shine through the conscience like a light in a lantern’.165 For both religious 
groups, therefore, judging whether a conscience is good or evil depends completely on 
                                                             
161 Stubbes, Conscience the Best Friend, p. 5. 
162 Robert Barclay, An Apology for the True Christian Divinity (Philadelphia, 1848), p. 143. 
163 Barbour, The Quakers in Puritan England, pp. 111-2. 
164 Barclay, An Apology, p. 117. 
165 Barbour, The Quakers in Puritan England, pp. 111-2. 
60 
 
the nature of its contents or fillings: a conscience filled by the spirit of God is a powerful 
moral faculty which can spotlight and reprove sins and exert on its host a painful feeling 
of shame, but if the conscience is asleep or corrupt, this leads to a frozen and shameless 
heart. 
However, there is a sharp disparity in belief between Calvinists and Quakers 
regarding the functions of Holy Spirit or divine light. For Calvinists, keeping a good 
conscience by following the guide of Holy Spirit would contribute to holiness of life, 
but make no contribution to salvation. This is because, according to the doctrine of 
double predestination, God has already appointed a number of people to be saved 
through his grace, and at the same time ordained the remainder to eternal damnation for 
their sins. Calvinists argued that the fall of humanity was permanent, and that those 
who were elected would not experience the Kingdom of Heaven in this world. As there 
was no easy way to enjoy a certain assurance of salvation, Calvinists regarded shame 
as an important lifelong emotion for remaining pious. In contrast, Quakers, by opposing 
the doctrine of predestination, argued that every person could be saved by obeying the 
divine light. Unlike Calvinists who acknowledged the usefulness of the human will in 
conducting spiritual exercises such as self-examination and repentance, Quakers 
insisted that the carnal self and the free will should be thoroughly suppressed, so that 
the conscience could be entirely filled by the light. This enabled people to experience 
unspeakable peace and joy of salvation. 
Thus the Quaker convincement or re-birth may be seen as a process of self-denial. 
Damrosch describes this model of salvation as a transformation from ‘dualism’ to an 
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‘unconflicted monism’.166 Rebirth in the light requires the death of the self and its 
natural will.167 A convinced Quaker thus has no way to understand the natural self and 
world, but submits to the leading of the divine light. As Richard Hubberthorne claimed, 
‘when the Lord reveals any of his ways within man, man must die and know his own 
ways no more, but must be led in a way which he knows not, contrary to his will, 
contrary to his wisdom, contrary to his reason, and to his carnal mind. For none of these 
must enter, but must be cast out into the lake which burns.’168 Barclay likewise urged 
people to ‘become a fool for Christ’s sake’, so that God can teach them in their own 
hearts.169 Isaac Penington, meanwhile, kept an account of this inward experience of 
‘death’ and ‘foolishness’ during convincement: 
I have met with the true peace, the true righteousness, the true holiness, the true 
rest of the soul, the everlasting habitation, which the redeemed dwell in… The 
Lord has broken the man’s part in me, and I am a worm and no man before him. 
I have no strength to do any good or service for him, nay I cannot watch over or 
preserve myself. I feel daily that I keep not alive my own soul, but am weaker 
before men, yea weaker in my spirit (as in myself) than ever I have been. But I 
cannot but utter to the praise of my God, that I feel his arm stretched out for me; 
and my weakness (which I feel in myself) is not my loss, but advantage before 
him.170 
Having a sense of self was necessary for feeling shame, chiefly because shame was, as 
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we have seen in the introductory chapter, an evaluative emotion concerning the image 
of the self. Once the sense of self was totally rejected by a convinced Quaker, he would, 
at least during a period of time, not experience any self-evaluative emotions such as 
shame, pride and guilt, but submit fully to the leading of the inward light, and share 
glory with God. 
The inward state of ‘shamelessness’ was further justified by the Quaker doctrine 
of perfectionism. Believing that the perfect, infallible Christ had superseded the old, 
carnal self, convinced Quakers claimed that they were liberated from sin in this world, 
and therefore had nothing to be ashamed of. This state of perfection is appropriately 
described by Fox: 
Now was I come up in spirit through the flaming sword into the paradise of God… 
I knew nothing but pureness, and innocence, and righteousness, being renewed 
up into the image of God by Christ Jesus, so that I say I was come up to the state 
of Adam which he was in before he fell… But I was immediately taken up in 
spirit, to see into another or more steadfast state than Adam’s in innocence, even 
into a state in Christ Jesus, that should never fall.171 
James Naylor commented that Fox’s perfect state ‘is born of the heavenly, is heavenly, 
spiritual, eternal, and incorruptible; which is the state of the new man, which of God is 
begotten of the divine nature.’172 A converted Quaker’s self-image became the image 
of perfect Christ; what he or she had said or done was believed as the expression of the 
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divine. In 1650, Fox was on trial at Derby on a charge of blasphemy. When Fox was 
asked by the magistrates whether he was sanctified, Fox replied: ‘“Sanctified? Yes” for 
I was in the Paradise of God’. Being asked whether he had no sin, Fox replied that 
‘Christ my Saviour hath taken away my sin, and in him there is no sin’.173 Naylor 
explained that the old, carnal George Fox ‘was denied as dust; but the Spirit that spoken 
in him is equal with God’.174 William Dewsbury kept a similar account of this innocent 
state after convincement: ‘so through the righteous law of life in Christ Jesus I was 
made free and clean from the body of sin and death; and through these great trials my 
garment is washed, and made white in the blood of the Lamb.’175 While the extinction 
of selfhood left no room for self-evaluative emotion, the birth of this perfect self further 
convinced Quakers that they were free from sin and had nothing to be ashamed of. 
Being either foolish or perfect thus contributed to a sense of shamelessness, which 
constitutes a distinctive aspect of Quaker spirituality. 
  Convinced Quakers believed that they had entered into a perfect, sinless state 
through the leading of light within. But as time went by, enabling this perfect state to 
remain perfect is by no means an easy task. This was a real problem for Quakers, 
because ‘the purged, solemn, and selfless self does have to go on living in the fallen 
world’.176 What would happen if a convinced Quaker committed a sin again? Would 
he feel shame? Or would he continually insist on his innocence? Anti-Quaker 
pamphlets kept many accounts of Quakers who committed sinful behaviours without 
                                                             
173 The Journal of George Fox, p. 55. 
174 James Neale, A Discovery of the Man of Sin (London, 1655), pp. 12-3. 
175 Dewsbury, Discoverie of the Great Enmitie of the Serpent against the Seed of the Woman 
(Calvert, 1655), pp. 13-4, 16, 19, cited in Moore, The Light in Their Consciences, p. 83. 
176 Damrosch, The Sorrow of the Quaker Jesus, p. 111. 
64 
 
feeling shame. For example, Nicholas Kate, a Quaker in Harwell of Oxfordshire, who 
was reported to have appeared ‘starke naked in a most immodest manner, even beyond 
the Pagans, and so walked through a long Street’ of Newberry, asserted that ‘any woman 
was as free to him as his wife’.177 A Bristol Quaker likewise claimed that ‘he was 
confident of his perfect holiness and on that account went to bed with a woman, and 
yet afterwards excused himself saying, there was a necessary for it, there was no other 
spare bed in the house.’178 No matter whether these accounts were true or not, at least 
they indicate that the Quaker idea of perfection faced the danger of being abused as an 
excuse for sin. George Fox insisted that converted Quakers were perfect and would 
never fall. The only way to explain the repeated sin is that he or she was not a true 
Quaker at all, and therefore should be driven out from the Quaker community. But 
simply refusing to admit a wrongdoer’s Quaker identity could not prevent Quakers from 
committing sin again. Facing the shortcomings of the Quaker doctrine and the criticisms 
of anti-Quakers, later Quaker theologians modified Fox’s ideas about absolute 
infallibility or perfectionism so that to allow for Quakers who fell short. Barclay, for 
example, argued that there remained ‘a possibility of sinning’, if converted Quakers did 
not ‘most diligently and watchfully attend unto the Lord’. 179  Bathurst similarly 
maintained that Quakers are infallible only if ‘they are guided by the Infallible Spirit, 
namely, the Spirit of the Lord’; in other words, convinced Quakers might lose innocence 
if they failed to obey the leading of the divine light.180 
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As convincement could not protect Quakers from sinning again, the state of 
perfection was temporary in nature. As Barbour wrote, ‘new life cannot be accounted 
for as mere commitment or release from tension, since long period of struggle preceded 
and interrupted the feeling of peace.’181 This suggests that the emotion of shame was 
unlikely to be extinct after convincement, but was merely restrained or superseded by 
the overwhelming joy and peace of salvation. Quakers committing sins would still feel 
shame. And like Calvinists, they embraced shame and humiliation, regarding them as 
an important way to resume piety and return to God. As the early Quaker apologist 
Thomas Ellwood (1639-1714) wrote, in order to ‘rightly return, and be sensibly 
received into the unity of the body again’, sinning Quakers should ‘honestly and openly 
acknowledge their outgoings, and take condemnation and shame’ to themselves.182 The 
eighteenth-century Quaker missionary Patience Brayton recorded her continual inward 
struggle with sin and temptation. In a meeting at Kirklington, after keeping herself ‘in 
the low valley of humiliation’, Brayton was ‘filled again with a renewal of divine 
goodness’.183 On his way to Ireland, Samuel Neale, an eighteenth-century Irish Quaker 
minister, found that his ‘weakness and frailties were great’, and that he ‘was irresolute 
with respect to standing against temptation and the allurements of sin, and sin-pleasing 
pleasure’. In such a state of qualm, Naylor reached Cork where he attended a meeting: 
[M]y state was so opened to that highly favoured instrument in the Lord’s hand… 
that all I had done seemed to have been unfolded... I was as one smitten to the 
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ground, dissolved in tears, and without spirit. This was a visitation from the Most 
High, beyond all others that I had as yet witnessed: I was so wrought upon by the 
power and Spirit of the holy Jesus, that like Saul, I was ready to cry out; ‘Lord, 
what wouldest thou have me to do?’ I was almost ashamed to be seen, being so 
bedewed with tears, and slunk away from the meeting, to get into a private place.184 
The Quaker disposition to shame and self-humiliation has changed little over time. In 
26 May 1836, the 78-year-old Mary Hagger wrote, ‘sitting up in bed, my mind was very 
unexpectedly by these words, “The Lord knows them that are his,” which affected me. 
I said in my heart, what have I to return for such favours; surely nothing but shame and 
confusion of face!’ Several days later, Hagger recorded that her ‘short comings’ and 
‘many omissions and commissions’ caused her ‘many hours of sorrow and bitter cries 
to the Creator for forgiveness’, and that she ‘was strengthened again’ through true 
repentance ‘in the days of humiliation’.185 All of these examples show that convinced 
Quakers still kept a watchful eye on, and always felt ashamed of, sins and spiritual 
laxity. More importantly, this evidence demonstrates that the emotion of shame 
provided sinful Quakers with a powerful impetus to repent and reunite themselves with 
God. Therefore, Quaker convincement was not something that was experienced once 
for all time, but rather, was a repeated spiritual exercise which was required throughout 
the life. 
Convinced Quakers not only kept a strict moral line to demonstrate their salvation 
                                                             
184 Ibid., vol. 6, pp. 3-4. 
185 Ibid., vol. 7, p. 460. 
67 
 
and triumph over sins, but engaged themselves in ‘the Lamb’s War’.186 In this war, 
Quaker missionaries strove for ‘calling “the world” towards a new mode of religious 
experience’ and to convince those still shut up in unbelief that they could be saved 
through the leading of indwelling light of God.187 Believing that they were filled with 
the divine light and guided by immediate revelation from God, Quakers saw themselves 
as a ‘spokesman for God’ or ‘publishers of the Truth’ just like those great prophets and 
apostles in the Old and New Testament eras. 188  Quakers broadcast the prophet’s 
message not only through words, but also by ‘signs and wonders’ in a graphic way.189 
In most cases, these signs functioned as a warning, aiming to ‘turn men from evil’ and 
‘to produce repentance so that the terrible threat would not really be allowed to take 
place’.190 According to Moore, Quakers’ signs were designed to represent ‘the fall of 
the godless society and the coming of God’s kingdom’.191 Perhaps the most typical and 
unusual sign provided by early Quakers was the practice of going naked. In a letter to 
Quakers of Ulverston in 1652, George Fox wrote that ‘the Lord made one to go naked 
among you, a figure of thy nakedness, and of your nakedness, and as a sign amongst 
you before your destruction cometh, that you might see that you were naked and not 
covered with the truth’.192 During the following ten years, the practice of going naked 
as a sign became a recurrent phenomenon, which constituted a remarkable aspect of the 
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early Quaker movement in England. 
The activity of going naked as a sign offers another perspective on the study of the 
Quaker sense of shame. Did early Quakers who had gone naked feel shame for their 
behaviour? If not, how did they overcome the emotion of shame? Although going naked 
did not always mean complete nudity, contemporary people, especially critics of the 
Quakers, nevertheless regarded it as immodest and shameful. ‘They are the most 
immodest, obscene, people in the world’, one author condemned, ‘if all the Stories of 
their women’s stripping themselves to the very skin, in the presence of men, and of 
men’s so doing in the presence of women of late years [were collected], they would be 
enough to make a large Volume.’193 It was recorded that in the summer of 1659, a 
Quaker in Colchester ‘went stark naked all through the Market: And another day, which 
was the Lords day, in the same posture entered into the greatest assembly that was in 
that Town… and for a long time act the part of a Speaker’.194 In 1653, a man and a 
woman, calling themselves Adam and Eve, ‘went for some while as some uncivilized 
heathen doe, discovering their nakedness to the eye of every beholder, and when they 
were publickly examined at the Assizes for their brutish practice, the man wickedly 
affirmed that the power of God was upon him, he was commanded to do it.’ 195 
Similarly, in Westmorland, ‘a mad man naked all but his shirt, [walked] through Kendall 
crying, Repent, Repent, wo, wo, come out of Sodome.’ 196  It is apparent that 
contemporary observers were shocked and disturbed by naked Quakers; they 
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denounced these Quakers and their deviant behaviour as ‘Signs of the Prodigious 
Delusions of the Devil’ and ‘Enthusiastically-Madness’. 197  For example, Charles 
Leslie condemned a Quaker for the following reasons: 
[I]nstead of being ashamed of such a Beast, he there blasphemously compares 
this Brutality of his to Isaiah’s being commanded to go Naked for a Sign to Egypt. 
Not knowing that the sackcloth or Garment of Hair which Isaiah was Commanded 
to Loose from his Loyns, it being worn Girt close about the Loyns, was a Rough 
sort of a Mantle or Upper Garment Made of Hair. 
Leslie then concluded that ‘if a man shou'd Strip off his Cloaths, to Fight, Run, Work, 
or to do anything upon which he was very Intent, this was called being Naked, and that 
Shamelessly too’.198 
Did these Quaker prophets really know no shame when going naked for a sign? 
Some naked Quakers described God’s command and their activities as a ‘burden’ and 
‘sacrifice’, which implied their reluctance and shamefacedness.199 Indeed, as James 
Naylor observed, many naked Quakers acted contrary to their own wills.200 Robert 
Barclay, for example, wrote that ‘the Command of the Lord concerning this thing (going 
naked) came unto me that very Morning as I awakened, and the Burden thereof was 
very Great and seemed almost insupportable unto me’. Feeling that ‘the Agony of Spirit’ 
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was ‘great’, Barclay ‘besought the Lord with tears’ that this command might pass away 
from him.201 On another occasion, when God commanded William Simpson to go 
naked as a sign, Simpson wrote: ‘I had rather have died than gone on this service’.202 
Solomon Eccles also took a note of his shame with regard to God’s command: ‘I can 
truly say that I have strove much, and besought the Lord, that this going naked might 
be taken from me.’203 
No matter how great the inward shame and anguish were, these Quakers eventually 
obeyed God’s command and stripped themselves in public to broadcast divine messages. 
The primary reason that Quakers were able to overcome their feelings of shame and 
fear was that these emotions represented a timid conscience, which convinced Quakers 
that their self-will had impeded the work of the divine light, and therefore should be 
suppressed by all means. As Barbour claims, ‘if a consciously selfish motive opposed 
the impulse, this provided all the greater reason for proceeding.’204 Obeying the guide 
of the light was not shameful; if Quakers felt shame for the call, it meant that they were 
ashamed of God. Moreover, convinced Quakers believed that their carnal self and free 
will were dead, or had been superseded by Christ; therefore, as the Quaker prophet 
Thomas Holme claimed, ‘it is not I but God that goeth Naked.’205 The sense of self is 
crucial for feeling shame since shame is an emotion that involves a judgement on the 
self. According to Damrosch, ‘the enacting of the sign of nakedness expressed a 
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renunciation of selfhood that made ordinary shame irrelevant.’206 The command of 
God was irresistible, but obeying it brought Quakers a sense of ease and joy. The burden 
of shame was a temporary one; it would be swept away once Quakers carried out their 
mission. As Thomas Briggs, a Cardiff Quaker, wrote: ‘when I was Naked in the streets, 
the Burden was taken off me: that I said in myself, how easy am I now! It is good to 
obey the voice of the Lord.’207 
Another, and possibly a more direct impetus for Quakers to conquer the sense of 
shame was offered by a much stronger emotion, that of anger. Early Quakers always 
felt angry when they witnessed what they believed to be sin, or when they felt 
themselves (and the Quaker community) to have been wrongly treated by religious 
opponents. Hence, going naked as a sign was a warning or protest against ungodly 
behaviour and religious persecution. One day in 1658, Elizebeth Fletcher and her 
companion Elizebeth Levens, two Quakers from Kendal, were publicly humiliated in 
the city of Oxford. It is recorded that ‘the Black tribe of Scholars and magistrates 
daggered them first through a dirty pond or pool, afterwards had them to a pump, and 
holding their mouths to the pump endeavoured to pump water thereunto with other 
shameful abuses’. This humiliation enraged Fletcher, who ‘went naked through the 
Streets of that City’ as a sign to condemn those hypocritical scholars, and to warn them 
that ‘the Lord would strip them off, so that their Nakedness should Appear’.208 In 1667, 
officials raided a secret Quaker meeting in London and killed Quakers and wounded 
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several others. The incident stimulated Solomon Eccles to go naked ‘through 
Bartholomew Fair at Smithfield as a sign’.209 Samuel Pepys, who witnessed Eccles’s 
behaviour, wrote that ‘a man, a Quaker, came naked through the Westminster Hall, only 
very civilly tied about the privates to avoid scandal, and with a chafing-dish of fire and 
brimstone burning upon his head, crying, Repent! Repent!’210 In fact, it was not the 
first time that Solomon Eccles went naked; all of his actions occurred when he 
disagreed with the iniquity and wickedness that he had encountered. One day, when 
Eccles saw other persons’ ‘filthy shows’ and ‘cursed practices’, he ‘immediately 
prepared to lay down [his] body a sacrifice for God’ to go naked for a sign. On another 
occasion, he went naked in order to warn ‘all drunkards and swinish men and 
women’.211 From other sources, we may read something Eccles did not mention. For 
example, he once besmeared his elbows with excrement and went naked to a church at 
Aldermanbury in London during the service. In the church he shouted: ‘I might as well 
come into the Church with that Filth in my Hands, as the Minister with a Bible’.212 
Here, excrement was used as a means to humiliate the clergyman and his Bible, showing 
that it was great indignation and hostility to Quaker enemies that forced Eccles to go 
naked. Going naked was a warning, a denouncement and a protest, which could not be 
carried out without the impetus of strong emotions. If we have to ask when Quakers 
experienced shame while going naked, it might be answered that they did feel shame 
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when they witnessed, as Eccles lamented, ‘how greatly is God dishonoured by this 
provoking Generation’.213 This feeling of shame then switched to anger, and became 
an uncompromising motivating force that encouraged Quakers to provide a sign. 
     Although there was significant disagreement over theological issues between 
Quakers and Calvinists, they had many similarities in experiencing and interpreting 
shame. Quakers regarded shame as a moral emotion which was crucial for keeping 
holiness of life. They often experienced shame during the early stages of convincement. 
It was the indwelling light of Christ that produced this painful feeling, since the light 
uncovered Quakers’ sinful past and made them aware of their debased nature. However, 
the Quaker sense of shame had distinctive features. Believing that they were in union 
with God and living a sinless, perfect life convinced Quakers that they had entered into 
a state of shamelessness. This state was, however, a temporary one, because they had 
to go on living in a fallen world, and face the danger of backsliding. Therefore, shame 
and self-humiliation were still important spiritual experiences that every person should 
have in order to resist sin and stay with God. Early Quakers were notorious for their 
activity of going naked. While Quakers did feel ashamed of being naked, they saw it as 
a false emotion. The requirement of self-denial, the leading of the light within, and 
indignation against sin and their religious enemies provided Quakers with the power to 
overcome shame and timidity. 
The practice of going naked as a sign nevertheless decreased rapidly after 1662.214 
Eighteenth-century Quakers regarded their eristic predecessors and their boisterous 
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behaviours as odd and inappropriate, placing more emphasis on looking inwardly 
through private spiritual searching in silence. In this changing context, the significance 
of shame as a moral and private emotion was continually stressed by Quakers. 
 
‘Holy Shame Shall Warm My Heart’: the Methodist Sense of Shame 
The Methodist movement that began in the late 1730s had a major impact on 
eighteenth-century Britain’s religious culture. The rise of Methodism can be seen as a 
critical response to the coldness and apathy of the Church of England.215 Methodist 
ministers such as John Wesley and George Whitefield, despite their respective 
Arminian and Calvinistic wings, advocated an affectionate and heart-felt faith, and saw 
an outpouring of emotions as a significant sign of piety. Although emotive religiosity 
did not exclusively belong to Methodism, a heightened sense of shame was nevertheless 
central to the Methodist movement. This section will first explore the Methodist 
attitudes towards shame by seeing how ministers impressed the emotion on their flocks, 
and then discuss why Methodist outpourings of shame were increasingly questioned as 
enthusiastic madness and hypocrisy. This section finds that, as with Calvinists and 
Quakers, Methodists regarded shame as an important moral emotion which was 
indispensable in everyday devotional exercise. Methodists and Quakers had similar 
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spiritual experience during conversion; but unlike convinced Quakers who believed that 
they were sinless and perfect, converted Methodists still acknowledged their sinful, 
fallible nature. While Methodists, like seventeen-century Calvinists and Quakers, 
embraced shame through introspection and wholehearted prayer, it is noteworthy that 
Methodist ministers placed a particular emphasis on evoking and inculcating a sense of 
shame through passionate preaching. 
Early Methodist preachers were experts in using enthusiastic sermons to provoke 
the excessive feelings of their hearers. John Nelson, a lay preacher and John Wesley’s 
principle assistant in Yorkshire, suggested, ‘no other preaching will do for Yorkshire, 
but the old sort that comes like a thunderclap upon the conscience. Fine preaching does 
more harm than good here.’216 Provoking a congregation to weeping was a welcome 
consequence of such ‘thunderclap’ preaching. In order to prompt their listeners to 
spiritual tears, Methodist preachers, most notably George Whitefield, often moved and 
wept themselves during sermons. One of Whitfield’s hearers wrote: 
I hardly ever knew him go through a sermon without weeping, more or less, and 
I truly believe his were the tears of sincerity. His voice was often interrupted by 
his affection… I could hardly bear such unreserved use of tears, and the scope he 
gave to his feelings, for sometimes he exceedingly wept, stamped loudly and 
passionately, and was frequently so overcome, that for a few seconds, you would 
suspect he never could recover.217 
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Whitefield encouraged people to shed tears, since ‘the white gutters made by their tears’ 
were a proof of ‘being affected’ and the working of God: ‘your tears and deep attention 
are an evidence that the Lord God is amongst us of a truth.’218 
The outcome of emotive preaching was remarkable. James Lackington (1746-
1815), a notable bookseller in Britain, recalled that Whitefield ‘had a perfect command 
over the passions of his audience’: ‘In every sermon that I heard him preach, he would 
sometimes make them ready to burst with laughter, and the next moment drown them 
in tears; indeed it was scarce possible for the most guarded to escape the effect.’219 The 
Scottish evangelical preacher James Robe (1688-1753) noted that ‘Mr. Whitefield’s 
Sermons were attended with much power… several crying out, and a very great but 
decent weeping and mourning was observable through the auditory.’220 The sermons 
preached by Robe himself had a similar effect, ‘many being so deeply affected in 
hearing, that frequently a general Sound of Weeping, through the whole Congregation 
rises so high, that it much drowns my Voice.’221 John Gillies (1712–1796), another 
Scottish Methodist minister, recorded that during a sermon to a large congregation, 
listeners ‘attended with great horror and trembling, and loud weeping… many did 
continue crying in the most doleful manner along the road in their way home.’222 On 
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May 13th 1758, John Nelson attended Wesley’s sermon and remarked: ‘I never saw a 
congregation so affected. Most of the people were in tears, some for joy, and some from 
a sense of their sins.’223  One night in January 1782, William Black, a prominent 
Wesleyan minister in Nova Scotia, noticed that there was a young man who ‘trembled 
greatly, and cried’ outside the house wherein he was preaching. When Black went out 
of the house, he found that the young man was ‘kneeling on the snow, crying and 
praying in the bitterness of his soul.’224 
The extremity of tears shed by both preachers and flocks was not exclusively a 
Methodist phenomenon; it may be seen as a revival of seventeenth-century puritan and 
nonconformist traditions.225 Early Methodists approved of such excessive weeping, 
since it embodied the sense of shame required by sincere repentance and conversion. It 
should be noted that shame was, of course, not the only emotion that led to tears. 
Methodists usually shed tears of grief, fear, and joy for reasons of either anxiety about 
eternal damnation or gratitude to God’s blessing. In most cases, these emotions 
coexisted and were linked with each other. But it is clear that Methodist preachers 
placed particular emphasis on experiencing shame. They claimed that ‘fear and shame 
were the immediate effects of sin’; but while people afflicted with a sense of fear were 
scared by the wrath of God and the terror of hell, a sense of shame and humiliation 
urged them to have ‘a deep view into their original Guilt and Pollution’ and ‘abase 
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themselves and repent in Dust and Ashes’. 226  The early Methodist minister John 
Cennick (1718-1755) stated that ‘whosoever then here examines himself and finds he 
is not in the faith, let him with tears and shame, confess it before our Saviour’.227 
Besides seeing shame as grievous reflection on sins, Methodists also emphasised the 
importance of shame as an inward disposition to self-humiliation and abasement. As 
John Wesley wrote, ‘it is great wisdom to esteem ourselves nothing.’228 Thomas Scott 
(1747-1821), a prominent Anglican evangelical, stressed the importance of self-
humiliation, claiming that humility ‘may be considered as most essential to the 
Christian temper’, and that people should see themselves ‘to be as nothing before the 
infinite Creator’.229 Furthermore, Methodists saw the sense of shame and humiliation 
as a sign of grace and salvation. According to Philip Doddridge, a prominent 
eighteenth-century non-conformist minister whose evangelical writings and hymns 
made a great contribution to the Methodist movement, ‘vain are all your religious hopes, 
if there has not been a cordial humiliation before the presence of God for all your sins’. 
‘If God purposes finally to save you,’ wrote Doddridge, ‘he will humble you by repeated 
disappointments till he teaches you better. You will be ashamed of one scheme and 
effort, and of another, till you settle upon the true basis.’230 
While Methodist preachers emphasised the importance of shame, they did not 
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ignore the value of fear. They stressed that the fear of the Lord was the beginning of 
wisdom (Proverbs 9:10), and that in order to provoke shame, the proud heart should 
first be terrified.231 A usual way of threatening people was to inculcate them with 
horrendous or supernatural images of a furious God, the final judgement, a horrific hell, 
through enthusiastic preaching. The Methodist lay preacher Nathaniel Snip wrote that 
he threatened his listeners ‘with everlasting Brimstone and Fire in case they believed 
not themselves to be in a State of Perdition’.232 James Robe, meanwhile, once asked 
his listeners what they felt during sermons, and ‘they told me that they were under 
dreadful apprehensions of the terrible wrath of God, due to them for their sins, 
especially for their slighting of Jesus Christ by unbelief’.233 As Nathaniel Hurst, an 
auditor of Methodist sermons, said: ‘I used to think that the ground whereon I stood 
was hot under me which made me almost to tremble and to think if the ground should 
open and swallow me up I should perish forever.’ When going to the bed at night, Mary 
Ramsay ‘felt the pangs of hell and misery’, and feared that she ‘should never awake’. 
Similarly, Sarah Middleton noted that ‘I felt my self so vile that I thought hell was ready 
to swallow me up.’234 Nobody would doubt the success of early Methodist preachers 
in awakening and frightening their flocks’ consciences by preaching the terror of 
damnation. According to Bruce Hindmarsh, ‘with this first awakening of conscience 
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typically came a fear of hell, and this was followed in due course by a more evangelical 
shame for having offended God.’235 
Like their seventeenth-century predecessors, Methodist preachers saw God as the 
shaming audience because he could discover every secret sin. God was ‘the most 
vigilant overlooker of all’, Doddridge warned, ‘he is continually near you, wherever 
you are, and wherever you are employed, by day or by night’, even if you can ‘conceal 
evils from others, you could not but know they were open to him.’236  Doddridge 
recorded his overwhelming sorrow and shame when he realised that God had witnessed, 
and was angry at his spiritual laxity and sins: ‘Alas, Lord, whither am I fallen! Thine 
eye sees me still; but Oh how unlike what it once saw me! Cold and insensible as I am, 
I must blush on the reflection. Thou see me in secret, and see me often amusing myself 
with trifles in those seasons, which I used solemnly to devote to thine immediate 
service.’237 Besides convincing their flocks of the power of surveillance by God, it is 
noteworthy that early Methodist preachers could provoke feelings of shame in their 
listeners by placing them ‘in the story as living actors’, and making them find 
‘themselves individuated and addressed in ways that seemed to specify them 
uniquely’.238 When John Nelson attended a sermon preached by John Wesley, he was 
overwhelmed with shame for feeling that Wesley singled him out and spoke to him by 
name: 
When he began to speak, his words made me tremble. I thought he spoke to no 
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one but me, and I durst not look up; for I imagined all the people were looking at 
me. I was ashamed to show my face, expecting God would make me a public 
example, either by letting the earth open and swallow me up, or by striking me 
dead.239  
Nelson’s experience was typical; in his study of evangelical conversion narratives, 
Hindmarsh offers many similar examples which demonstrate Methodist preachers’ 
capacity to impose shame on their flocks by individual and personalised ways of 
preaching. For example, Thomas Cooper wrote after hearing John Wesley’s sermon: ‘I 
thought I was the person he made his discourse upon for he told me all that every [thing] 
I did. I was so ashamed of my selves.’ On another occasion, when Charles Wesley 
preached a sermon on adultery, one of his hearers Samuel Webb felt that his well-buried 
sins were exposed. Thus, he ‘could do not to make a disturbance before the sermon was 
over’. Similarly, Maria Price despised herself as ‘a dark dead stony hearted damned 
unbelieving Pharisee’ because she felt that Charles Wesley was able to read her mind 
and see her guilt.240  
As well as skilful ways of preaching, hymns were widely used by Methodists to 
heighten the spiritual sense of shame. One does not have to search very far to find that 
‘shame’ was one of keywords of the lyrics of Methodist hymns. Lamenting about the 
shame and sinfulness of the self and crying for the mercy of God were integral parts of 
hymns. These hymns were produced as a kind of sermon or an exemplary prayer, 
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teaching people the right way of confessing sins and communicating with God. Warning 
that ‘confusion, shame, and misery’ were due outcomes of ‘loudly-crying sins’, 
Methodist hymn writers stressed the necessity of shamefacedness in confession, and 
urged people to ‘sink down with shame before sacred Jesus’s Name’ and ‘blush for 
shame at his pierced feet’.241 Thus one of Charles Wesley’s hymns reads ‘let me feel 
my load of shame, / And groan my want of love: / Low in the deepest deep / My 
humbled spirit lay, / And give me there to cry, and weep / My pensive life away.’242 In 
another hymn, Charles Wesley wrote: ‘Base wretch that I am! / With sorrow and shame 
/ The sin I confess / Which robbed me of all my sweet comfort and peace.’243 Methodist 
hymn-writers regarded feelings of shame as a ‘holy’ experience that everyone should 
embrace. A hymn produced by John Cennick thus reads ‘He is thy head, / Fall down 
and yet be glad! / With Joy and Shame. / I own I am a sinner vile: / From Unbelief is 
all my Smart; / But ah! chastise me with a Smile, / And holy Shame shall warm my 
Heart.’244 Charles Wesley similarly wrote: ‘Let me sink into the Dust, / Full of Holy 
Shame adore; / Jesus Christ, the Good, the Just, / Bids me go, and sin no more.’245  
The experience of shame and humiliation was not only important when repenting 
and converting, but was also required after receiving the assurance of salvation. Here 
the sense of shame was mixed with gratitude and unworthiness. As John Cennick wrote, 
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‘I Stand amazed / Ashamed abased, / To think I’m one, / He set his Heart upon: / I blush 
with deepest Shame, / Dear Lamb, / When I behold / me in that Fold, / Bought by thy 
Smart, / And Laid so near thy Heart.’246 Charles Wesley wrote: ‘Overwhelmed with 
Pardoning Grace, / Jesus, at thy Feet I lie, / Dare not see thy smiling Face, / Tremble at 
thy Mercy night; / I, a Child of Wrath and Hell, / How can I look up to Heaven! / Lord, 
I faint thy Love to fee, / Blush, and die to be forgiven.’ 247  Converted people’s 
experience of shame was, for the most part, not an acute, grievous self-reflection on sin, 
but rather a much gentler psyche of humility and lowliness. Charles Wesley, in one of 
his hymns, described this inward state as ‘the guiltless shame’, ‘the sweet distress’, and 
‘the genuine meek humility’.248 
As Methodist hymns indicate, shame and self-humiliation were important 
psychologies for those who had been graced by God. Methodist ministers emphasised 
that blessed people should go on keeping a lowliness of heart, blushing at the mercy of 
God, and acknowledging their undeserving of grace because of their original and 
particular sins. ‘So a true Christian,’ as John Cennick wrote, ‘the more he knows of 
Jesus, the more he experiences of his Grace and Mercy, and ripens for Glory, the more 
he bows down, and with Humility and Shame confesses his own Unworthiness, and 
adores the free Grace of God his Saviour.’249 For Methodists, converted people were 
not sinless or infallible, but were still tempted by Satan. The sense of shame functioned 
as a powerful restraint, helping converts to preserve the grace of God and to resist 
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temptation. In order to continue to be pious after conversion, Doddridge advised people 
to ask themselves a set of questions in their day-to-day spiritual exercises: 
Are you more frequently renewing your application, your sincere, steady, 
determinate application, to the righteousness and blood of Christ, as being 
sensible how unworthy you are to appear before God, otherwise than in him? And 
do the remaining corruptions of your heart humble you before him, though the 
disorders of your life are in a great measure cured? Are you more earnest to obtain 
the quickening influences of the Holy Spirit; and have you such a sense of your 
own weakens, as to engage you depend, in all the duties you perform, upon the 
communications of his grace to “help your infirmities?” Can you, at the close of 
your most religious, exemplary, and useful days, blush before God for the 
deficiencies of them, while others perhaps may be ready to admire and extol your 
conduct? … Do you learn to receive the bounties of providence, not only with 
thankfulness as coming from God, but with a mixture of shame and confusion too, 
under a consciousness that you do not deserve them, and are continually forfeiting 
them?250 
The essence of Doddridge’s advice, indeed, seemed to be to inculcate converted people 
with a sense of shame. Here shame was a lasting inward state, involving the senses of 
humility, abasement, and unworthiness. As the Irish Methodist preacher Thomas Walsh 
remarked, the pious after conversion ‘saw nothing whereof to glory in himself before 
God, but rather was continually filled with holy shame and deep abasement at the 
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disparity which he still perceived between himself and his holy Lord’. 251  The 
Methodist ideal of shame as a lifelong spiritual psyche changed little in the nineteenth 
century. In 1813, the prominent Wesleyan divine Jabez Bunting warned that even if a 
person was redeemed by God, he would go on facing the danger of corruption because 
humanity was fallible in nature. Therefore, the self-abasing emotion of shame, together 
with feelings of sorrow and regret about sins, were still needed: 
Sin… is not changed in its nature, so as to be made less exceedingly sinful… by 
the pardon of the sinner. The penalty is remitted; and the obligation to suffer that 
penalty is dissolved, but it is still naturally due, though graciously remitted. Hence 
appears the propriety and the duty of continuing to confess and lament even 
pardoned sin. Though released from its penal consequences by an act of divine 
clemency, we should still remember, that the dust of self-abasement is our proper 
place before God.252 
Reinforcing this sense of shame led Methodists to examine themselves rigidly. 
Like other protestant groups, the Methodists regarded prayer as an important way to 
experience shame, and insisted that prayer would not be sincere without wholehearted 
shame and remorse for one’s sins.253 Doddridge urged people to take on a great deal of 
shame and pain when praying. In an exemplary prayer, he wrote: ‘I may justly appear 
before thee this day with shame and terror, in confusion and consternation of spirit… 
How then shall I appear in thy presence, or lift up my face to thee! I am full of confusion, 
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and feel a secret regret in the thought of applying to thee.’ 254  In another prayer, 
Doddridge wrote: ‘I come from my very heart ashamed of myself, and with an 
acknowledgement in the sincerity and humility of my soul, that I have played the fool, 
and have erred exceedingly. I am confounded myself at the remembrance of these things. 
Lord, I am ashamed to stand or to kneel before thee.’255 The evangelical writer Isaac 
Watts (1674-1748) also urged people to fill their hearts with ‘uneasy and painful 
affections’ during introspection and confession. He advised people to examine their 
hearts by asking themselves: ‘Dose thou look back on thy own former transgressions, 
with holy shame and sincere sorrow? Art thou covered with an inward blush at the 
recollection of thy past follies? Has thy sincere and unfeigned repentance been 
manifested by all the proper passions that attend a penitent, by self-abasement and 
inward confusion, by mourning in secret, and a holy displacency and resentment against 
thyself and thy folly?’ 256  Emphasising the importance of self-examination led 
Methodists to a wariness of sin and backsliding. James Robe once asked his followers 
about their spiritual experience after conversion, and wrote: 
When they spoke of their former Ways they blushed, and wept, and said, None in 
all the Country round were so vile as they, and earnestly desired to exalt Free 
grace: And when I was cautioning them against new Temptations and Relapses, 
they showed a Sense of their own Weakness, and were afraid on that Account to 
come near their old Companions… They said, they would wish rather to die than 
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go back to old Sins, and if ever they should be left to any of them, they would 
incline to leave the Country, because of the Dishonour it would bring on the Work 
of God, which they could not bear to see.257 
Nonetheless, Methodists’ emotive religiosity and intensive inculcation of religious 
passions were not without problems. In 1766, Samuel Martin, an opponent of 
Methodism, observed that Methodist preachers’ enthusiastic preaching led their 
followers to melancholy. ‘One of their hearers complained to me,’ wrote Martin, ‘that 
she had not been happy ever since the communion at a particular place.’258 John Nelson 
had suffered long from depression, and many times had been tempted to suicide: 
‘feeling my corruptions, with strong temptations, I fell into great doubting. I was almost 
in despair. I could scarce pray at all, and was tempted to murder myself. One day, as I 
was going to hear Mr. Grimshaw, and going over a bridge, I was strongly tempted to 
leap into the river.’259 Besides inward depression, a more visible problem was physical 
agitation. Hysterical reactions, which usually manifested themselves in crying, 
groaning, trembling and fainting, were expressions of mixed spiritual passions. While 
Methodist preachers regarded these physical agitations as a sign of the working of Holy 
Spirit, conventional Anglicans attacked them as fanaticism and enthusiastic madness 
inspired by demons. In 1779, an anti-Methodist satire ridiculed such excessive 
behaviours: 
Seraphic --- whilst in Torments others roar, 
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By Satan Scourg’d, or fasten’d to the Floor; 
A Pandemonium of the F --- d’ry make, 
Feel fancy’d Flames, and Chains ideal shake; 
Laugh, cry, display what Modesty should hide; 
Now boil with Rage; Becalm’d, again subside; 
Now ebb, now flow, as Priestcrast rules the Tide.  
These Mad-folks foam, rant, caper, and curvet,  
Flame, shiver, tremble, dance, chaunt, rave, and fret.260 
In another anti-Methodist tract The Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists Compared 
(1754), George Lavington (1684-1762) remarked that it was not possible to describe 
the progress of Methodism ‘without taking in shocking and horrible things’: 
Such are their Crying out, Screamings, Shriekings, Roarings, Groanings, 
Tremblings, Gnashings, Yellings, Formings, Convulsions, Swoonings, Droppings, 
Blasphemies, Curses, dying and despairing Agonies, Variety of Tortures in Body 
and Mind… This, is no doubt, is a Fling at Mr. Wesley’s Accounts; which are in 
Truth too shocking and terrible, to be written, or read, without Horror and pain 
of Mind: And one would really imagine, that Bedlam was let loose, and all the 
Hypochondriac and Hysterical, Epileptic, Convulsed, Fevered, Delirious, 
Bewitched, and Possessed persons were summoned from all Quarters of the 
Nation.261 
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Lavington argued against Methodists, who saw excessive emotional expressions as the 
‘extraordinary Workings of God in the Soul’ and ‘Marks and Proofs or true Piety’, 
claiming that such hysterical actions were only marks of ‘Madness and real Disease’.262 
Critics even claimed that Methodism was responsible for the increase of madmen: ‘But 
if these gentlemen (Methodist ministers) are determined to build, I would recommend 
to them the plan of a certain edifice… which… may accommodate many of the religious 
mad in this country.’263 In 1765, an Anglican writer accused Methodist preachers of 
using ‘strange Gestures and horrid Expressions, as tend to the making People mad and 
disordered in their Sense’. 264  Another anti-Methodist ridiculed Wesley’s London 
chapel for being the place in which people were trained to be a ‘fanatic mad’: 
In holy Go-Carts there, by due Degrees, 
They’re taught to snivel, groan, cant, whine, and wheeze,  
Heart-melting Tones of wheedling Intercession,  
Boanergy, on Mobs to make Impression; 
Stage-Tricks, to fill the gloomy Soul with Fear,  
And wring from Guilt a shilling, and a Tear.265 
Facing criticisms regarding Methodist enthusiasm, both Methodists and their 
opponents began to reflect on the important question of how to distinguish, experience, 
and express spiritual emotions; they asked whether the excessive weeping, groaning 
and screaming were the authentic expressions of inward shame, guilt and fear, and the 
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real signs of conversion. In his A Fine Picture of Enthusiasm (1744), the Anglican 
clergyman John Scott acknowledged that ‘sensitive passions’ were of ‘an excellent use’ 
in religion, but stressed that sincere spiritual affections should be ‘gentle’, ‘soft’, and 
‘easy’ because religion ‘is a wise, a still, and silent thing’ that consists ‘not only in 
intermittent Fits of Passion, but in the Midst of cool Thoughts and calm Deliberations’, 
and it ‘does not come and go, like the Colours of a blushing Face.’266 In acknowledging 
the positive role of moderate spiritual affections, Scott warned about the danger of 
uncontrolled, excessive passions in religion. He argued that physical agitations such as 
bitter cries should not be seen as a sign of piety, because ‘there are many Men who are 
sincerely good, who yet cannot raise their sensitive Passions in their religious Exercise; 
who are heartily sorry for their Sins, and yet cannot weep for them.’ Accordingly, Scott 
noticed that ‘there are many gross Hypocrites that have not one Dram of true Piety in 
them, who yet can pour out their confessions in Floods of tears.’267 In 1740, William 
Bowman, vicar of Dewsbury and Aldbrough, asserted that ‘an outward Shew of 
extraordinary Holiness and Piety, is not always an Indication that a Man is sincere; that 
under this Mask has often lain concealed the greatest Wickedness and Impiety’.268 In 
1766, John Tottie, archdeacon of Worcester, emphasised that ‘the Operations of the 
Spirit are not violent and tempestuous… but they are so gentle and peaceable in their 
Nature as they are in their Effects’.269 None of these authors directly discussed the 
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emotion of shame, but they nevertheless implied that physical reactions such as 
weeping, which had long been regarded as an expression of shame, may be sham, and 
therefore should not be fully trusted or elevated to a place of significance.270 
Moreover, critics argued that sincere spiritual feelings should be spontaneous, 
rather than having an obvious purpose, or being mechanical. It was observed that many 
Methodist laypeople compelled themselves to shed floods of tears because they saw it 
as a prerequisite of salvation. In 1754, the Methodist minister of Glasgow John Gills 
said: 
they believed there was a good work going on; that people were convinced, and 
brought into a conversed state; and they desired to be converted too: they saw 
others weeping and fainting, and heard people mourning and lamenting, and they 
thought if they could be like these it would be very hopeful with them; hence, 
they endeavoured just to get themselves affected by sermons, and if they could 
come to weeping, or get their passions so raised as to incline them to vent 
themselves by cries, now they hoped they were got under convictions, and were 
in a very hopeful way.271  
Similarly, Scott regarded the Methodist process of conversion as a trick of self-
deceiving and a kind of masochism. He noted that Methodists forced themselves to 
enter a state of dread, remorse and sadness, and saw experiencing grievous emotions as 
a necessary step to conversion: 
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Suppose these Men, before their pretended Conversion, or Regeneration, to have 
a good Dose of Melancholy in their Tempers, this will naturally dispose them to 
terrifying Apprehensions, and mournful Conceits; and, being thus disposed, their 
Fancies are easily impressed with dreadful Images of the Wrath of God, and their 
own undone Condition. And, according as the Temper of their Bodies is more or 
less disposed to Fear, so this frightful Passion continues longer or shorter upon 
them. If it continues longer, it will, from that reiterated or repeated Impressions 
of those dreadful Objects which first raised it, by Degree be heightened into 
Horror and Desperation! And, when it is so, then the Man is under Conviction of 
his undone Condition, and under the Terrors of the Law, and the Spirit of Bondage, 
which, according to the New Method, is always the first Step to Conversion. And 
when the first Fury of Despair is over, it naturally issues into a deep Melancholy, 
and there spreads itself in woeful Regrets, and self-condemning Reflections and 
this is what they call Compunction, which is the next Step to be taken in this 
Methodical Way of Conversion.272 
Religious emotions were thus falsely provoked. Methodists believed that they were 
graced by God simply because ‘they have run through all the Stages of Passion’.273 
Thus, while Methodist preachers’ intense inculcation of shame might have produced 
shamefaced believers, ironically, they might not have any sense of shame at all. 
Critics of Methodist enthusiasm argued that true and sincere spiritual emotions 
should not be imposed from outside by means of terror or superstition. In his Die and 
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be Damned. Or an Antidote against every Species of Methodism and Enthusiasm (1758), 
Thomas Mortimer strongly criticised Methodist ministers for preaching fear by 
conjuring up dreadful and supernatural scenes. As Mortimer observed, many Methodist 
preachers ‘dive into scripture for passages which they wrest in favour of their terrific 
form of preaching the gospel, and as fear is ever predominant in weak minds, they 
endeavour to produce vouchers from holy writ to terrify the ignorant into the belief of 
their particular systems, making their appeals to the passion of fear.’ Opposing the 
invocation of fear, Mortimer argued that ministers should endeavor to ‘implant in the 
minds of men a love of true religion, and a lively faith in Christ, by mild persuasive and 
the cool dictates of reason and argument.’274 In An Essay on the Characteristics of 
Methodism (1781), the eighteenth-century Cambridge graduate John Mainwaring 
argued that true religious affection should be prompted by reason rather than by fear. 
He criticised Methodist preachers for trying to ‘awaken and inflame the devout 
affections, and rouse men to a sense of piety’ by ‘incessant appeal to their fears’. 
Although he acknowledged that fear was a useful spiritual emotion, Mainwaring 
nevertheless argued that ‘a settled piety can only be the result of an informed 
understanding’.275 Because Methodist preachers often exploited fear as a means to 
trigger and reinforce the sense of shame, opponents’ accusation against the invocation 
of fear implied that the sincere emotion of shame should not be exerted by terror. 
Perhaps the most explicit and detailed discussion on the sincerity of religious 
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emotions in the eighteenth century was carried out by Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), 
a prominent evangelical theologian and preacher in New England. In his influential A 
Treatise Concerning Religious Affections (1746), Edwards did not directly discuss the 
emotion of shame, but rather, scrutinised an equivalent spiritual experience: humiliation. 
Like many British commentators of the time, Edwards accepted humiliation as a 
significant spiritual psychology, but warned that a genuine experience of humiliation 
should not be triggered by terror, or expressed by extravagant physical reactions. He 
identified falsely provoked humiliation as ‘legal humiliation’. Acknowledging the 
usefulness of ‘legal humiliation’ in making people ‘sensible that they are little and 
nothing before the great and terrible God, and that they are undone, and wholly 
insufficient to help themselves’, he nonetheless insisted that ‘legal humiliation has in it 
no spiritual good’.276 For Edwards, people in ‘legal humiliation’ are ‘legally humbled 
and have no humility’, and are not truly aware of ‘their own odiousness on the account 
of sin’ or ‘the hateful nature of sin’ because their feelings of shame or humiliation were 
not produced by a deeply affected heart, but rather imposed by the fear of ‘the wrath of 
God’, ‘the strictness of his law’, and ‘the eternal damnation’.277 
 Johnathan Edwards argued that sincere humiliation only belongs to what he 
termed ‘evangelical humiliation’. Edwards defined it as a sense by which ‘a Christian 
has of his own utter insufficiency, despicableness, and odiousness, with an answerable 
frame of heart’.278 In contrast to legal humiliation, the evangelical is a spontaneous and 
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voluntary spiritual feeling or disposition, in which people, by ‘a discovery of the beauty 
of God’s holiness and moral perfection’, are not only convinced of the odious nature of 
sin and the depravity of the self, but voluntarily ‘deny and renounce themselves’ and 
‘sweetly yield themselves at the feet of God’.279 The differences between legal and 
evangelical humiliation indicate that the former is a sense that compels people to 
surrender, while the later encourages wholehearted repentance and reformation. 
Moreover, Edwards regarded evangelical humiliation as ‘the principle part of the great 
Christian duty of self-denial’. True self-denial has two requirements, the first being ‘a 
man’s denying his worldly inclinations, and in forsaking and renouncing all worldly 
objects and enjoyments’; the second, and the more important requirement is the denial 
of ‘his natural self-exaltation, and renouncing his own dignity and glory, and in being 
emptied of himself; so that he does freely and from his very heart renounce himself, 
and annihilate himself’.280  To see whether a man has successfully denied himself 
according to these two requirements helps to judge whether he is in a sincere state of 
humiliation. Self-humiliation is important, but Edwards warned people against spiritual 
pride, arguing that a humble man is never proud of his humiliation, but sees his baseness, 
impotence and filthiness as insufficient. Humiliation is a lifelong disposition; in order 
to maintain this devotional psyche, Edwards advised people to implement ‘a great 
strictness of self-examination’ by asking themselves whether they are ‘thinking highly 
of their humility’: 
If… you answer, No, it seems to me, none are so bad as I. Do not let the matter 
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pass off so; but examine again, whether or not you do not think yourself better 
than others on this very account, because you imagine you think so meanly of 
yourself. Have not you a high opinion of this humility? and if you answer again, 
No; I have not an high opinion of my humility; it seems to me I am as proud as 
the devil; yet examine again, whether self-conceit do not rise up under this cover; 
whether on this very account, that you think yourself as proud as the devil, you 
do not think yourself to be very humble.281 
Emphasising the importance of self-examination in keeping a humble heart not only 
demonstrates that sincere humiliation is a self-imposed experience, but also implies that 
people should express their spiritual affections in a private and moderate way. As 
Edwards wrote, people in true humiliation never showed their humility in ‘any singular 
outward meanness of apparel, or way of living’, and only those who feigned humiliation 
‘are apt to be much in speaking of their humiliation, and to set them forth in high terms, 
and to make a great outward show of humility, in affected looks, gestures, or manners 
of speech, or meanness of apparel, or some affected singularity’.282 
Like seventeenth-century Calvinists and Quakers, Methodists regarded shame as 
an important moral emotion required by everyday spiritual life. Although Methodist 
ministers advised their followers to experience shame through strict self-examination 
and wholehearted prayer, they were notorious for their intense inculcation of spiritual 
emotions by enthusiastic preaching. In particular, they often tried to provoke feelings 
of shame by threatening their flocks with horrendous and superstitious scenes. 
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Contemporaries attacked Methodists’ enthusiastic ways of preaching as fanaticism, and 
claimed that spiritual affections such as shame and sorrow provoked by superstitious 
fear were insincere and fruitless. These criticisms re-confirmed a principle which had 
long been emphasised by Protestant writers, that is, spiritual shame should be a 
spontaneous moral emotion produced by diligent introspection, rather than intense 
inculcation. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how Calvinists, Quakers, and Methodists experienced and 
interpreted the emotion of shame between the mid-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
It is clear that despite the controversies among these groups over ecclesiastical, 
theological and political issues, early modern Protestants, including Quakers, regarded 
shame as a basic, significant moral emotion in spiritual life. In a religious context, 
shame was an immediate emotion arising from an apprehension of sins and spiritual 
laxity, and also a continual inward disposition to self-abasement and unworthiness. 
Three religious groups all praised shame as a penitential and devotional emotion, which 
not only signified faith and piety, but also functioned as a powerful restraint, helping 
people to resist temptation and sin. In addition, spiritual shame is primarily an 
individual, self-imposed emotion. Early modern Protestants embraced shame through 
rigorous self-examination and private confession, and saw shame that was imposed 
from the outside as secondary or even problematic. Devotional life required people to 
keep a watchful eye on sins, and take shame to themselves whenever they committed 
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any sinful behaviour, but also to cloth themselves with humility, and acknowledged 
their lowliness of status. Therefore, shame was a central and lifelong religious 
sentiment, which constituted an important part of the Protestant psyche. 
Besides these shared understandings, it should be noted that the Quaker sense of 
shame had distinctive features. In contrast to Calvinists who believed that only a limited 
number of people could be saved and that it is impossible to experience salvation in this 
world, Quakers maintained that ‘Christ has come to teach his people himself’ and that 
the Kingdom of Heaven could be experienced immediately by all. Convinced Quakers 
believed that they had been superseded by Christ, and entered into a sinless, perfect, 
and infallible state. The extinction of the self-will and the doctrine of perfectionism 
made converted Quakers believe that they had nothing to be ashamed of. In like manner, 
the necessity of self-denial and obeying the divine illumination provided Quakers with 
power to overcome their feelings of shame and fear, and to go naked for a sign. However, 
the sense of shamelessness did not change Quakers’ understandings of shame as a moral 
and individual emotion. Because converted Quakers had to go on living in such a fallen 
world and facing danger of backsliding, they should embrace shame and self-
humiliation in order to preserve the grace of God and prevent themselves from sinning 
again.  
The significance of religious shame seemed to be heightened in the eighteenth 
century. While seventeenth-century Calvinists encouraged people to embrace the 
emotion of shame, eighteenth-century Methodist ministers intensively inculcated 
shame in their flocks. Early Methodist preachers were experts in adopting emotive 
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preaching to terrify followers’ conscience and provoke their spiritual feelings. 
Opponents of enthusiastic Methodism questioned the sincerity of Methodists’ hysterical 
emotional expressions, and argued that sincere spiritual affections such as shame and 
remorse should be moderate, and experienced as a consequence of self-examination 
rather than outside enforcement. 
In spite of these different understandings, the status of shame as a fundamental 
Protestant psyche had changed little. At the end of eighteenth century England 
witnessed the evangelical revival within the Anglican Church. From the writings of the 
leading evangelical revivalists, we find that the importance of shame as a moral and 
individual emotion was continually emphasised. In his letter to a woman in June1777, 
the prominent evangelical cleric John Newton (1725-1807) wrote: ‘one eminent branch 
of our holiness, is a sense of shame and humiliation for those evils which are only 
known to ourselves.’283 Elsewhere Newton re-emphasised that feeling shame was the 
mark of piety and holiness: ‘those who are most spiritual, are most deeply affected with 
shame, humiliation, and grief… because they have the clearest views of the holiness of 
God, the spirituality of the law, the love of Christ, and the deceitfulness of their own 
hearts.’284 The Cambridge evangelical clergyman Charles Simeon (1759-1836) also 
wrote: ‘let our humiliation be deep, and our repentance genuine: let us be willing to 
take shame to our selves both before God and man; and be indifferent about the 
estimation of man, provided we may but obtain in favour of a reconciled God.’285 
                                                             
283 John Newton, The Works of the Rev. John Newton (6 vol, 3rd edn, London, 1824), vol. 1, p. 690. 
284 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 474. 
285 Charles Simeon, The Entire Works of the Rev. C. Simeon (12 vols, London, 1833), vol. 3, pp. 
299-30. 
100 
 
Henry Venn (1725-1797), an Anglican minister and one of the founders of the Clapham 
Sect, taught that only if people degenerated their spirt and embraced shame by making 
themselves ‘more loathsome than the beggar on the dunghill’, would God clothe them 
with ‘the robe of salvation’.286 Like their Puritan forebears, evangelical revivalists 
carried out diligent self-examination in daily life and recorded in diaries their shame 
and sorrow for omissions and commissions. The great abolitionist and evangelical 
William Wilberforce (1759-1833) once lamented: ‘how little good have I done 
compared with what I might have done! What procrastination! Consider in detail how 
deficient in the duties of an M.P., father, master, friend, companion, brother. Resolutions 
broken. Intemperance often. How sinful this when taken in relation to motives to self-
denial, from love to Christ – and to self-extinction, for me a vile ungrateful sinner! Oh 
shame, shame!’287 
We should not deny the positive effects of shame in preventing sins and promoting 
morality. However, in the light of our modern humanistic values, the religious sense of 
shame seems cruel, since it advocated essentially a dehumanised mental state of self-
abasement and lowliness. This oppressive sense of shame was not without challenges 
in early modern time. During the eighteenth century – a century that has been identified 
as an age of enlightenment, refinement and socialisation – the meanings of shame 
witnessed changes. Religious shame played a crucial role in people’s daily life, but it 
did not represent the whole culture of shame. Secular and social factors that emerged 
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in the eighteenth century called for new and refined ways of interpreting shame; at the 
same time, however, they potentially impaired the moral power of shame. It is to these 
secular and social influences on the cultures of shame in an age of enlightenment and 
refinement that the next chapter now turns. 
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Chapter Three 
Shame and the Culture of Politeness 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the ways in which shame was experienced and 
interpreted as a fundamental part of the Protestant psyche in early modern Britain. It 
demonstrated that shame in the religious context was a recurrent emotion or inward 
state of self-loathing and unworthiness, in which people blushed for their sins and 
backslidings, and abased themselves as worms and dust before God. Shame was self-
imposed, either by the reproach of conscience or the imagined surveillance of God, and 
was considered positively by Protestant theologians as ‘bridles or restraints which God 
hath put upon humane nature’ and a means to come closer to God.288 
This chapter offers a closer look at the culture of shame in a more secular and 
social context, with particular attention to the question of how shame was interpreted 
and discussed in eighteenth-century polite society. The chapter comprises three sections. 
The first section provides an intellectual history of the emotion of shame by examining 
the works of enlightenment writers such as John Locke, Anthony Ashley Cooper, 
Bernard Mandeville, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam Smith, and examines 
how their views on shame differed from each other and religious interpretations. The 
second section discusses how feelings of shame were refined in order to meet the 
requirements of, and to promote, polite social communication. The final section will 
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explore the impact of polite culture on the relationship between notions of shame based 
on absolute moral standards and those constructed by relative social opinion, and then 
discuss how codes of politeness potentially undermined the moral power of shame, and 
reduced it to a superficial feeling without moral depth. 
This chapter argues that the eighteenth-century culture of politeness played an 
important role in elevating social factors to a place of significance in interpreting and 
experiencing shame. In addition, principles of sociability and refinement inculcated a 
moderate sense of shame, which required people to be modest and humble in polite 
social interaction, without involving self-abasing elements of shame such as excessive 
humility, unworthiness and bashfulness that had long been approved by religious and 
moral writers. Furthermore, seeing politeness as a synthesis of outward polish with 
inner virtue, polite writers argued that the sense of shame should be constructed by both 
moral and social values. The moral and social constructions of shame were not 
necessarily at odds with each other insofar as social judgement accorded with moral 
norms. However, under the influence of polite culture, the importance of social opinion 
in incurring shame became so great that it could be separate from and even subvert 
moral standards. The consequence of this was increasing anxiety about the growth of 
what many polite writers termed ‘false shame’, a morally superficial and harmful 
emotion that relied entirely on the opinion of others, which mainly derived from the 
judgment of, for example, a person’s appearance or outer fashion rather than his or her 
true moral quality or learning. 
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Secularising Shame 
While the polite ideal first emerged as a form of personal and social refinement in the 
late seventeenth century, there was also a simultaneous growing interest in the cult of 
the emotions. Throughout the long-eighteenth century, a large number of treatises were 
published in the effort to explore the nature of human emotions, and to teach readers 
how to regulate and exploit their passions or affections in both religious and social lives. 
Historians attribute this rising interest in emotions to the impact of polite culture. As 
Thomas Dixon claims, ‘a governed and rational passion, properly educated and smartly 
dressed, could be deemed to have won the approval of the will and intellect, and to have 
gained entry into polite society in the form of sympathy, affection or sentiment.’289 The 
emergence of John Locke’s empirical philosophy can be seen as another impetus for 
the contemporary interest in human psychology. Inspired in part by the Newtonian view 
that rational laws of the universe could be processed through the human faculty of 
sensation, and also in order to counter the Cambridge Platonist’s belief in the inborn or 
pre-existing nature of reason and the unreliability of sensation in understanding reality, 
Locke compared the human mind to a blank slate or Tabula rasa wherein reason was 
not naturally given, but originated in the accumulation of experience derived from 
sensation and reflection. Feelings, as a basic form of physical sense and an important 
way of accessing knowledge, thus became an object of much academic discussion. 
The proliferation of writings on the emotions can also be seen as a critical response 
to the epicurean account of human nature held by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and 
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Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733), and also to the Calvinist belief in the total depravity 
of humanity. In Leviathan (1651) Hobbes argued that human beings were driven by 
appetites and desires, and that virtue was the product of selfishness. Similarly, 
Mandeville in his The Fable of the Bees (the 1714 edition) upheld the view that 
humanity was selfish and greedy, arguing that self-interested actions could contribute 
to social welfare. Such cynical and pessimistic attitudes about human nature provoked 
much criticism from eighteenth-century philosophers and moralists. Critics argued 
against the sinful origins of humanity, claiming that people not only had an innate 
faculty of morality to subdue vice and pursue virtue, but also possessed sentiments such 
as benevolence and sympathy by which to promote the public good. In this way, 
emotion was closely associated with morality, and became an important means of 
feeling, practising, and expressing virtues. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, the Methodist movement, characterised by its passionate and emotive 
religiosity, furthered contemporary debates on religious affections. It was within this 
mixed context that the human faculty of feeling was placed under great scrutiny in the 
late-seventeenth and eighteenth-century religious, philosophical, and scientific writings. 
Shame, as a basic human emotion, became one of the most frequently discussed 
subjects. 
In order to understand the meaning of shame in relation to polite society, a brief 
look at contemporary attitudes towards the nature of ‘passion’ is required. Briefly, early 
modern discourse on the passions was twofold. On the one hand, both religious and 
secular writers inherited the Stoic view, and warned about the negative aspects of the 
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passions, arguing that passions were the violent and troubling movement of the soul, 
and could lead people to immorality and sin. In his Characters of the Virtues and Vice 
of the Age (1695), Abel Boyer, a French-English scholar, wrote that ‘there is in all 
passions a kind of injustice and self-interest, which makes them very dangerous to be 
followed’.290 The Anglican clergyman Francis Bragge (1664-1728) also observed that 
when people were vehemently moved and affected by the passions, they would feel ‘a 
kind of uneasiness and pain, and suffer under the violent impressions’.291 Isaac Watts 
in his The Doctrine of the Passions Explained and Improved (1724) warned about the 
dangers of ungoverned passions: 
Ungoverned passions break all the bonds of human society and peace, and would 
change the tribes of mankind into brutal herds, or make the world a mere 
wilderness of savages. Passions unbridled would violate all the sacred ties of 
religion, and raise the sons of men in arms against their creator. Where passion 
runs riot, there are none of the rights of God or man secure from its insolences.292 
Later writers continually expressed their mistrust of passions, stressing the need to 
subdue rebellious feelings. In 1790, for example, Edmund Burke claimed that ‘not only 
that the passions of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and body 
as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted, their 
will controlled, and their passions brought into subjection’.293 
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On the other hand, contemporary writers acknowledged the fact that passions had 
moral, religious, and intellectual values when they were well regulated and directed by 
virtue and reason. According to Watts, ‘when the passions are once set right, they 
become exceeding serviceable to us in things that relate to God, and to our neighbour, 
as well as to ourselves.’ He further claimed that the rightly regulated passions were 
‘lively, warm, and vigorous principles and powers in our nature, which animate us to 
pursue good, and avoid the evil’, and that even ‘painful passions may be happily 
engaged in the interest of God and religion’.294 Similarly, in his The Government of the 
Passions (1704) William Ayloffe wrote that if passions could receive ‘great advantages 
from the assistance of virtue, after some training in her school, they repay her richly, 
and served her as faithfully’.295 Thus, passions, as Bragge wrote, ‘are not designed to 
be destroyed’, but rather might be of great use if they ‘are governed by reason and 
religion’.296 Early modern writers called such well-regulated and morally-constructed 
passions ‘affections’ or ‘sentiments’, and used these terms to distinguish milder, rational, 
and virtuous forms of feeling from violent, ungoverned, and morally-problematic 
passions. It is noteworthy that both religious and secular writings of the time 
encouraged people to cultivate godly, virtuous affections.297 A typical example of these 
works comes from Jonathan Edwards’s Treatise Concerning Religious Affections, in 
which he wrote: ‘holy affections are not heat without light, but evermore arise from 
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some information of the understanding, some spiritual instruction that the mind receives, 
some light or actual knowledge.’298 The Scottish moral philosopher Francis Hutcheson 
(1694-1746) advocated ‘universal calm good-will or benevolence’, which he regarded 
as ‘the leading affection of the soul’ and ‘the highest perfection of our nature’ that every 
person should have in order to promote morality and to restrain self-interested and 
irrational appetites or passions.299 
The interpretation of the human faculty of feeling determined how the emotion of 
shame was treated by contemporary scholars. All passions should be placed on moral 
ground, and shame was no exception. In the following discussion, we shall see that 
secular discussions shared the religious view that shame was an emotion of great moral 
values, and functioned as a means to defend virtue and resist sin. However, what made 
secular interpretations different from religious ones is that eighteenth-century 
philosophers generally regarded shame as a social emotion, which was closely 
connected with a sense of honour and reputation, and usually occurred as a result of 
external judgement rather than self-examination. 
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke defined shame as 
‘Uneasiness of the Mind, upon the Thought of having done something, which is 
indecent, or will lessen the valued Esteem which others have for us’.300 However, it 
was in his famous writing on education that Locke provided a more detailed discussion 
of the moral value and social dimension of shame. For Locke, one of the most important 
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ways of teaching children virtue and good manners was to inculcate them with deep-
seated senses of honour and shame. Locke saw this early planted sense of shame as ‘the 
great Secret of Education’, claiming that ‘Esteem and Disgrace are… the most powerful 
incentives to the Mind… If you can once get into Children a Love of Credit, and an 
Apprehension of Shame and Disgrace, you have put into them the true Principle, which 
will constantly work, and incline them to the right.’301 According to Locke, since 
youngsters, even at very early ages, were sensitive to praise and commendations, 
parents should therefore take advantage of this natural disposition to teach their children 
that ‘those that are commended, and in Esteem for doing well, will necessarily beloved 
and cherished by every Body, and… when any one by Miscarriage falls into Disesteem, 
and cares not to preserve his Credit, he will unavoidably fall under Neglect and 
Contempt.’302 When children made a mistake, parents should show them ‘a cold and 
neglectful countenance’ and only in this way could they learn ‘modesty and shame’ and 
‘quickly come to have a natural abhorrence for that which they found made them 
slighted and neglected by everybody’. 303  Corporal punishments such as whipping 
should be carefully avoided, because, as Locke wrote: 
If the greatest Part of the Trouble be not the Sense that they have done amiss, and 
the Apprehension that they have drawn on themselves the just Displeasure of their 
best Friends, the Pain of Whipping will work but an imperfect Cure. It only 
patches up for the present, and skins it over, but reaches not to be the Bottom of 
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the fore-ingenious Shame, and the Apprehensions of Displeasure, are the only 
true Restraint.304 
The only fault that deserved harsh correction was ‘obstinacy or rebellion’, but even in 
these circumstances, ‘the Shame of the whipping, and not the Pain, should be the 
greatest Part of the Punishment’, since ‘Shame of doing amiss, and deserving 
Chastisement, is the only true Restraint belonging to Virtue.’305 In addition, children’s 
sense of shame was fragile, and should be carefully preserved. Hence, rebukes and 
chiding must be ‘not only in sober, grave, and unpassionate Words, but also alone and 
in private’. If parents exposed their children to shame by publishing their miscarriages, 
children would become ‘less careful to preserve other good Thoughts of them’ and 
suspect that ‘their Reputation with them is already blemished’.306 
Locke’s Some Thought Concerning Education is not concerned with feelings or 
psychology, but his view on shame coincided with, and indeed influenced, the 
eighteenth-century moral philosophers’ interpretations of this emotion. The sense of 
shame that Locke fervently advocated was essentially a socially-constructed and 
honour-oriented one. But emphasising the social origin of shame and the importance of 
external judgement did not mean that shame was irrelevant to moral values. Indeed, 
Locke did not regard reputation as ‘the true Principle and Measure of Virtue’, but 
believed that a good reputation made young people ‘come nearest to it’.307 Shame was 
not just a means of education, but became the very purpose of it, since this emotion 
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contained the seeds of virtue and civility, and led youngsters to good manners and 
politeness. 
 Walter Charleton, in his philosophical treatise A Natural History of the Passions 
(1701), shared Locke’s view on the social and moral natures of shame. According to 
Charleton, shame was a grievous passion, but its outcome might be positive, since it 
gave people ‘more wariness for the future’, and excited ‘an expectation of 
amendment’.308 The feelings of shame and glory were psychological responses to the 
consideration of ‘what opinion other men have of us’. These two feelings, as Charleton 
remarked, ‘though directly opposite each to other, do yet agree in their end, which is to 
incite us to virtue; the first by hope, the other by fear: and that we may make a right use 
of them both, we are to have our judgment well instructed what actions are truly worthy 
praise or dispraise.’309 Francis Hutcheson in his An Essay on the Nature and Conduct 
of the Passions and Affections (1728) also highlighted the social nature of shame. He 
regarded shame as an emotion that belonged to what he termed ‘a sense of honour’ and 
‘the public passions’, and defined it as ‘an uneasy sensation only arises from 
Apprehension of other people’s dislike, condemnation, or resentment of injuries done 
by us’.310 The social dimension of shame was also reflected in the fact that ‘men may 
feel the Passion of Shame for the dishonourable Actions of others’.311 Furthermore, 
Hutcheson stressed the essentiality of moral norms in constructing notions of shame 
and honour: 
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To be honoured, highly esteemed, valued, praised, or on the contrary, to be 
despised, undervalued, censured or condemned; to be proud or ashamed, are 
words without any meaning, if we take away a moral sense. A sense of morality 
there must be, and natural it must be, if the desire of esteem, pride or shame be 
natural.312 
While Hutcherson defined shame as a sense of honour that relied on the opinion 
of others, two Scottish moral philosophers, David Hume and Adam Smith, offered a 
more detailed and systematic discussion of the social nature of shame. In his A Treatise 
of Human Nature (1738), Hume wrote that ‘hatred, resentment, esteem, love, courage, 
mirth, and melancholy; all these passions I feel more from communication than from 
my own natural temper and disposition’.313 The ‘communication’ of passions between 
people was a process which Hume termed ‘sympathy’. Sympathy enabled passions to 
‘pass with the greatest facility from one person to another, and produce correspondent 
movements in all human breasts.’314 For Hume, men were not self-sufficient in terms 
of feelings, but had to ‘always consider the sentiments of others in their judgement of 
themselves’; without the influence of external or socially-transmitted emotions, 
personal feelings such as shame and pride would not be produced.315 
It was through the theory of sympathy that Hume firmly deemed shame to be a 
social emotion. Hume did not directly discuss ‘shame’ in his A Treatise of Human 
Nature, but scrutinised the passion of ‘humility’ and the opposite feeling of pride. 
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According to Hume, the first requisite for experiencing humility is that there existed an 
‘unhappy’ or ‘disagreeable’ subject, and that this subject should have a close, peculiar 
relation to the self. The subject might be ‘every valuable quality of the mind’ such as 
morality, learning, and wit, or those relating to the body such as a person’s appearance 
and strength, or external things such as house, garden, wealth, clothes, and title.316 
However, merely an unhappy or disapproved of subject would not be sufficient to incur 
humility. Here, Hume stressed the necessity of social judgement, arguing that it was not 
the unhappy thing, but the unhappy feelings of others received by us through sympathy 
that eventually provoked our sense of shame. Accordingly, ‘virtue, beauty and riches 
have little influence’ on the passion of pride when they are ‘not seconded by the 
opinions and sentiments of others’.317 
The importance of social factors is further reflected in their capacity to decide on 
the strength of the experience of humility. For Hume, the degrees of ‘social relation’ 
between the self and others influenced how powerfully a person’s feeling of humility 
operated. The first type of ‘social relation’ refers to the extent of a man’s respect or 
esteem to persons who made judgement of him. Thus, Hume observed that humans 
were more likely to feel shame before the person they reverenced: 
We receive a much greater satisfaction from the approbation of those, whom we 
ourselves esteem and approve of, than of those, whom we hate and despise. In 
like manner we are principally mortified with the contempt of persons, upon 
whose judgement we set some value, and are, in a great measure, indifferent about 
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the opinions of the rest of mankind.318 
Another type of ‘social relation’ refers to the extent of familiarity between the self and 
others. Thus, Hume wrote: ‘we are most uneasy under the contempt of persons, who 
are both related to us by blood, and contiguous in place.’319 In order to mitigate feelings 
of humiliation, a man could ‘seek to diminish this sympathy by separating these 
relations’, and place himself ‘in a contiguity to strangers, and at a distance from 
relations’. This helps to explain why a poor man who was ‘lightly treated’ by strangers 
would find himself ‘easier in that situation’ than when he ‘was everyday exposed to the 
contempt of his kindred and countrymen’,320 and also why ‘men of good families but 
narrow circumstances’ chose to ‘leave their friends and country, and seek their 
livelihood by mean and mechanical employments among strangers, than among those, 
who are acquainted with their birth and education’.321 This evidence demonstrates that 
humility or shame, in the philosophy of Hume, was an externally imposed emotion that 
was aroused as the result of a person’s sympathetic or secondary experience of other 
people’ dissentient opinions, rather than a self-condemnation arising from the work of 
conscience or other innate principles. 
The socially-constructed nature of shame was further confirmed by Adam Smith. 
In his The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Smith inherited Hume’s theory of 
sympathy, and developed it by introducing the concept of ‘impartial spectator’, arguing 
that sympathy is not simply a transfer of feelings between persons, but rather a process 
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of mirroring and imagination, in which one person imagines that there is an impartial 
spectator who comes to feel and reconstruct the passions of others by putting himself 
in their situations which he watches. ‘As we have no immediate experience of what 
other men feel,’ Smith wrote, ‘we can form no idea of the manner in which they are 
affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation.’322 
Shame is an emotion felt as a result of sympathy. Thus, according to Smith, when ‘we 
blush for the impudence and rudeness of another’ it is not because that person feels 
shame and transfers this passion to us – in fact, he may have no sense of shame of his 
behaviour at all – but due to the fact that ‘we cannot help feeling with what confusion 
we ourselves should be covered, had we behaved in so absurd a manner.’323 In cases 
where an individual feels a sense of shame for violating moral norms, the passion of 
shame is provoked because that person views impropriety and wickedness ‘in the light 
in which the impartial spectator would view it’, and realises that his or her immoral 
actions will ‘ever come to be generally known’ and ‘excite detestation and resentment’ 
of others.324 
Although it would seem that the concept of the spectator is somewhat similar to 
that of conscience which religious writers regarded as the vicegerent of God, and indeed 
Smith often used ‘spectator’ interchangeably with other terms and phrases such as 
‘conscience’, ‘reason’, ‘the inhabitant of the breast’, ‘the man within’, and ‘the great 
judge and arbiter of our conduct’, Smith nonetheless argued that the passions or 
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opinions reproduced by this imagined spectator were social in nature: 
Our continual observations upon the conduct of others certain lead us to form to 
ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done 
or to be avoided. Some of their actions shock all our natural sentiments. We hear 
every body about us express the like detestation against them. This still further 
confirms, and even exasperates, our natural sense of their deformity. It satisfies 
us that we view them in the proper light, when we see other people view them in 
the same light. We resolve never to be guilty of the like, nor ever, upon any 
account, to render ourselves in this manner the objects of universal 
disapprobation. We thus naturally lay down to ourselves a general rule, that all 
such actions are to be avoided, as tending to render us odious, contemptible, or 
punishable – the objects of all those sentiments for which we have the greatest 
dread and aversion.325 
Thus, it is neither God, nor innate principles, but values shaped by social interactions 
that decide the opinions of spectator, the rules for self-examination, and the basis of 
sympathy. ‘Man alone cannot reflect upon his behaviour’, wrote Smith, but when he is 
brought into ‘society’, he will be ‘immediately provided with the mirror which he 
wanted before.’326 This ‘mirror’ is essentially the sight seen by the spectator, whose 
feelings or opinions with regard to his host’s appearance or manners are, in fact, the 
reflections of social norms and customs. Without the involvement of social judgement, 
emotions such as shame and pride will not exist. Thus, a wicked person will not feel 
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‘the agonies of shame’ if he ‘never can reflect on the sentiment which mankind must 
entertain with regard to him’. 327  Similarly, if a man isolated himself from social 
interactions, as Smith wrote, 
He would not be cast down with inward shame at the thought of this deformity; 
nor would he be elevated with secret triumph of mind from the consciousness of 
the contrary beauty. All such sentiments suppose the idea of some other being, 
who is the natural judge of the person that feels them; and it is only by sympathy 
with the decision of this arbiter of his conduct, that he can conceive either the 
triumph of self-applause or the shame of self-condemnation.328 
Emphasising the social nature of shame does not mean that Smith ignored the 
importance of morality in constructing a sense of shame. Possibly impressed by the 
negative impact of polite and commercial society of the time, Smith in the sixth edition 
of his The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790) added a chapter entitled Of the corruption 
of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to the rich and the 
great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition. In this new chapter, 
Smith expressed his anxiety about the growth of what he thought were the false senses 
of shame and honour. To acquire and enjoy the admiration of others is the great 
objective of humans; however, as Smith observed, many contemporaries abandoned 
‘the paths of virtue’, and increasingly saw ‘wealth and greatness’ as the only measure 
of honour and the means to build up a reputation.329 In the superior circle of society, 
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‘success and preferment depend, not upon the esteem of intelligent and well-informed 
equals, but upon the fanciful and foolish favour of ignorant, presumptuous, and proud 
superiors’.330 Moreover, ordinary people were proud to imitate the fashionable dress, 
conversation, deportment, and even vices and follies of the rich and great. Such a vain 
individual ‘assumes the equipage and splendid way of living of his superiors, without 
considering, that whatever may be praise worthy in any of these derives its whole merit 
and propriety from its suitableness to that situation and fortune which both require, and 
can easily support the expense.’331 For Smith, the love of glory and the fear of shame 
are dispositions of the same nature; things building up the honour of an individual will 
also lead him or her to shame if that things changes to the opposite. Therefore, once 
people sought to build up reputation merely by means of outer fashions and vain 
admirations, as Smith warned, the sense of shame would inevitably become a shallow 
one. It was no longer either wickedness or vice, but poverty or unfashionable dress that 
made people blush. 
The social and moral dimensions of shame were continually affirmed by the late 
eighteenth-century scholars. For example, in his A Short View of the Human Faculties 
and Passions (1770), John Bethum argued that ‘love of fame and fear of shame… are 
such powerful and prevalent motives of action, that they must not be weakened or 
suppressed without substituting higher principles in their stead.’ Like most other 
contemporary academic analysts, Bethum argued that the fear of shame ‘serves for the 
restraint’ of our conduct, making us ‘renounce our follies’ – a function that many ‘higher 
                                                             
330 Ibid., p. 87. 
331 Ibid., p. 88. 
119 
 
principles are wanting’. 332  At the end of the eighteenth century, a scholar named 
Kingsmill Davan likewise emphasised the importance of the social nature and moral 
value of shame: ‘shame arises from a sense of doing what may degrade our character 
in the opinion of others’, it ‘displays a graceful virtuous mind’, and only ‘the vicious’ 
who ‘has lost native feelings’ and ‘the path to returning virtue’ cannot blush.333 
While most eighteenth-century philosophers and academic analysts regarded 
shame as a socially-constructed emotion of great moral values, we should nevertheless 
be aware that there were scholars such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of 
Shaftesbury, who insisted that shame was a private emotion immune to social opinion, 
and some writers, most notably Bernard Mandeville and David Hume, questioned the 
moral origin of shame and regarded it as potentially a mentally harmful emotion. Thus, 
in his Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711), Shaftesbury argued 
against those who claimed that ‘vice, virtue, honour, shame, all this is found in Opinion 
only’ and that ‘Opinion is law and Measure’, claiming instead that the passion of shame 
derives from a sense of ‘what is shameful and odious in itself’, rather than of ‘what is 
hurtful or dangerous in its Consequence’ due to the condemnation of others. Thus, for 
Shaftesbury, shame is not a social emotion, but rather a private one, decided on by the 
moral values of the self: 
The greatest Danger in the world can never breed Shame: nor can the Opinion of 
all the World compel us to it, where our own Opinion is not Party. We may be 
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afraid of appearing impudent, and may therefore feign a Modesty. But we can 
never really blush for any thing but what we truly think Shameful, and what we 
shou’d still blush for, notwithstanding we were ever so secure as to our Interest, 
and out of reach of all Inconvenience that cou’d happen to us from the thing we 
are asham’d of.334 
Bernard Mandeville in his notorious The Fable of the Bees, agreed with John 
Locke about the crucial role of education in cultivating a sense of shame, but pointed 
out the selfish and hypocritical motive of feeling shame, arguing that ‘shame’ and 
‘modesty’ are nothing but a means to hide our strongest passions of ‘Lust, Pride, and 
Selfishness’, and by which to help us to receive ‘the Esteem of others’, and to enjoy 
‘our sensual Pleasures’ and ‘all worldly Comforts’.335  Thus, a man who does not 
conceal or restrain his passions by a sense of shame, and offers to ‘speak the Truth of 
his Heart and what he feels within’ by telling a woman that ‘he could like no body so 
well to propagate his Species upon as herself’, will be called ‘a Brute’ and ‘the most 
contemptible Creature upon Earth’.336 By contrast, a well-educated gentleman can gain 
‘the Good Will’ and ‘the Affection of the Women’ by hiding his real appetite and 
showing modesty, even if his ‘Inclination to a Woman’ is as violent ‘as the brutish 
Fellow’.337 Mandeville pointed out the self-interested motive for feeling shame, but he 
nonetheless acknowledged the potential moral and social values of this somewhat 
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selfish and pretended emotion. ‘It is Shame and Education that contain the Seeds of all 
Politeness,’ wrote Mandeville, ‘it is incredible how necessary an Ingredient Shame is 
to make us sociable… The Happiness of Conversation depends upon it, and no Society 
could be polish’d, if the Generality of Mankind was not subject to it.’338 
Although Hume firmly identified shame as a social emotion, it should be noted 
that unlike many religious or secular moralists who regarded humility as a virtue and 
pride a sin, he questioned the moral origin of humility, and regarded it as a mentally 
problematic emotion. According to Hume, ‘morality is more properly felt than judged 
of… The uneasiness and satisfaction are not only inseparable from vice and virtue, but 
constitute their very nature and essence.’339 According to Hume, while the passion of 
pride originates from a satisfaction with, or admiration for, virtue and beauty and 
therefore should be cherished as a positive sentiment, humility, given its painful and 
uneasy nature, is produced as a result of vice: 
There may be some … [who] may here be surpriz’d to hear me talk of virtue as 
exciting pride, which they look upon as a vice; and of vice as producing humility, 
which they having been taught to consider as a virtue. But… I observe, that by 
pride I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the 
view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfy’d with 
ourselves: And that by humility I mean the opposite impression. ’Tis evident the 
former impression is not always vicious, nor the latter virtuous. The most rigid 
morality allows to us to receive a pleasure from reflecting on a generous action; 
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and ’tis by none esteem’d a virtue to feel any fruitless remorse upon the thoughts 
of past villainy and baseness.340 
Furthermore, Hume argued that ‘pride and vanity’ might invigorate and exalt the mind, 
while excessive humility and self-abasement would ‘deject and infeeble the human 
souls’.341 For Hume, ‘a well-established pride and self-esteem’ are laudable, since they 
make us ‘sensible of our own merit, and give us a confidence and assurance in all our 
projects and enterprizes’. And it would be ‘more advantageous to overrate our merit, 
than to form ideas of it, below its just standard’ because ‘fortune commonly favours the 
bold and enterprising; and nothing inspires us with more boldness than a good opinion 
of ourselves’. By contrast, a modest, self-abasing disposition ‘produces often 
uneasiness in the person endowed with it’.342 
This section has offered an intellectual history of shame by examining some of the 
most influential philosophical works of the eighteenth century. Indeed, as this 
discussion has indicated, any attempt to identify the emotion of shame as purely a social, 
private or moral emotion will oversimplify the complexity of shame. Secular 
interpretations of shame were not entirely coincident with the religious ones. And even 
within the secular context, contemporary scholars did not offer a single or coherent 
discourse about the passion of shame. However, despite Mandeville’s and Hume’s 
questioning of the moral origin of shame, and Shaftesbury’s view of shame as a private 
emotion, there can be little doubt that the majority of writers reviewed in this section 
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were inclined to identify shame as a social emotion decided by other’s judgement, and 
a sentiment of great moral values in promoting virtues and manners. If religious shame 
was essentially a private emotion concerning personal salvation, shame in a more 
secular context was chiefly a social emotion concerning one’s public honour or 
reputation. These secular discourses were more than just ideas; in fact, they mirrored 
contemporary concerns about shame, and can be seen as a critical response to what 
many conduct writers saw as the ‘false shame’ which either impeded, or resulted from, 
polite society. It is to the polite writers’ discussions on the right and wrong senses of 
shame that the next section now turns. 
 
‘Modest without being bashful’: Impolite Shame 
On 17 September 1751, The Rambler published a letter from a young gentleman who 
complained of his own shamefacedness and awkward manners at his friend’s wedding-
day celebration. The young man was virtuous and well-educated. From early childhood 
he had been ‘inculcated nothing but the dignity of knowledge and the happiness of 
virtue’, which not only encouraged him to pursue his studies with ‘incessant industry’, 
and to avoid everything which he ‘considered as vicious’, but convinced him that ‘a 
tainted reputation the greatest calamity’. After graduating from the university, he sought 
to seize every opportunity to display his virtue and learning, hoping to be admired and 
to build a reputation. Undoubtedly, the young man would not decline his friend’s 
invitation to the wedding-day celebration. On the day of celebration, however, when 
the young gent entered the dining room and saw how ‘the whole company rose’ at his 
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entrance, he was abashed and overwhelmed by timidity: 
I saw so many eyes fixed at once upon me, I was blasted with a sudden imbecility, 
I was quelled by some nameless power which I found impossible to be resisted. 
My sight was dazzled, my cheeks glowed, my perceptions were confounded; I 
was harassed by the multitude of eager salutations, and returned the common 
civilities with hesitation and importunity. The sense of my own blunders 
increasing my confusion, and before the exchange of ceremonies allowed me to 
sit down, I was ready to sink under the oppression of surprize; my voice grew 
weak, and my knees trembled. 
The state of confusion and bashfulness continued when he found himself unable to 
answer other people’s questions that were ‘seldom discussed in books’. Fortunately, a 
clergyman rescued the young man with questions about Newtonian philosophy, which 
made him ‘rouse from depression and discourse with ease and volubility’. But he soon 
realised that ‘however I might please myself, I found very little added by my 
demonstrations to the satisfaction of the company’, since his antagonist, who knew ‘the 
laws of conversation too well to detain their attention long upon an unpleasing topic’, 
dismissed the controversy, and resigned the young gent to his ‘former insignificance 
and perplexity’. The experience of humiliation became acute when he heard several 
men in the company ridiculing ‘the uselessness of universities, the folly of book-
learning, and the awkwardness of scholars’. After dinner, the young man was invited to 
the tea table of the ladies, wherein he resolved to recover his credit by showing ‘graceful 
compliment’ and saying ‘something pretty’ to them. He tried to recollect all he had read 
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or heard in praise of beauty, but could find nothing to say. At this moment, the young 
man was overwhelmed by shame: 
There are not many situations more incessantly uneasy than that in which the man 
is placed who is watching an opportunity to speak, without courage to take it 
when it is offered… I was ashamed of silence, yet could find nothing to say of 
elegance or importance equal to my wishes. The ladies, afraid my learning, 
thought themselves not qualified to propose any subject of rattle to a man so 
famous for dispute, and there was nothing on either side but impatience and 
vexation. 
When the young gent finally found ‘a happy compliment’ after ‘long indulgence in 
meditation’, he accidentally dropped the saucer from his hand. ‘The cup was broken, 
the lap-dog was scalded, a brocaded petticoat was stained, and the whole assembly was 
thrown into disorder.’ Realising that all hopes of reputation were gone, he stole away 
in silence. It was at this moment that the young man’s feeling of shame reached its peak: 
Shame, above any other passion, propagates itself. Before those who have seen 
me confused, I can never appear without new confusion, and the remembrance of 
the weakness which I formerly discovered, hinders me acting or speaking with 
my natural force.343 
Samuel Johnson’s portrait of this unsociable, gauche and pedantic young man 
provided a typical example of impolite personality and unsuccessful communication, 
which not only taught readers that desirable manners and address were of equal 
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importance as virtue and learning in polite society, but also demonstrated the 
significance of ‘easiness’ – a term that polite writers regarded as a ‘naturally free and 
unconfined’ way of communication, without involving ‘harshness, formality, forced 
behaviour or conceits’ – in modern polite sociability.344 But in terms of the aim of this 
chapter, another, and indeed a more important, implication of this negative example is 
reflected in a phrase which Johnson quoted from Homer and used as a prologue of the 
story: ‘shame greatly hurts or greatly helps mankind.’345  We have seen that early 
modern authors identified modesty, awkwardness and bashfulness as dispositions that 
belonged to the sense of shame basically because they all involved a low self-esteem 
and an awareness of weakness, incompetence or inferiority of the self. Researching 
contemporary discussions about modesty in the context of politeness thus provides a 
new way of thinking about shame. As we shall see in this section, a modest, bashful 
disposition, which had long been regarded by both religious and secular moralists as a 
sign of virtue, became an object of refinement in polite society. 
That modesty was a virtue and a significant element of good manners is well 
known. But the eighteen-century emphasis on the importance of modesty was not 
simply a restatement of an old theme. For polite theorists and conduct writers, modesty 
was one of the central principles of politeness, because it represented a scrupulous 
disposition and involved a natural shame and avoidance of vice, which they saw as 
virtuous qualities that helped to guard one’s innocence and promote virtue. A modest 
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man was sensitive to shame, and always got ready to blush for any of vicious things 
and misbehaviours committed or encountered. Spectator No. 373 defined modesty as 
‘the Reflection of an Ingenuous Mind, either when a Man has committed an Action for 
which he censures himself, or fancies that he is exposed to the Censure of others’. ‘A 
Man truly Modest,’ as the Spectator further pointed out, ‘is as much so when he is alone 
as in Company, and as subject to a Blush in his Closet, as when the Eyes of Multitudes 
are upon him.’346 It was natural for females to be more inclined to be modest. For a 
woman, as Addison wrote, modesty ‘is not only an Ornament, but also a Guard to Virtue. 
It is a kind of quick and delicate Feeling in the Soul, which makes her shrink and 
withdraw her self from every thing that has Danger in it. It is such an exquisite 
Sensibility, as warns her to shun the first Appearance of every thing which is hurtful.’347 
In his A Compleat Treatise of Moral and Intellectual Virtues (1722), John Hartcliffe, a 
Cambridge scholar and conduct writer, spelled out the correlation between modesty and 
shame and how a modest disposition functioned as a means of preventing sins. ‘We 
must put on such a Modesty, as may guard our Virtue against the strongest persuasions 
to Evil,’ said Hartcliffe; a modest man ‘blushes at the Sound of an Oath, and is ashamed 
of Drinking; he is too bashful for the Chamber of the Whore, and cannot behold the 
detestable Foreheads of the violent, unjust, and debauched Race of Mankind, without 
great Confusion of Face.’348 
Another reason for emphasising modesty in polite society lay in the notion that a 
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modest person’s aptitude for self-control, avoidance of exaggeration, and unassuming 
characters were desirable qualities that contributed to both elegant manners and a new 
model of an easy, polite, and mutually-respected sociability. ‘True politeness is modest,’ 
an eighteenth-century French behavioural guide remarked.349 Here, modesty was not 
just a fear of shame or a watchful sensibility about immorality and sin, but rather, was 
a lasting and natural disposition to self-denial, which reminded a person of his or her 
own disadvantages, and required them to hold a moderate and even a lower self-
estimation. According to James Fordyce, modesty required us ‘not to rate our abilities 
or attainments… beyond their value, which must be estimated exactly in proportion to 
the pious, the benevolent, and the prudent use we make of them. Nor are we to 
contemplate only the bright side of our conduct, but to look also at those frailties and 
failing.’350 Regarding modesty as ‘one of the most attractive virtues that belongs to 
man’, the Scottish scholar Henry Home (1696-1782) warned his readers against the 
passion of pride, which he saw as ‘self-esteem in excess’, which was so ‘hateful’ that 
‘ought to be repressed by every possible mortification’.351 
Although the dispositions of modesty and shame were of great help to personal 
and social refinement, they were not without problems. It is striking that eighteenth-
century conduct writers increasingly warned readers of the harm of excessive modesty, 
arguing that true modesty should be moderate, without involving the false, self-abasing 
elements of shame such as bashfulness, diffidence, humiliation and unworthiness. In 
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polite society, an overly modest or shamefaced disposition was regarded as anti-social, 
since it contradicted the easy, informal and sociable ways of communication. In the 
eighteenth century, the conflict between excessive modesty and refined sociability 
became so great that some contemporaries even regarded ‘modesty’ as a pejorative term. 
‘A modest Man,’ as the Spectator observed, ‘is very often used to signify a sheepish 
awkward Fellow, who has neither Good-breeding, Politeness, nor any Knowledge of 
the World.’ 352  Locke also wrote that ‘there is often in people a clownish 
shamefacedness, before Strangers, or those above them: They are confounded in their 
Thoughts, Words, and Looks; and so lose themselves, in that Confusion, as not to be 
able to do any thing, or at least not do with that Freedom and Gracefulness’. Seeing this 
sheepish shamefacedness as a mark of ill-breeding, Locke argued that the only way to 
overcome the false sense of shame was ‘not to think meanly of ourselves’. 353  In 
Spectator No. 484, Steele regarded modesty not as ‘a certain Indication of Merit’, but 
‘a certain Obstacle to the producing of it’, because ‘under the Notion of modesty, Men 
have indulged themselves in a Spiritless Sheepishness’, which led those who indulged 
in it to give away every opportunity of making progress or building up their reputation 
in social communication and competition: 
I have said often, Modesty must be an Act of the Will, and yet it always implies 
Self-Denial: For if a Man has an ardent Desire to do what is laudable for him to 
perform, and, from an unmanly Bashfulness, shrinks away, and lets his Merit 
languish in Silence, he ought not to be angry at the World that a more unskilful 
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Actor succeeds in his Part, because he has not Confidence to come upon the Stage 
himself.354 
The Marquise de Lambert, author of Advice of a Mother to her Son and Daughter 
(1737) also attacked excessive modesty for its harm to polite and intelligent sociability: 
‘there is nothing so improper for a Young Man as that Modesty which makes him fancy 
he is not capable of great Things. This Modesty is Faintness of Soul, which hinders it 
from exerting itself, and running with a swift Career toward Glory.’355 Another polite 
writer likewise complained that ‘there are men of great parts, that are guilty of 
downright bashfulness, that by a strange hesitation and reluctance to speak, murder the 
finest and most elegant thoughts’.356 Thus, in view of the destructive effects of such 
overwhelmingly modest disposition to both personal refinement and polite social 
interaction, Chesterfield continually advised his son to subdue ‘awkward bashfulness’ 
and ‘low diffidence of the self’, which he saw as ‘the distinguishing character of an 
English booby’ or ‘country bumpkin’ who is usually ‘frightened out of his wits when 
people of fashion speak to him, and blushes and stammers, without being able to give 
a proper answer’. Seeing excessive shamefacedness as a mark of incompetence in 
sociability and unmaking of gentlemanliness, Chesterfield reminded his son: ‘to be civil 
with ease is the way to be well received in company… to be bashful is to be 
ridiculous.’357 
The criticism of excessive modesty and shamefacedness continued in the late 
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eighteenth century. Although Vicesimus Knox regarded modesty ‘which causes an 
efflorescence in the cheek of the schoolboys’ as a ‘favourable presage of every thing 
amiable’, he nevertheless warned that it would be ‘a great misfortune’ if ‘excessive 
diffidence and bashfulness’ continued through adult life.358  Knox claimed that the 
excess of shamefacedness in adults would not only ‘retard the acquisition of knowledge, 
and destroy its due effect when acquired’, but also injure society since ‘invincible 
diffidence’ impeded ‘the communication of many ideas and opinions which are 
calculated to improve mankind, and to sweeten the pleasures of friendly association’.359 
Moreover, Knox advocated an equal, mutually-respected model of communication, and 
strongly argued against those who had true learning and genius voluntarily shamed and 
abased themselves by showing their lowliness and servility to those rich and powerful:  
True learning, true taste, and true genius, can scarcely consist with abject servility. 
Yet persons with the characters of these qualities have often been disgracefully 
submissive to rank and opulence… They become voluntary slaves, and dearly 
earn the wages of their servitude.360 
Besides urging readers to reject extreme and unreasonable shamefacedness and 
self-abasement, polite writers further emphasised the need of assurance in polite 
sociability, arguing that a true modest disposition should be a combination of self-
confidence and a moderate sense of shame or humility. Thus, seeing assurance as ‘the 
Faculty of possessing a Man’s self, or of saying and doing indifferent things without 
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any Uneasiness or Emotion in the Mind’, the Spectator argued that: 
Modesty and Assurance are both amiable, and may very well meet in the same 
Person. When they are thus mixed and blended together, they compose what we 
endeavour to express when we say a modest Assurance; by which we understand 
the just Mean between Bashfulness and Impudence. 
The Spectator advised would-be polite persons to ‘cherish and encourage’ a modest, 
assured dispositions, and warned that ‘a Man without Assurance is liable to be made 
uneasy by the Folly or Ill-nature of every one he converses with’ and that ‘a Man 
without Modesty is lost to all Sense of Honour and Virtue’.361 Similarly, in his Essays 
relating to the Conduct of Life (1717), Giles Jacob wrote that ‘a Man must have a 
superabundant Humility attended with the utmost Constancy and Resolution of 
Mind’.362  In 1753, The World told a fable about how ‘Modesty’, the daughter of 
‘Knowledge’, and ‘Assurance’, the son of ‘Ignorance’, became good friends and helped 
each other during a long journey. Thus, ‘the follies of Assurance were continually 
checked by the delicacy of Modesty; and the blushes of Modesty were frequently 
relieved by the vivacity of Assurance.’363 In his An Essay on Politeness (1775), John 
Harris argued that the genuine disposition to humility was by no means ‘a dastardly 
spirit, a flattering resignation of the sentiments, or stooping to perform the lowest 
offices in life’, but rather, contained ‘a decent pride’, which ‘supports a man in time of 
trouble, adds importance to his character, pushes him with vigour to attempt noble 
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actions, and withholds him from appearing in any part of his conduct mean and 
contemptible.364 James Fordyce also claimed that a truly modest and humble person 
would never make himself ‘sink beneath his station’, ‘yield up lightly the respect to 
which he is entitled’, ‘surrender without a reason any just claim supported by the laws 
of society’, ‘walk with down cast eyes’, or ‘tread with timidity and hesitation like a 
slave in the presence of a tyrant’. Instead, he possessed not only ‘sobriety of mind, and 
modesty of deportment’, but also ‘a becoming resolution, an ingenuous confidence, in 
asserting, justifying, defending… what the heart believes to be right and true’. And this 
assured and confident temper, according to Fordyce, ‘is not incompatible with an 
unassuming temper, or an unpretending manner.’365 
Like other conduct writers of the time, Chesterfield also emphasised the 
significance of self-confidence in building up gentlemanliness and integrating into 
modern sociable living. He claimed that ‘the medium’ between excessive humility and 
imprudent pride ‘points out the well-bred man’, a man which he saw as ‘modest without 
being bashful, and steady without being impudent’.366 But it should be noted that 
unlike other polite writers who identified genuine modesty or shamefacedness as a 
reflection of a virtuous innate disposition, Chesterfield’s modesty was a calculated and 
superficial one. The real, and perhaps most important, function of modesty was to 
conceal one’s merit and inward pride and, by doing so, to gain good will and admiration 
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from others. As Chesterfield wrote: 
Modesty is the only sure bait when you angle for praise… By this modesty I do 
not mean timidity, and awkward bashfulness. On the contrary, be inwardly firm 
and steady, know your own value… but take great care to let nobody discover 
that you do know your own value. Whatever real merit you have, other people 
will discover; and people always magnify their own discoveries, as they lessen 
those of others.367 
It is clear that what Chesterfield truly advocated was assurance and confidence in 
modern polite communication. Chesterfield agreed the virtuous essence of modesty, 
and continually stressed the need of modesty for subduing impudence and insolence, 
but he strongly opposed the ridiculous and unbecoming shamefacedness which was 
usually associated with an overly-modest disposition. Chesterfield’s self-interested 
model of modesty echoed Bernard Mandeville and David Hume who, as we have seen 
in the previous section, saw shame and modesty as nothing but a disguise of inward 
assurance, pride, and selfishness. As Chesterfield wrote to his son: ‘assurance and 
intrepidity, under the white banner of seeming modesty’ not only ‘clear the way for 
merit’, but provided ‘possibly the most useful qualification that a man can have in every 
part of life.’368 
 Of course, not every conduct writer agreed with Chesterfieldian modesty. For 
example, Lambert advised readers to ‘be humble without being bashful’, because 
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‘shame is a secret Pride; and Pride is an Error with Regard to one’s own Worth, and an 
Injustice with regard to what one has a Mind to appear to others’. 369  Richardson 
similarly warned: ‘Over-Modesty borders nearly on pride: And too liberal self-
accusations are generally but so many traps for praise.’370 Knox similarly pointed out 
the potential hypocrisy of modest and humble dispositions, arguing that such seeming 
modesty ‘is often the natural result of sullen pride and subtle artifice’. For Knox, ‘pride 
is a cause of taciturnity no less often than diffidence’ since there were many people 
believed that ‘silence gives the appearance of wisdom’, and that ‘they possess no 
method of acquiring the character of wisdom so easily as by silence’.371 
Regardless of the controversies over the motives of modesty, what had become a 
standard view of the eighteenth-century conduct writers is that dispositions such as self-
denial and abasement, which had long been considered as the essential parts of the 
religious sense of shame, were regarded as inappropriate and potentially harmful in 
polite society. Conduct writers increasingly saw excessive modesty, bashfulness and 
low self-esteem as marks of false shame, and repeatedly warned readers against this 
harmful disposition because it exposed a person’s weakness, impeded him or her from 
attending pleasing and intelligent social communications, and blocked the way to 
access a good reputation in polite society. Furthermore, this section again demonstrated 
that in polite society, others’ opinion became an important factor in raising shame. 
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‘Banish false shame, this monster of vanity and arrogance!’ 
A frequently discussed issue within contemporary discussions of shame was, as many 
polite writers asked, what a ‘right’ sense of shame consisted of. Indeed, reasons for 
shame varied considerably from person to person according to their genders, rank, 
characters, and their specific circumstances. For the pious such as John Bunyan, even 
the slightest and the most secret mistake could impose a deep sense of shame. Samuel 
Pepys repeatedly wrote that he ‘was ashamed to be seen in a hackney’ for fearing being 
jeered at by his acquaintances and friends.372 In Frances Burney’s Evelina (1778), 
Lovel was not ashamed of his foppish dress, but he did feel being shamed by Evelina 
when the latter shew no admiration of him and refused his dancing invitation.373 While 
fallen women sought to hide their shame in desperation, courtesans or those who were 
called ‘demi-reps’ unashamedly enjoyed their ‘reputation’ and ‘honour’ gained through 
unchastity.374  
Despite the diversity of reasons for experiencing shame, eighteenth-century polite 
writers generally identify shame as a consequence of, first, moral judgement, that is, 
someone felt shame due to the violation of moral values and, second, social judgement, 
whereby a person experienced shame for being disapproved or despised by others. For 
eighteenth-century writers, as we shall see, shame should be measured and constructed 
by moral norms. Social judgement was important in inducing shame, but polite writers 
nevertheless insisted that others’ opinion was the right reason for feeling shame only if 
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it derived from and accorded with moral standards. 
However, before investigating contemporary discussions about right and wrong 
senses of shame within the context of polite society, it is worthwhile looking at the early 
modern concept of ‘civility’ and how this linked to the later emergence of polite culture. 
In her study of early modern English behavioural literature, Anna Bryson argues that 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed a gradual change of codes of manners 
from medieval ‘courtesy’ to early modern ‘civility’. 375  Where medieval courtesy 
concentrated on the accomplishments of elegant behaviour and courtliness within the 
context of lordship and service, civility, if it did not rejected principles of courtesy, 
inculcated rules of civilised conduct in a wider range of the population extending 
beyond the circle of the court and noble household. A striking feature of civility 
literature was its concentration on etiquette for every aspect of gentlemanly conduct 
and good breeding, such as, in the words of historian of masculine politeness Philip 
Carter, ‘table manners, dress, personal hygiene, the discharge of bodily waste, street 
conduct, and relations with social superiors and inferiors.’376 The popularisation of 
these conduct guides made both elite and non-elite male readers believe that even 
without a noble lineage, the self-presentation of a civilised personality through polished 
behaviour and decent appearance could help to establish honour and reputation. 
A typical example of civility literature in the mid-seventeenth century was Francis 
Osborne’s Advice to a Son (1656). Like many seventeenth-century conduct writers, 
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Osborne did not ignore the role of religion and morality in seeking good breeding and 
reputation, but put more stress on outside refinement by providing a large number of 
precise stipulations about practical matters such as dressing, speaking, and visiting, 
which made his account look like ‘a study in how to avoid making errors as a means of 
maintaining one’s standing and reputation in a distinctly competitive and ungrateful 
society.’ 377  Osborne’s ideal of refinement was characteristically practical and 
sophisticated. Duplicitous behaviour and pretended civility, if not being advocated, was 
at least tolerated in a competitive society; as Osborne wrote, ‘Court him always, you 
hope one day to make use of, but at the least expense you can.’378 Outer appearance 
was equally important in preserving and increasing a reputation; Osborne advocated a 
dress ‘exceeding rather than coming short of others of like fortune’ as a means to find 
‘acceptance where ever you come’.379 Osborne’s Advice was popular. Sir William Petty, 
a colleague of Samuel Pepys at the Navy Board, regarded this book among those ‘most 
esteemed and generally cried up for wit in the world’.380  Undoubtedly, Osborne’s 
equation of civility and refinement with outside elegance would make its stalwart 
readers like Pepys more likely to regard an omission in dress or fashion as a disgrace 
and shame. On 19 October 1661, for example, Pepys, at a ‘handsome dinner’ with his 
friends, was ashamed of himself for ‘not being neat in clothes’: ‘I find a great fault in 
me, could not be so merry as otherwise, and at all times I am and can be, when I am in 
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good habitt, which makes me remember my father Osborne’s rule for a gentleman to 
spare in all things rather than in that.’381 
Eighteenth-century advocates of politeness nevertheless found codes of civility 
represented in behavioural literature like Osborne’s Advice deeply problematic; seeing 
‘civility’ as ‘mostly a Surface without Depth’. They worried that the excessive 
concentration on outer polish would marginalise the central role of moral virtue in 
refinement, and make external embellishments of dress and manners the sole criterion 
for the judgement of honour and dishonour.382 Thus, the emergence of the concept of 
politeness as a superior mode of both personal and social refinement in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries can be seen as a critical response to the 
earlier deviant codes of civility. While civility was condemned as an inadequate mode 
of refinement which lacked morality and overestimated the importance of externality, 
politeness advocated harmony between inner virtue and outer polish.383 Highlighting 
the fundamental role of moral virtue in refinement and establishing honour, polite 
writers argued that ‘pleasing externality’ was the genuine emanation of internal 
elegance or what Locke termed ‘a well-formed Mind’ rather than imposed stipulations 
of civility.384 The moral nature of politeness was repeatedly emphasised throughout the 
eighteenth century. Antoine Courtin regarded ‘outward honour’ as the reflection of 
inner virtue, claiming that this honourable display ‘attracts the Heart of Men; for ‘tis 
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the Property of Virtue to make it self esteemed, applauded and believ’d.’385 Regarding 
politeness as ‘all moral Virtues in Epitome’, the author of Reflexions upon the 
Politeness of Manners (1707) argued that ‘virtue consist not merely in Surface and 
Exterior, but must have its Principle in the Soul’.386 Similarly, true politeness was 
virtuous. In 1734, the Gentleman’s Magazine remarked, ‘nothing that is indecent or 
disagreeable can be polite.’ 387  Samuel Richardson likewise claimed that ‘true 
politeness is but another word for Virtue’.388 
Seeing politeness first and foremost as an inward refinement reflecting virtue, 
early eighteenth-century conduct writers stressed that a person’s inner characters such 
as morality and learning should be the foundation of the construction and judgement of 
shame and honour. In 1713, the Guardian wrote that ‘Knowledge is indeed that which, 
next to virtue, truly and essentially raises one man above another. It finishes one half of 
the human soul…and is…the natural source of wealth and honour.’389 In 1747, an 
anonymous polite manual claimed that a virtuous mind was the source of a good 
reputation: ‘the seat of solid honour is in a man’s own bosom, and no one can want 
support, who is in possession of an honest conscience.’390 The Spectator repeatedly 
reminded readers that feeling shame or glory merely for the reasons of, for example, 
dress, title or fortune was not only wrong but potentially harmful. In July 1711, Richard 
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Steele warned that ‘Shame of Poverty’ would make people not only ‘launch into 
unnecessary Equipage, vain Expense, and lavish Entertainment’, but ‘go every Day a 
step nearer to it’.391 Several months later, Joseph Addison pointed out that a ‘vicious 
Modesty’ was a sentiment which ‘makes a man ashamed of his Person, his Birth, his 
Profession, his Poverty, or the like Misfortunes, which it was not in his Choice to 
prevent, and is not in his Power to rectify.’392 Again, in 1714, a correspondence to the 
Spectator remarked that it would be a ‘folly’ and ‘Mark of Ridicule’ if a man prides 
himself ‘in worthless’ or ‘shameful things' such as ‘the Good of Fortune, a gay Dress 
or a new Title’.393 
Firmly identifying shame as a morally-constructed emotion, eighteenth-century 
conduct writers shared the religious view that shame should be imposed by the moral 
agency of the self. James Fordyce (1720-1796), a Scottish Presbyterian minister and 
conduct writer, argued that the blame of conscience would not only make a wrongdoer’s 
‘feelings of honour shrink back… like the sensitive plant from the hand that touches it’, 
but also, more importantly, make him blush and truly aware that he had done something 
‘deviating from Virtue’.394  Such sentiments did not mean that social opinion was 
insignificant. Compared to religious teachings, it is noteworthy that eighteenth-century 
conduct manuals more frequently highlighted the role of social spectators as a powerful 
moral restraint and shaming audience. Nevertheless, conduct writers insisted that in 
order to arouse a genuine, moral sense of shame, the judgement of conscience should 
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be prior to that of the world. ‘It is that you are struck dumb immediately with a 
conscientious Shame for what you have been saying,’ Addison wrote, ‘then you are 
inwardly grieved at the Sentiments which you cannot but perceive others entertain 
concerning you. In short, you are against your self; the laugh of the Company runs 
against you.’395 In 1790, the author of a female conduct guide expressed a similar view: 
There are two courts before which you must inevitably appear in judgement, your 
conscience and the world; you may possibly get clear of the world, but you can 
never get clear of conscience. Secure her testimony in favour of your honesty, ’tis 
what you own to yourself; but withal, do not neglect the approbation of the public; 
for a contempt of reputation naturally leads to a contempt of virtue.396 
The extent to which the eighteenth-century emphasis on the moral origin of shame 
succeeded in correcting the potentially problematic notions of shame produced by the 
seventeenth-century codes of civility is a question which is, however, difficult to answer. 
But conduct literature offers an important perspective through which we are able to 
access contemporary perceptions of shame. Although discussions about manners and 
morals, as Anna Bryson wrote, ‘are concerned with ideals, and may themselves give 
little indication of the distance between these ideals and real behaviour’, they 
nevertheless reflected a ‘significant cultural fact’ and the existence of a real and ‘hot’ 
public concern of the time.397 Thus, by taking a closer look at polite and conduct 
literatures we find that the discussions and concern about a ‘false’ sense of shame – 
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which were always didactic and lamenting in tone – not only persisted, but dramatically 
increased throughout the eighteenth century. 
Eighteenth-century polite and conduct writers regarded their age as a period where 
there was particular alarm over the prevalence of what they regarded as ‘false shame’. 
They observed that many people enslaved themselves to others’ opinion, and measured 
shame and honour merely by social opinion without concerning true virtue. Identifying 
such socially-constructed, morally-superficial shame as ‘a vicious modesty’, an 
anonymous author wrote that a man of this modesty always ‘complies with every thing, 
and is only fearful of doing what may look singular in company. His course is with the 
torrent, and he lets himself go to every action or discourse, however unjustifiable in 
itself, so it be in vogue among him companions’. The author condemned this kind of 
modesty as ‘one of the most ridiculous dispositions in human nature’, since it made a 
man no longer feel shame for ‘speaking or acting in a dissolute or irrational manner’, 
and become ‘ashamed of governing himself by the principles of reason, virtue, and 
religion’.398 What this author had criticised reflected a real problem of his age. Modern 
sociable living made people attach more importance to the opinions of others who were 
in the same social group or circle. But social judgement did not always function as a 
weapon against immorality; it might exist independently of, or even invert moral virtue. 
The author observed that it was the desire for a reputation in company and the fear of 
being ridiculed as a coward or being kicked out of the fashionable world that obliged a 
man to ‘conceal any serious sentiment’ and ‘appear a greater libertine than he is’. Once 
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a ‘modest man’ blushed ‘to do any thing that is opposite to the humour of his 
companions’, his sense of shame lost its moral power and corrupted into the art of 
complaisance, and became an accessary to vice.399 
This anonymous author was, of course, not alone in warning about the danger of 
such a socially-constructed, morally-superficial sense of shame. In 1777, James 
Fordyce wrote that ‘we naturally wish for approbation, and shrink from contempt’, and 
that the ‘sense of honour and shame’ was ‘the most powerful, vivid, and beautiful 
principle of the yet uncorrupted mind’.400 However, ‘the fear of ridicule’ and ‘the hope 
of praise,’ as he observed, often deterred young men from virtue, and incited them to 
evil when they were ‘in those companies where praise and ridicule are distributed 
according to the laws of the modes’.401 Being ‘more studious of Honour as a Reward 
than of Honour as a Principle’, and having ‘more anxiety about what the world may say 
of them, than what they must think of themselves’, these young men’s ‘predominant 
ambition’ was, according to Fordyce, ‘to Appear’.402 In view of the negative impact of 
social judgement on the notions of shame and honour, Fordyce reminded his readers to 
‘make the Love of Fame coincide with the Love of Virtue’, and never to ‘suspend 
satisfaction upon the opinion of others’.403 Similarly, Charles Townley (1737-1805), a 
wealthy country gentleman and collector, regarded ‘false shame’ as ‘the most dangerous 
enemy of morals’ because it left ‘inexperienced youth wholly defenceless to encounter 
the force of false argument, ill-example, and the still more penetrating shafts of ridicule’. 
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Townley urged ‘those who superintend education’ to inculcate youth with moral virtue, 
which he believed was the ground of the right sense of shame and honour and a means 
to prevent the power of social opinion from inculcating false notions of what was 
shameful: ‘the Preceptor should carefully inculcate that degree of firmness which 
enables men to assert their own sentiments, and convince his pupil that the worst species 
of cowardice is that of the dastard who betrays his best interests through fear of 
lessening himself in the eyes of those whose opinions he ought to despise.’404 
Contemporary concern over the superficiality of shame was also embodied in the 
growing tide of criticism against those who measured shame and honour merely by 
fashion, title and wealth, rather than moral norms. The vain glory of dress was a 
frequent target of attack. But we should bear in mind that eighteenth-century polite 
commentators never denied or ignored the importance of good dress and appearance in 
building up reputation and promoting polite sociability.405  Indeed, in a century of 
increasing urbanisation and socialisation, clothing was deemed to be an effective way 
of both establishing and assessing the quality and social standing of unknown men and 
women.406 Early eighteenth-century conduct literature argued that suitable clothing 
should accord with the principles of conformity and moderation.407 The Spectator 
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reminded readers to avoid appearing like a fop and a sloven because while the foppery 
of over-dress reduced a man to a fool, a man appearing with ‘an awkward and pitiful 
dress’ shall be ‘coldly received’.408 Spectator No. 631 argued that decent, neat, and 
clean dress was ‘a Mark of Politeness’, since it ‘produces Love’, ‘bears Analogy to 
Purity of Mind’, and ‘renders us agreeable to others and easie to our selves’.409 Even 
Chesterfield, who was notorious for his influential but superficial and self-interested 
ideas of refinement, agreed with the Spectator’s view on clothing: ‘the difference in 
dress between a man of sense and a fop is that the fop values himself upon his dress; 
and the man of sense laughs at it, at the same time that he knows he must not neglect 
it… for we cannot help forming some opinion of a man’s sense and character from his 
dress.’410 
While eighteenth-century commentators acknowledged the significance of clothes 
and physical appearance in polite society, what they really opposed were persons like 
William Hickey – a real-life fop when he was young in the mid-eighteenth century – 
who were not only unashamed of ignorance and effeminate foppery but rather gloried 
in it. In 1766, articled as a clerk to Mr. Bayley, Hickey hastened to sculpt his hair into 
a fashionable style: 
I was further gratified by having my hair tied, turned over my forehead, powdered, 
pomatumed, and three curls on each side, with a thick false tail, my operator being 
Nerot, a fashionable French hair dresser and peruke maker justly considered the 
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best in his line, in London. And thus equipped, I came forth a smart and dashing 
Clerk to an Attorney.411 
Later, when Hickey received a commission to serve in the army, he rushed to his father’s 
tailor in order to obtain fashionable regimentals, even though he had no idea about to 
which corps he belonged: 
I then went to my father’s tailor, Anthony Marcelis, of Suffolk Street, Charing 
Cross, to order regimentals; but not knowing what corps I should be appointed, I 
conceived the best thing I could do would be to have a suit of each description… 
Upon my leaving Marcelis, I met in the street a dashing fellow in a scarlet frock, 
with black waistcoat, breeches, and stockings, which in my eyes appeared 
remarkably smart. I therefore returned instantly to the tailor to bespeak a similar 
dress… In three days, my clothes being sent home, I burst forth a martial buck of 
the first stamp; and not a little vain was I of the figure I made. I seldom appeared 
two successive days in the same dress… some of my brother Joseph’s 
acquaintances enquired what the devil regiment I had got into, for that they met 
me in half a dozen different uniforms in as many days.412 
Such preoccupation with fashionable dress was not merely a London phenomenon. 
In fact, the imitation of the dress and lifestyle of the capital’s fashionable world was 
common in provincial towns and even the universities of Oxbridge, places which many 
contemporaries and modern historians regarded as untouched by urban culture and 
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metropolitan fashion.413 William Hickey’s contemporary, James Harris, later first Earl 
of Malmesbury and a diplomat, recalled his days as an undergraduate student at Oxford 
in 1760s: ‘the set of men with whom I lived were very pleasant, but very idle fellows. 
Our life was an imitation of High Life in London; luckily drinking was not the fashion, 
but what we did drink was claret, and we had our regular round of evening card parties, 
to the great annoyance of our finances.’414 The dramatist George Colman the younger 
also recalled his foppish youth at Oxford and how he unashamedly ‘strutted along in 
the pride of’ his ‘unstatutable curls and coat’ in front of the Vice-Chancellor on the day 
of enrolment: 
On my entrance at Oxford, as a member of Christ Church, I was too foppish a 
follower of the prevailing fashions to be a reverential observer of academical 
dress: – in truth, I was an egregious little puppy: – and I was presented to the 
Vice-Chancellor, to be matriculated, in a grass-green coat, with the furiously be-
powder’d pate of an ultra-coxcomb; – both of which are proscribed, by the Statues 
of the University.415 
The pursuit of trivial fashion, as presented in the behaviours of William Hickey 
and George Colman during their young years, was becoming prevalent in the eyes of 
eighteenth-century conduct and moral writers. In Moral Instructions for Youth (1742), 
an English edition translated from a popular French conduct book, the author observed 
that ‘there are not a few’ who make dress ‘one of the principal Subjects of their Vanity, 
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and one of the most painful and troublesome Concerns of their Lives’.416 In 1747, 
another writer remarked that a vain man’s happiness and concern were to a large extent 
decided by his dress and how other people looked upon it; ‘it is that the dressing part 
of men are uneasy till they are regarded for a well-tied cravat, an hat cocked with an 
uncommon briskness, a very well-chosen coat, or for other instances of merit, which 
they are impatient to see pass without some particular observation.’417 Instead of seeing 
vain glory as a result of seventeenth-century codes of civility or a phenomenon which 
existed only in restricted social circles, the author, like most contemporary polite 
commentators, regarded it as an eighteenth-century tide which was rising to an alarming 
level. ‘The world is infatuated with the love of appearances instead of realities and 
substance,’ he lamented, ‘dress is grown of universal use in conduct of life; even so far, 
that civilities and respect are only paid to appearance which become a passport that 
introduces us into all polite assemblies, and the most certain method of making most of 
the youth of our nation taken notice of.’418 
Not all conduct writers specifically discussed shame, but their intensive attack on 
vain glory and the deformed notion of honour indicated that the moral basis of shame 
was gradually eroding. In his An Essay on Honour (1741), Timothy Hooker complained 
that many people simply regarded ‘noise and Shew, Title and Equipage, Glitter and 
Grandeur constitute the whole Idea of Honour’.419 In 1755, the Man periodical argued 
that ‘a pride founded upon birth, title, estate, or other things no way essential to our 
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nature, is but a childish vanity. Whoever would think nobly of himself, must drop this 
silly pretension to regard’.420 In his remarkably popular manual An Estimate of the 
Manners and Principles of the Times (1757), John Brown observed that ‘the Love of 
Applause and Fear of Shame’, if not ‘wholly destroyed’, were ‘perverted’ and ‘turned 
upon unworthy Objects’: 
[T]he Principle of Honour is either lost, or totally corrupted: That no generous 
Thirst of Praise is left among us: That our Ambitions are trifling and unmanly as 
our Pleasures: That Wealth, Titles, Dress, Equipage, Sagacity in Gaming or 
Wagers, splendid Furniture and a Table, are the sole Fountains, from which we 
desire to draw Respect to ourselves, or Applause from others: We aspire to Folly, 
and are proud of Meanness: the Principle of Honour is Perverted and Dwindled 
into unmanly Vanity.421 
According to Brown, vain glory and false shame were different passions of the same 
nature and end; popinjays boasting about trivial fashions would not only blush for being 
seen in a less than fashionable dress, but also consider virtuous behaviour as shameful. 
As Brown observed, a man ‘in Pursuit of Glory, and serve the Public at the Expense of 
his Ease, his Fortune, or his Pleasure’ was often ‘stared or laughed at in every 
fashionable Circle’ as a ‘silly Fellow’ and ‘Idiot’.422 
The criticism over the false sense of shame continued in the late eighteenth century. 
An essay in the Loiterer periodical (1789-1790) identified those who took pride in 
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trifles, follies, and vanities as ‘dashing men’. A dashing man ‘must buy horses which 
he cannot ride’ and ‘contract debts which he cannot pay’; at the same time, as the 
Loiterer observed, he regarded ‘respect to decency’ as ‘quizzical’, ‘virtue’ as ‘a bore’, 
learning’ as ‘the devil’, and ‘obedience to superiors’ as ‘cowardly’, and counted it his 
great shame to be judged virtuous or learned. The Loiterer inculcated those ‘who are 
eager to shew their spirit and desirous of being called Dashing Men’ with a notion that 
‘in an age like this, contempt of false shame is the noblest proof of spirit, and that those 
have the most dash who dare to be virtuous’.423 Other writers such as Vicesimus Knox 
(1752-1821), a minister and prominent essayist, did not directly mention the sense of 
shame, but criticised those who sought to establish honour merely through the display 
of exquisite and trivial fashions. According to Knox, singularity in dress had become 
one of the commonest ways of seeking distinction: ‘an enormous pair of buckles has 
given many a young man a degree of confidence, which no learning or virtue which he 
possessed, could ever have supplied.’424 Knox stressed that a real honourable man was 
first and foremost ‘a moral man’, not a ‘dunce’ whose honour was built on ‘external 
ceremony and dress’. Vanity would eventually contradict itself and defeat its own 
purpose; its consequence ‘is too often ruin in polite life, bankruptcy in the commercial, 
and misery and disgrace in all’.425 
Public concern over the prevalence of false shame was further reflected on 
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London’s stages. In December 1789 Henry Mackenzie’s comedy False Shame, or the 
White Hypocrite was performed in Covent Garden under the title of The Force of 
Fashion. 426  In this comedy Mackenzie represented how ‘false shame’, which he 
identified as a morally superficial and vicious disposition derived from an unbridled 
passion for praise and distinction, overpowered a ‘virtuous’ and ‘amiable’ young man, 
and made him pretend to be fashionable and wicked in order to be thought sophisticated 
by his companions. At the end of the comedy, Mackenzie delivered the moral lesson 
through the words of ‘Miss Mountfort’: ‘a man who is first such a hypocrite from vanity, 
or from fear (of shame and ridicule), will be in danger of becoming the character he 
personates.’427 Several years later, in another False Shame (1799), a comedy translated 
from German, Captain Erlach taught Emma, an orphan, that ‘to be ashamed of 
abandoning absurd notions is false shame’ and that ‘among all the species of false 
shame, the most atrocious is to be ashamed of one’s poor parents’. In another dialogue, 
when Emma said that she could not appear in ‘splendid circles’ because her companions 
were all in ‘dazzling finery’ and ‘the world grounds its fickle judgement’ on ‘weak 
foundations’, Erlach refuted: ‘in plain words – that signifies – thou wast shamed of thy 
wardrobe’, and urged Emma to ‘banish false shame’, which he decried as a ‘monster of 
vanity and arrogance!’428 
How polite culture contributed to the false sense of shame is a question that 
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deserves further research. But the link between them is obvious. The increase of 
commercialisation and urbanisation in the eighteenth century called for polite 
sociability; politeness in turn boosted modern sociable living and material consumption. 
It was in this context that social opinion and the associated issues such as manners, 
dress, and wealth were increasingly regarded as crucial factors for gaining a reputation. 
Polite writers repeatedly stressed the moral basis of notions of shame and honour, but 
it could not prevent many contemporaries from indulging themselves in the vain glory 
of the trivial fashions and the praise of others. Luxurious consumption and superficial 
socialising in polite society distorted the sense of honour, and accordingly reduced 
shame to a morally-superficial emotion, in which many people, as contemporary polite 
writers lamented, blushed for virtuous behaviour, and feared the shame of being 
counted unfashionable. 
 
Conclusion 
In the secular context, shame was primarily a socially-constructed emotion, but its 
moral basis was under continual threat from the superficial and immoral social factors 
of polite society. Unlike religious writers who advocated shame as a self-imposed 
emotion, eighteenth-century philosophers highlighted the social dimension of it, 
arguing that shame was imposed from the outside as a result of social judgment. 
Although writers such as Bernard Mandeville and David Hume suspected the moral 
origin of shame, claiming that the feeling of shame was essentially a product of vice 
and always functioned as a disguise of self-interest and vice, both of them followed the 
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view of other scholars that shame had great moral values in promoting virtues and 
preventing sins. However, polite commentators worried that social factors would 
undermine the moral basis and power of shame. They regarded the eighteenth century 
as a period of particular alarm of over rising levels of dissonance between absolute 
moral norms and relative social opinions in constructing the notions of shame, and 
severely attacked those who measured shame and glory merely by superficial criteria 
such as dress, title, and wealth without concern for moral standards. Besides criticising 
the morally-superficial sense of shame, polite writers regarded excessive modesty and 
self-abasement as another sort of false shame, and urged people to overcome 
unreasonable shamefacedness because it not only impeded polite sociability, but 
prevented one from gaining a reputation in polite society. Of course, there is still much 
to be said in regard to notions of true and false senses of shame in contemporary society. 
For example, the rise of libertinism, the emergence of the term ‘demi-rep’, and the 
remarkable increase of popular interest in sexual scandals of those from the fashionable 
world in the eighteenth century surely reflected the changing notion of shame. The 
spread of scandal and the change of the contemporary notion of shame would not have 
occurred if without an important factor, a factor that remains to be investigated in the 
next chapter: print. 
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Chapter Four 
Shame, Print, and Scandalous Publications 
 
Introduction 
One of the central features of eighteenth-century society was the immense expansion 
of print, evident not only in the continual popularity of the traditional forms of the 
ballad, broadside, chapbook, and pamphlet, but also in the development of new genres, 
such as the periodical, newspaper, novel, and visual satire. Along with this burgeoning 
culture of print, there was an increase in printed material about crime and scandal and 
a growth of public interest in these areas. The story of wrongdoers and their 
transgressions was a major theme in early modern media. 429  Cheap print such as 
ballads and chapbooks, which had been widely used as a medium to circulate 
information, regularly publicised freshly committed crimes to meet the demands of both 
poorer and middling sectors of society.430 Another popular form of crime literature that 
emerged in the early seventeenth century was the pamphlet relating the life-story of a 
condemned criminal. This type of literature was represented by the works of the prison 
chaplains or visitors such as Thomas Cooper and Henry Goodcole.431 From the 1670s 
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onward this genre was developed by the quasi-official publications of the Ordinary’s 
Account – a narrative dedicated to providing an account of the criminal careers, the 
behaviour in prison, and the final confession of Newgate prisoners who had been 
executed at Tyburn – and the paralleled serial publication of the formal trial proceedings 
known as the Old Bailey Session Papers (OBSP).432 Due to their regular and extensive 
coverage of crime and criminals, the OBSP and Ordinary’s Account became not only, 
as a French visitor noted at the end of the seventeenth century, ‘one of the most diverting 
the things a man can read in London’, but also the key source of other crime narratives 
in competing genres, such as criminal biographies, compilations of trials, novels, satires, 
and the popular periodical press.433 The eighteenth century witnessed the spectacular 
rise of newspapers and magazines as the most influential media in communicating 
information about crime and transgression. In addition to providing their readers with 
accounts of newsworthy offences committed by persons of the lower, non-elite social 
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groups, newspapers and magazines also devoted to reporting the corruptions of the 
world of fashion.434 As the scandals of aristocrats and elites were finding an ever-
enlarged place in the contemporary popular press and pamphlets, a culture emerged in 
which the privacies and transgressions of the ruling classes could be openly discussed 
by the populace. This printed forum shaped popular understandings of right and wrong, 
law and crime, as well as honour and shame. 
Crime and scandal are closely connected with shame insofar as they are behaviours 
deemed shameful and contemptible. Publicising a shameful transgression and 
perpetrator through the printed media could not only damage the reputation of the 
wrongdoer, and make the guilty party suffers from a painful sense of shame and 
humiliation, but also stir up shame and abhorrence among readers. The printed reports 
about, and images of, shameful persons and deeds therefore provide a suitable 
perspective through which to explore the culture of shame. This chapter explores the 
changing way in which shame was represented in printed material about crime and 
scandal, and its impact on the contemporary notions of shame. Did the audience feel 
abhorrence and shame when reading the stories of those conventionally disgraceful 
sexual transgressions such as prostitution and adultery? Did the proliferation of printed 
materials about aristocratic scandal and the extensive exhibition of their shame and vice 
contributed to a growth of an unblushing readership and a culture of shamelessness? 
How did contemporary people comment on such scandalous literature? These questions 
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lie at the heart of this chapter. 
In this chapter, the term ‘shame’ has different meanings. It can include a general 
reference to shameful, infamous transgressions but also to an emotion or sentiment that 
the perpetrator expressed, the writer intended to reinforced, and the reader experienced. 
Shame is also considered in this chapter as a form of public humiliation through print. 
It is in the context of print culture that we are able to examine how these different but 
interconnected dimensions of shame – as an emotion, as a result of moral judgement, 
and as a shaming action – interacted with each other and constructed a broad culture of 
shame in the long eighteenth century. Within the scope of this chapter, it is impossible 
and unnecessary to give an exhaustive survey of all types of crime. The literature of 
capital crimes such as murder constituted the majority of early modern criminal 
writings and bore explicit ideological and moral functions, but this chapter will only 
examine it briefly because, as we have seen in the introductory chapter, this is a subject 
that has already been scrutinised by historians. Given that sexual scandal had long been 
deemed ‘shameful’ and ‘infamous’ that could potentially damage the perpetrator’s 
reputation and influence the reader’s perception of shame, the main focus of this chapter 
will be therefore on sexual transgression, with particular attention given to that of 
aristocrats and social elites. 
This chapter comprises four sections. The second section focuses on news 
materials centring on crimes committed by ordinary people, and explores how shame 
was represented in ballads, pamphlets, and semi-official accounts roughly between the 
mid-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries. The third and fourth sections 
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concentrate on printed materials about sexual scandals of the high circles before and 
after the mid-eighteenth century, and examine how media such as newspapers, 
magazines, and satires gradually departed from the traditional ways of describing 
shameful behaviours. The fourth section investigates contemporary attitudes to the rise 
of scandal journalism and its impact on contemporary notions of shame. Sources such 
as novels, plays, and conduct books are not neglected, but receive rather less attention 
because the focus is on print’s journalistic function. 
Three arguments may be drawn from this chapter. First, seventeenth-century 
criminal accounts were generally morally-oriented or, if more accurately, dared not to 
abandon the moral perspective; the detail of transgression was considered less 
important, and was more often presented as the exemplary basis for didactic teaching. 
Teaching readers what was shameful and inculcating them with a moral sense of shame 
was considered by contemporary writers as a much more important purpose than 
reconstructing an authentic and tell-all account of the event. Second, the eighteenth 
century witnessed the ‘commodification’ of shame, which was evidenced by the 
spectacular increase and popularity of scandalous literature about upper-class adultery. 
In this cult of scandal journalism, shameful behaviour and the personalities involved 
became the main subject of representation; the moral function of such literature, and 
whether it could reinforce a moral sense of shame in the reader, was becoming a 
subordinate concern. Finally, the shameless representation of the traditionally shameful 
subjects of sex, nudity, and scatology in printed media raised anxiety and criticism 
among contemporary writers, making them believe that they were living in an era 
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without shame, in which, as they themselves observed, the audience no longer blushed 
to read the stories about crime and depravity, which they should have treated with 
abhorrence and shame. 
 
Moralising Shame: the Representation of Crime in Prints, c. 1650-1700 
Before the expansion of the periodical press in the eighteenth century, news ballads and 
pamphlets occupied an important position in the history of early journalism in England. 
Though the regular production of newsbooks began as early as the 1620s, the ‘news’ 
that these periodical publications reported was largely of events of foreign countries. 
The strict press censorship gave rise to official and authorised news periodicals. The 
abolition of the Star Chamber in 1641 and the temporary lapse of the Licensing Act 
between 1679 and 1685 made further contribution to the growth of the press. Before 
the end of the seventeenth century, however, newspapers remained few in number, and 
limited in distribution. Because newspapers were invented in an era of political crisis 
and party conflict, they were more often used for disseminating political news, while 
social and popular events such as those in respect to the crime were seldom touched 
upon.435 
In comparison with the seventeenth-century press, the contemporary ballad was 
one of the most important forms of printed news media. It not only provided news of 
remote and political events, but also told stories about current local happenings, in 
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which crime was a recurring and popular theme. In a dialogue extracted from 
Middleton’s The World Tost at Tennis (1620), when the scholar said that he could make 
ballads for a need, the soldier replied:  
Very well, sir, and I’ll warrant thee thou shalt never want subject to write of; one 
hangs himself today, another drowns himself tomorrow; a sergeant stabbed next 
day, here a pettifogger at the pillory, a bawd on the cart’s nose, and a pandar in 
the tail; hic mulier, haec vir, fashions, fictions, felonies, fooleries: a hundred 
havens has the balladmonger to traffic at, and new ones still daily discovered.436 
At the price of one penny, ballads were an affordable and accessible medium for news; 
as Henry Peacham wrote in 1641, ‘For a penny you may have all the News in England, 
of Murders, Flouds, Witches, Fires, Tempests, and what not, in one of Martin Parker’s 
Ballads’.437 Ballads involving criminal events were produced not merely for spreading 
news, but rather, they had clear ideological purpose, aiming to inculcate a set of moral 
values into the audience and deter them from going astray. This moralising and didactic 
motive decided how shame was represented in criminal ballads; briefly, it was the 
shameful nature and outcome of transgression, rather than shameful details of crime 
that became the main subject of representation. 
Stories about the lives and exploits of capitally convicted criminals such as 
murderers and robbers constituted a major theme in early modern criminal ballads. A 
typical form of such ballads was known as the ‘goodnight’ or the ‘last farewell’, in 
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which the condemned prisoner expressed his or her penitent last word, warned others 
against every small fault and vice, and made a spiritual preparation of death. These 
ballads functioned as a cautionary tale or a godly lesson, in which ‘shame’ and the 
relative terminologies such as ‘disgrace’, ‘dishonour’, and ‘infamous’ were explicitly 
pronounced in order to warn and decry. A notable feature of crime ballads is their rigid 
reinforcement of a notion that shame is the unavoidable consequence of committing sin 
and crime. In The Golden Farmer’s Last Farewell, the condemned person, who was 
found guilty of murder and robbery in 1690, bemoaned his ruin that led to the imminent 
execution: ‘I have run my Race, I now at last do see, That in much shame and sad 
disgrace, my Life will ended be.’438 Phrases like this were typical. In another ballad, 
for example, James Selbee, who was condemned for murder, lamented: ‘Had I been 
kind and loving to my Wife, I might have liv’d a long and happy life; But having run a 
loose lascivious race, My days will end in shame and sad disgrace.’439 In order to 
inculcate readers with a sense of shame, ballad writers usually used filth or dirt as a 
metaphor for the shameful ends of reprobates. In A Warning to all Lewd Livers, the 
protagonist, a decadent, licentious, and consequently impoverished young man, was 
found dead, in a very shameful manner, in a dunghill: ‘But like a poor despised wretch, 
His latest gasp that he did fetch, Was on a Dung-hill in the Night, When as no creature 
was in sight. But in the morning he was found, As cold as clay upon the ground: Thus 
was he born in shame to dye, And end his days in Misery.’440 
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Besides emphasising the shameful end of reprobates, early modern crime ballads 
also highlighted the trajectory of degradation of those condemned, that is, their minor 
faults and crimes committed in earlier lives that led them to shame and ruin. Thus from 
the ballad about the young man who was found dead in the dunghill, the audience 
learned that he ‘did consume and waste time’ in ‘drinking’ and ‘unlawful game’, 
‘haunted Taverns day and night’ with ‘Lewd women’ and ‘Cutpurse boys’, and stole his 
mother’s money and made her beg ‘relief from door to door’. Gaining nothing but 
shame and contempt from such an extravagant, decadent lifestyle, he lamented that he 
became a social outcast: ‘My dearest Kinsfolks do me chide, My dearest friends can’t 
me abide: Those were my consorts of late, Their love is turned into hate… Both old and 
young, both great and small, Both Rich and poor despise me all: No friend to take my 
part have I, But was constrain’d in fields to lye.’441 James Selbee also confessed his 
descent down the slippery slope of immoralities from minor delinquency and mistake: 
‘In wicked pleasures I my days have spent… I seldom did frequent the House of Prayer, 
But Harlots Houses and carousing too, And now I see what it has brought me to.’442 
By outlining a sinful past leading up to a final barbarous crime such as murder and 
robbery, criminal ballads conveyed the message that capital crime and the shameful end 
of ruin was neither incidental nor far away from ordinary people. Rather, they were 
predictable, and likely to be committed by all men and women if they failed to check 
the seeds of corruption or to resist the ubiquitous temptations of sin. 
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It is true that over the course of the seventeenth century, ballad writers were 
becoming more interested in reporting the details of the crime, and became inclined to 
highlight that their accounts were factual report of the real criminal event.443 But we 
should be cautious that ‘truth’ did not necessarily means the accuracy of information, 
and was even not a necessary part of contemporary news-writing.444 Historians have 
reminded us that many of early modern criminal ballads should better be seen as 
fictional, rather than factual texts.445  ‘News accounts were important,’ as Leonard 
Davis claims, ‘only insofar they clearly taught lessons and offered interpretations. If 
they were not new, if they were not accurate, or even if they were completely fabricated, 
they could still serve this purpose.’446 For criminal ballads which were produced for 
the purpose of moralising, whether the account of crime was true or not was less 
important. But offering the audience with a factual account of the crime and 
highlighting the authenticity of it not only helped to attract readers, but also provide the 
ballad with an exemplum, through which the moral lesson could be effectively 
delivered and inculcated in minds of readers. As David Turner argues, the moral 
message of criminal publications ‘derived its power precisely from the premise that the 
people described in the accounts were real and that the events had actually taken place, 
giving them an immediacy and relevance sometimes lacking from traditional religious 
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conduct literature.’447 Despite the growth of the narrative and sensational elements in 
seventeenth-century criminal ballads, the fact of crime was nevertheless considered less 
important than the moral meaning that ballad writers intended to draw from it; indeed, 
as Sandra Clark observed, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century the moralising 
function and cautionary quality of criminal ballads, particularly those known as the 
‘goodnight’, had changed little.448 
Pamphlets were another major form of print that had been used in disseminating 
news about crime in the seventeenth century. They were produced for different purposes: 
some provided lurid and sensational accounts to gratify the curiosity of the public, while 
others had explicit ideological intention, aiming to promote social consensus on moral 
values, and to enhance the legitimacy of the state in punishing criminals. But in most 
cases the sensational and didactic elements coexisted and were well balanced in 
criminal texts.449 The majority of crime pamphlets in the seventeenth century claimed 
their moral functions, and regarded didacticism as an indispensable part of the texts. 
The pamphlet accounts were similar in structure. Typically they included factual 
accounts of the event, sketches of the criminal’s sinful past, the apprehension and trial, 
and the criminal’s confession and execution. Confession was a crucial subject of 
representation, enabling writers to give detailed description of criminals’ outpourings 
of shame and remorse before their execution, and to inculcate readers with the moral 
sense of shame, which was believed by contemporaries to be the proper and must-have 
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psychological response to crime, and the powerful inward restraint that kept people 
away from the dangers of sin. In the first half of the seventeenth century, typical crime 
pamphlets were represented by the works of Thomas Cooper and Henry Goodcole. It is 
notable that both authors repeatedly reinforced the notions that ‘shame, hell, and 
destruction’ are the just ‘reward and wages of sin’, and that what brought bloody and 
monstrous criminals into ‘shame and confusion’ is a ‘loose and profane’ way of life in 
which they ‘walk in their steps and ways of wickedness’ and ‘merrily pass away their 
times and days’ in drinking, gaming, whoring and all kinds of ‘luxury and excess’.450  
The second half of the seventeenth century witnessed a proliferation of crime 
pamphlets, in which the new and probably the most influential genres were the OBSP 
and its sister publication known as the Ordinary’s Account. In comparison with the 
OBSP, which presented more as a dispassionate and legalistic account of trial 
proceedings, the Ordinary’s Account provided more subjective and moralistic narratives 
including the ordinary’s sermons, short biographies of the condemned criminals and 
accounts of their confessions and behaviours before and at executions.451 That the 
Ordinary’s Account had explicit moral purpose is familiar to historians. It should be 
added that shame occupied a central place in the moral lessons delivered by the Account. 
The condemned criminals were expected to express their deep remorse and shame for 
the crime which had led them to the miserable end, and their outpourings of shame were 
one of the most important subjects of representation. Thus, in December 1693 Samuel 
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Smith, the Ordinary of Newgate prison, kept an account of a notorious malefactor’s 
confession, and described it as a ‘sincere, fervent and modest’ example of repentance 
that deserved to be learned by criminals who hope to reconcile with God and be saved 
by Him: ‘O my Lord I am ashamed and deeply grieve, that I no sooner knew thee, that 
I might longer have honored and served thee, than possibly now I can, in the extreamest 
part of my life; thus I seal the sincerity of my heart in owning thee for my Lord and my 
God, with the chearful shedding of my Hearts blood.’ In the latter part of the Account, 
Samuel Smith recorded a ‘penitent’ prayer made by Abraham Stacy who was convicted 
of highway robbery: ‘O Lord I must with sorrow and shame confess, it would be just 
with thee, should Death eternal be the wages of my sins. O Lord, I have slighted thy 
mercy, and what can I expect, but to be an everlasting sacrifice to thy Justice.’452  
These confessions were not just an outpouring of inward shame and guilt for the 
specific offence that led to the death penalty, but rather a repentance of the general 
sinfulness and past delinquencies, such as idleness, Sabbath-breaking, failing to go to 
church, profaneness, and drinking, which had brought the perpetrator, stage to stage, to 
a life of crime and the miserable end.453 It is notable that the Ordinaries and authors of 
many contemporary crime pamphlets, like their early seventeenth-century predecessors, 
inclined to highlight the criminals’ penitential sentiments such as shame and sorrow for 
their degradation and sinfulness of the past, and regarded it as an effective way to warn 
readers of the danger and temptation of sins. For example, in his pamphlet on the 
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criminal life and the execution of the murderer Thomas Savage, Robert Franklin kept 
an account of the prisoner’s confession: ‘the first sin I began with, was Sabbath-
breaking, thereby I got acquaintance with bad company, and so went to the alehouse 
and to the bawdy house: there I was perswaded to rob my master and also to murder 
this poor innocent creature, for which I am come to this shameful end.’454 Similar 
confessions were recurrent in the Ordinary’s Account throughout a hundred years of 
publication between the 1670s and the 1770s.455 For example, the entry for 26th July 
1732 recorded the pray of Daniel Tipping: ‘Alas! what have I been doing since I came 
into the World, Folly and Sin hath taken up my Time, I am ashamed to look back upon 
the Years that I have spent, and to think of the Temptations that I have yielded to.’456 
The condemned criminals should feel shame not only for their general and ultimate 
transgressions, but also for having offended God. Humility and shame were the right 
dispositions that every person should have in order to come nearer to God. Redemption 
was still available to the condemned criminals; but in order to be reconciled with God 
and prepare for salvation, the convict should, as the Ordinary repeatedly emphasised, 
have a ‘clean conscience’ and ‘glorifie God in taking shame to himself’ through ‘a 
speedy repentance and thorough reformation’.457 Thus, in September 1690, seeing that 
there were several condemned criminals who ‘were not so sensible of their sinful and 
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deplorable Condition’, the Ordinary urged them to feel shame and make a sincere 
repentance: 
Where there is a Horror and Conviction there will be an unfeigned Grief for 
offending God's Holy Spirit, and an universal Hatred of all Sin as Sin, more as it 
pollutes than damns, put therefore your selves to Grief and Shame, chiefly for 
perverting the Long-suffering of God, who hath waited so long to be gracious to 
you; you have already, in excess, turned away your Hearts from God to the 
indulging of your Lusts.458 
Authors of crime prints also stressed that it was God who brought the hidden crimes to 
light and perpetrators to public shame. ‘Lord, thou knowest my secret sins, which yet 
are unknown to men, and all their Aggravations. Mine iniquities, Lord, have found me 
out; my fears and sorrows overwhelm me’, a convicted criminal repented.459 In 1686, 
an Ordinary wrote: ‘the Omniscient Lord strangely brings such Malefactors to Light, 
that they may be convinced and ashamed of their Atheism and Presumption of 
impunity.’460 The entry for 26 July 1693 also read: ‘how will the Hypocrites painting 
dop off before the fiery Trial of God's Omnisciency. The Shame of his Wickedness shall 
be laid open to Saints and Angels, tho he wrap up himself in his studied Collusions with 
a pleasing Flattery, to his just remediless Confusion.’461  
Shame was not only a grievous, penitential feeling, but was also referred to as the 
unhappy fate of the criminals, that is, the shame of a public death. Shame and death 
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were very closely linked in crime prints: ‘shameful death’ and ‘shameful end’ were 
perhaps the most frequently used phrases in the OBSP and the Ordinary’s Account, 
which reflected the shameful, ignominious nature of public execution. As with print 
ballads and early seventeenth-century crime pamphlets, the Ordinary’s Account aimed 
to inculcate readers with a notion that shame and death were the final, unavoidable 
consequence of crime. It is notable that the Ordinaries always preached sermons from 
Romans 6:21, ‘What Fruit had ye then in those Things, whereof ye are now ashamed? 
For the End of those Things is Death’. Thus, for example, the Ordinary’s Account for 
the 18 July 1711 highlighted arguments that, first, ‘the Sinner has but little Profit and 
Satisfaction by his Sins, even while he is committing them, and delighting, and enjoying 
himself in them’; second, ‘nothing but Shame and Sorrow follows upon, and is to be 
reaped from them’; and third, ‘Death, yea, Eternal Death and Damnation will be the sad 
Catastrophe and Conclusion and Reward of them.’462 In order to prevent people from 
sinning and the consequent ruin and death, authors of the Account continually 
emphasised the importance of keeping a moral sense of shame and a watchful 
conscience. As an Ordinary wrote in 1676, ‘shame and fear are the two great bridles 
that refrain Humane Nature from running into all kind of wickedness and when once it 
has cast them off, little good is to be expected.’463 In another Account, the Ordinary 
saw conscience as ‘God’s Spy and Deputy, armed by the Authority of his Commission’, 
and warned people never to conceal their sins because ‘your Conscience will keep a 
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private Session within your selves, so as to condemn you with grief and shame for your 
most secret sins.’464 
The printed ballads and the Ordinary’s Account were, of course, not the only forms 
of publications involved in reporting or commenting crimes. However, their generally 
conservative, moralising perspectives represented the tone of the majority of 
seventeenth-century crime prints. Shame occupied a central place in the moralising 
discourses on crime. Ballad writers, the Newgate Ordinaries, and authors of crime 
pamphlets highlighted the shameful nature of sin, crime, and punishment. More 
importantly, they aimed to reinforce a notion that shame was the just and unavoidable 
consequence of crime and that in order to reconcile with God criminals should confess 
with wholehearted shame and remorse for their transgressions. Religious beliefs stood 
behind the contemporary discourse on crime. The idea that God would detect hidden 
crimes and bring criminals to public shame was universal. Authors of crime prints also 
emphasised the necessity of keeping a moral sense of shame and a watchful conscience 
in order to prevent sinning and ruin. All in all, in the seventeenth century criminal 
publications talked about shame largely within a moral context, while the detailed 
representations of the shameful malefactor and transgression were less frequent when 
compared to the next century. 
 
Capitalising Shame: the Rise of Scandalous Publications, c. 1700-1750 
In the eighteenth century, the balance between elements of moralising and 
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sensationalism in crime prints began to shift towards the latter. Moral instructions were 
continually offered by writers, but many of them were presented in the preface or 
editorial comment, and merely functioned as a means of justifying the sensational 
content of their publications. Meanwhile, the fact of a transgression, especially the 
shocking and titillating aspects of it, was becoming a major subject of representation. 
The coverage of crime expanded, but it also became more selective, focusing 
increasingly on the wrongdoings of elite men and women.465 In the seventeenth century, 
shameful deeds were often represented as an exemplary basis for enforcing didacticism, 
and there was a real embarrassment in print media reporting the detailed facts of 
shameful transgressions. In the eighteenth century, however, the burgeoning culture of 
print and the paralleled rise of scandalous publications made the shame of social elite 
– especially conventionally shameful transgressions like adultery – a commodity or 
merchandise of great commercial values. It provided a business opportunity for 
publishers and writers, who unashamedly indulged themselves in producing the 
sensational and even salacious accounts of upper-class transgression. 
But this was not an overnight transformation. The separation of moralising from 
the reportage and the growing emphasis on sensationalism in crime news was a gradual 
and far from comprehensive process. On the one hand, the seventeenth century had 
already witnessed a growing sensationalism in crime publications. Writers and 
publishers were becoming interested in describing the shocking and lurid aspects of the 
offence and decorating their books with eye-catching title pages in order to draw 
                                                             
465 Simon Devereaux, ‘From Sessions to Newspapers? Criminal Trial Reporting, the Nature of 
Crime, and the London Press, 1770-1800’, London Journal, 32 (2007), pp. 1-27. 
173 
 
attention of readers. This change is also presented in printed materials about sexual 
transgressions. The second half of the seventeenth century saw the growing popularity 
of portraits of famous harlots and aristocratic mistresses among the common people. 
Royal courtesans and their immoral sexual lives in Charles II’s court stimulated writers 
to produce an abundance of accounts of their stories.466 Even the sexual deviance of 
ordinary woman could generate considerable public interest. A remarkable example is 
that of Mary Carleton. Disguising herself as a German princess, she married and 
defrauded numerous elite men, including aristocrats between 1663 and 1673. Her 
notorious and unnatural life of crime became a subject of contemporary pamphlets, 
plays, memoirs and biographies.467 These seventeenth-century accounts, which had 
strong elements of sensationalism, were to a large extent produced and read for sexual 
and erotic reasons. 
On the other hand, during the first half of the eighteenth century the moralistic 
perspective still played an important role in deciding on the tone and format of crime 
news. A crucial factor that contributed to the continuity of the moralistic colour of crime 
publication was the Reformation of Manners Campaign between 1688 and the 1730s. 
Initially aiming to crack down on the corruption of the Royal court and upper-class 
licentious sexuality, but in fact largely concentrating on the vice and immorality of the 
lower classes, this movement to some extent heightened the conservative tone of printed 
media in discussing and reporting sexual immoralities and crimes.468 It was in this 
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climate that John Dunton published a bi-weekly question-and-answer periodical the 
Athenian Mercury (1691-1697). Identifying the journal as a vanguard of the moral 
reform, and in order to ‘open the avenues, raise the Soul, as it were into Daylight, and 
restore the knowledge of Truth and Happiness, that had wandred so long unknown, and 
found out by few’, Dunton and his editors provided a large amount of advice on marital 
and sexual issues, such as those relating to marriage, adultery, bigamy and various kinds 
of infidelity, on the basis of both religious and moral value.469 The huge success of the 
Athenian Mercury in turn inspired the publication of several famous periodicals, 
including Daniel Defoe’s Review (1704-13), The British Apollo (1708-11), The Tatler 
(1709-11) and The Spectator (1711-14), The Gentleman’s Magazine (1730), and the Dr. 
Johnson’s The Rambler (1750-52). While these periodicals continued to see the Bible 
as the fount of moral knowledge, they began to define virtuous behaviour according to 
new and more secular criteria such as reason, civility, and human nature.470 Their 
moralistic and didactic function changed little, and which had a further impact on the 
tone of contemporary printed media in reporting crimes and immoralities. Indeed, over 
a long period of time between the late-seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries, 
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sensationalism and moralising were competing elements that could often coexist within 
a single scandalous text. 
However, the tone of news writing about transgression in the eighteenth century 
was undoubtedly more skewed towards sensationalism than ever before. This shift was 
epitomised by the rise of scandalous publications, in which personal shame and infamy 
became the major source and subject of representation. The publication of criminal 
conversation trials in the first half of the eighteenth century and the careers of early 
scandalmongers, most notably Edmund Curll, contributed considerably to this trend. 
The criminal conversation trial, which originated in the late seventeenth century and 
reached its height in late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was a civil suit 
brought to the courts of the King’s Bench or Common Pleas. Through a crim. con. suit 
a cuckolded husband could charge his wife’s paramour and, if the charge was proved, 
would be awarded monetary compensation for the loss the husband had suffered by the 
infidelity. 471  Since a crim. con. trial was expensive, almost all prosecutions were 
therefore brought by the wealthy elite. Involving marital and sexual privacies of high 
and mighty people, the crim. con. suits could always arouse wide public interest. Going 
to law meant that the family’s shame and infamy would be exposed in the press. 
Publishers employed hack writers to sit in the courtroom and note down the most 
sensational details of the trial. Their publications not only attracted a large reading 
public, but also became the source of other scandalous genres such as comedies about 
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cuckolds, memoirs of mistresses and courtesans, guides to brothels and prostitutes, 
satires on adulterers and cuckolded husbands, and novels about old libertines and poor 
maids – all were produced for profit, by means of capitalizing on the personal shame 
and exhibiting the titillating details of it. 
The London bookseller and publisher Edmund Curll played an important role in 
rise of British scandalous publications. Trading on the shame of social elites and the 
obscene details of their scandals, Curll ‘catered for, and perhaps helping to create, a 
new lower end of the book market’.472 After the initial success of his two-volume 
books on the trial between the Marquis de Gesvres and his wife in 1714 – a notorious 
case centring on his wife Mademoiselle Mascranny’s pleading for the nullity of the 
marriage because of his impotency – Curll soon published The Case of Impotency in 
1715, in which he not only recounted some English historical trials noted for 
uncovering the impotency and sodomy of the noblemen such as the Earl of Essex and 
the Earl of Castlehaven, but included one of the most recent crim. con. cases about the 
Duke of Norfolk against his wife’s lover, Sir John Jermaine. After this, Curll paid more 
attention to the crim. con. trials and the related issues such as adultery, polygamy and 
impotency of persons of rank that happened in his own age, from which he published 
Case of Divorce for Several Causes (1715) and The Cases of Polygamy (1732). All of 
these books must have proved attractive to the readers because, as Peter Wagner wrote, 
they ‘highlighted the sometimes bizarre sex life of the aristocracy while at the same 
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time exposing them to ridicule’.473 Offered under the guise of judicial reportage or 
medical documents, but in fact aiming at an audience interested in sensation and sex, 
Curll’s publications opened a peephole through which readers could see the sex-life of 
the upper classes and enjoy a vicarious pleasure.  
The muckraking career of Edmund Curll was undoubtedly radical in the still 
conservative atmosphere of the early eighteenth century when the movement of moral 
reform was reaching its apogee. Not surprisingly, his lurid and libellous publications 
shocked many contemporaries and triggered extensive criticism. People who felt 
infringed by Curll’s pamphlet warned him ‘to prevent any scandalous dispute’. In April 
1718 Daniel Defoe condemned Curll in Mist’s Weekly Journal for publishing a 
pornographic book Eunuchism Display’d (1718), and asserted that Curll deserved 
punishment for it.474 In 1725 Curll was brought before the King’s Bench for publishing 
a translation of an old and fairly infamous obscene text under the title The Nun in Her 
Smock (1724). Three years later, Curll was sentenced to stand in the pillory for 
publishing the Scottish spy John Ker’s memoir, a book which enraged the authority 
because it involved high political secrets from the reign of Queen Anne.475 Critics of 
Curll’s mercenary and unscrupulous publishing activities and the scandalous, prurient 
content of his publications continued throughout the centuries. Even modern reviewers 
show him little mercy. Thus, Ralph Straus, an early twentieth-century biographer of 
Edmund Curll, wrote: 
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The man was an impudent pest, and if amongst the hundreds of books that he 
published one or two were not without merit, there never lived a rogue who better 
deserved the appalling reputation that has always been his… He was called 
impudent liar, and accused of forgery, theft, immorality, and even something like 
murder.476  
Indeed, the rise of scandalous publications would not occur without shameless 
publishers. Edmund Curll was such a barefaced one in the eyes of his contemporaries 
such as Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift. His name on the title page promised 
potential readers ‘a certain alluring naughtiness in the book’.477 Daniel Defoe created 
a new term for his characteristically lurid and scandalous publications: ‘Curlicism.’ 
From him the Crime takes the just Denomination of Curlicism: The Fellow is a 
contemptible Wretch a thousand Ways: he is odious in his Person, scandalous in 
His Fame, he is mark’d by Nature, for he has a bawdy Countenance, and a 
debauch’d Mein, his Tongue is an Echo of all the beastly Language his Shop is 
fill’d with, and Filthiness drivels in the very Tone of his Voice.478 
‘Curlicism was above all an art of effrontery’; but far from being ashamed of this 
pejorative tag, Curll seemed to ‘embrace it as a compliment’. 479  He published 
Curlicism Display’d (May 1718) as a response to Defoe’s criticism; instead of trying to 
vindicate or refute something, Curll turned the book into an advertisement, in which he 
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listed numerous titles of books displayed in his shop hoping to entice readers to 
purchase his obscene books.480 In 1725, fearing that the authorities would charge him 
under the libel law for publishing the erotic book The Nun in Her Smock, Curll printed 
a public apology in the newspaper, but he apparently felt little shame, and once again 
took this opportunity to advertise his new books: 
I hereby most humbly ask Pardon for these Offences; but being resolved never 
more to offend in the like Manner, I give this Notice, that so soon as two Books, 
now in the Press, are finish'd, (viz. 1. The Miscellaneous Works of the Memorable 
Patriot Andrew Marvel esq.; in Prose and Verse. 2. The Case of Seduction; being 
the late Proceedings at Paris against the Rev. Abbé des Rues, for committing 
Rapes upon 133 Virgins. Written by himself) I am resolved to retire from all 
Publick Business.481 
Making a living by publicising scandalous literatures, Curll was surely aware of the 
danger he confronted. He justified the publication of impotency and adultery trial 
accounts by asserting that these texts were authentic, either drawing on legitimated and 
existing sources, or based on the true account of the trial which exhibited in open 
court.482  In Case of Divorce for Several Causes, he defended this book as being 
‘nothing more than a faithful Relation of Facts’.483 In view of his sensational and lurid 
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publications, Curll highlighted his moralising intention, asserting that his accounts were 
‘directly calculated for Antidotes against debauchery and Unnatural Lewdness, and not 
for Incentives to them’.484 On other occasions, Curll simply claimed that he intended 
to leave judgements up to the conscience of the reader.485 
The advent of criminal conversational trial offered writers and publishers like 
Edmund Curll a goldmine, which enabled them to make a profit out of the shame of the 
upper classes. It was against this background that the early eighteenth century witnessed 
a rise in scandalous publications and the commodification of shame. But it is wrong to 
exaggerate the degree of this change. Since moralising was still regarded as a crucial 
part of the crime and scandal literature, the sensational tone of these prints was 
somewhat restrained, and it seems that the detailed description and public exhibition of 
sexual matters were still considered improper. In her latest research on the aristocratic 
vice, Donna Andrew finds that ‘through the first almost seven decades of the eighteenth 
century, there was a real reluctance in the periodical press to extensively report these 
affairs in the particular, or to give any specific details.’486 Of the 23 recorded cases of 
crim. con. trial between 1680 and 1740, only 7 cases were subject to detailed coverage 
in pamphlets.487 But even these accounts of well-reported trials, as Andrew observes, 
‘tended to be shorter in length and unadorned by the colourful, imaginary illustrations 
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enhanced later pamphlets.’488 The news of a trial was often a single sentence long, such 
as The Gentleman’s Magazine report in 1757, ‘At the court of King’s Bench at Guildhall, 
the cause came on wherein Admiral K— was plaintiff, and Capt. G—r defendant in an 
action for criminal conversation, when the fact being fully proved, the jury gave a 
verdict for the plaintiff with a 1000 l. damage.’489 The newspaper reports of scandals 
were also selective. When the Biker versus Morley case was brought to trial in 1741, 
only one of the ten magazines and newspapers commented on it; noting that it was ‘a 
remarkable Case’ and that the hearing ‘had lasted twelve hours’, the Daily Gazetteer 
merely reported that the jury ‘brought in a Verdict for the Defendant’.490 In addition, 
accounts of trials were usually patched together with ‘historical’ cases such as the 
scandals of the Earl of Essex and Lady Howard and the trial of the Earl of Castlehaven, 
as represented in Curll’s 1715 pamphlet Cases of Divorce for Several Causes, while the 
more recent crim. con. trials and scandals made up only a very limited proportion. 
Furthermore, it is notable that the content of these scandalous publications was not as 
sensational or prurient as their titles suggested, and that their writers had put more 
emphasis on issues such as judgement, punishment, and moral lessons than the details 
of the shameful incident itself.491 And what had potentially prevented Curll’s books 
from attracting more audience was that many crucial parts of the accounts such as the 
trial of the Duchess of Cleveland were entirely in Latin.492 
The avoidance of reporting details of scandal is also reflected in these earlier 
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publications in a reluctance to name offenders. The prosecution for libel certainly 
deterred writers and publishers from naming scandalous protagonists, especially those 
drawn from the upper social classes.493 But it is also true that this unwillingness was 
to a large extent attributed to the moralising tradition of early modern crime and scandal 
literature, in which, as the previous section suggests, the identity of individual and the 
fact of transgression functioned primarily as an exemplary basis for decrying sin and 
vice, and were therefore considered relatively less important than the moral message 
that writers intended to deliver. The press in the first half of the eighteenth century 
inherited this tradition: regarding moral and social values as the central concern, it 
aimed to censure negative actions more than to expose particular individuals. For 
example, in John Dunton’s Night-Walker (1696-7), a monthly magazine characterised 
by its journalistic realism, lewd women and rakes are all anonymous figures because, 
as Dunton claimed, ‘our design is to reform, not to expose’. 494  Other forms of 
publications such as satires and novels also refrained from naming wrongdoers. William 
Hogarth seldom named those he ridiculed or accused of bad behaviour in his satirical 
paintings. In the caption of his Midnight Modern Conversation (1732), a caricature that 
attacked men of rank for indulging themselves in a shameful state of inebriation, 
Hogarth wrote: ‘Think not to find one meant resemblance there. We lash the vices but 
the persons spare.’495 In his Verses on the Death of Dr Swift (1739), Johnathan Swift 
also wrote that ‘Yet, malice never was his aim, He lashed the vice but spared the 
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name’.496 Similarly, Henry Fielding in Joseph Andrews (1742) asserted that what he 
targeted was ‘not men, but manners, not an individual, but a species.’497 
The moral messages were often directly expressed by writers. Periodicals in the 
first half of the eighteenth century continually reinforced the notion that adultery was 
so shameful that any people, including social elites and aristocrats, who were guilty of 
it deserved a shaming punishment and the forfeiture of reputation. ‘Adultery is not 
honourable,’ the Covent Garden Magazine remarked, ‘A Magistrate or a Clergyman 
who lies with his Neighbour’s Wife, may be justly esteemed as infamous as he who 
picks his Neighbour’s Pocket, and therefore might with no Impropriety suffer that same 
Punishment which the Mob inflict on the latter Crime, viz. ducking in a Horsepond.’ It 
further claimed that the offender, after suffering from the shaming punishment, ‘shall 
henceforth forfeit all Claim to the Respect; nor shall it be lawful afterwards for any 
Man to call such ducked Person, Honourable, Worshipful, or Reverend… And tho’ a 
lady may after ducking appear in Public, and visit and be visited as before, yet shall it 
not be lawful for her ever to mention the Word Honour.’498 Aiming to emphasise the 
shameful nature rather than the shameful details of sexual transgression, this text not 
only reflects the general attitude of contemporary papers towards sexual liberty in the 
upper classes, but explains why writings about divorce, adultery, and crim. con trials 
were usually more lengthy and detailed, in the form of commentary rather than 
reportage in the periodical press of the time. 
                                                             
496 Jonathan Swift, Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift, D.S.P.D. Occasioned by Reading a Maxim in 
Rochefoulcault (London, 1739), p. 43. 
497 Henry Fielding, Joseph Andrews, ed. John Berseth (Toronto, 2001), p. 128. 
498 Covent Garden Magazine, no. 68, ed. Gerard Edward Jensen (New York, 1964), pp. 122-3. 
184 
 
The rise of scandalous publications in the first half of the eighteenth century 
reflects that private shame – especially that of the superior ranks – had great commercial 
value and could be reached by wider publics through the dissemination of print. Shame 
provided unabashed publishers like Edmund Curll with a business opportunity; through 
advertising the sensational title page and representing lurid facts of transgressions, 
scandalous publications not only catered for, but also widened, the audience who were 
curious about the private lives of errant social elites. It was in this widening public 
sphere of print that personal shame was turning into a commodity, which could be 
exploited by writers, sold by publishers, and consumed by readers. But the degree of 
the rise of scandalous publications in the first half of the century should not be 
exaggerated. In an era when moralisation and didacticism were continually regarded as 
an important function of crime and scandal literature, the sensational tone and the 
detailed representation of shame in these accounts were still, to some extent, restrained. 
 
Aristocratic Shame and the Carnival of Scandal Journalism, c. 1750-1800 
The 1760s may be seen as the watershed for the development of scandal journalism. 
The final four decades of the eighteenth century witnessed the spectacular increase of 
criminal conversation cases. Between 1680 and 1740, there were only 23 recorded cases 
of crim. con., but in 1790s the number increased significantly to 74.499 In line with this 
explosion was the unprecedented rise of popular press. The daily newspapers, which 
emerged in the 1760s and 1770s, quickly became a strong competitor of other forms of 
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print media in reporting and commenting on the news of higher ranks.500 Periodicals 
such as The Town and Country Magazine which appeared in 1769, and its famous 
successors The Rambler’s Magazine; or, The Annals of Gallantry, Glee, Pleasure, and 
the Bon Ton published in 1783 and The Bon Ton Magazine; or, Microscope of Fashion 
and Folly in 1791 all concentrated to the stories and scandals of the world of fashion. 
Pamphlets, novels and satires likewise flourished in this period; focusing on the sexual 
improprieties of the upper classes, they satisfied the audience’s appetites for watching 
the private lives of high and mighty people, and made the shame of their social betters 
a popular subject of discussion and a source of entertainment. Among the numerous 
criminal conversations cases brought to trial in the second half of the century, perhaps 
the most extensively reported were scandals of the Duke of Grafton, the Duke of 
Cumberland, and Lady Worsley. The ways of reporting these infamous cases provide 
good examples of how personal shame was brought into the public domain and 
exploited for commercial, moral, and political purposes.501 
In 1768, when the third Duke of Grafton became George III’s chief minister, his 
wife, who had lived apart from him for nearly five years after a period of unhappy 
marriage, was found pregnant with a child by her lover, the Earl of Upper Ossory. The 
cuckolded Duke launched a criminal conversation charge against him, and petitioned 
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for a complete Parliamentary divorce. But instead of becoming an object of sympathy, 
Grafton was himself accused of sexual immorality. By the time his third child was born 
in 1764, the Duke had already established a relationship with the courtesan Nancy 
Parsons, who lived with him in secret at Woodford in Essex. In 1768 Grafton even kept 
Parsons in his London residence and accompanied her to the opera.502 The gossip and 
scandal made Grafton the target of attack in regards to a set of anonymous letters written 
under the name of Junius. In a letter addressed to the Public Advertiser in June 12, 1769, 
Junius wrote ‘Did not the duke of Grafton frequently lead his mistress into public, and 
even place her at the head of his table, as if he had pulled down an ancient temple of 
Venus, and could bury all decency and shame under the ruins?’503 While it was an open 
secret that many aristocrats kept mistresses, what enraged Junius in particular was that 
Grafton not only openly consorted with Parsons without any sense of shame, but also 
defended his adulterous behaviour, a behaviour which Junius condemned as ‘a certain 
outrage to decency and violation of public decorum’. Thus, ten days later, Junius wrote 
that: 
It is not that he kept a mistress at home, but that he constantly attended her abroad. 
It is not the private indulgence, but the public insult, of which I complain. The 
name of Miss Parsons would hardly have been known if the first lord of the 
treasury had not led her in triumph through the opera house, even in the presence 
of the queen. When we see a man act in this manner we may admit the shameless 
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depravity of his heart, but what are we to think of his understanding?504 
Another fact that enraged Junius was that Grafton, beyond all expectations, 
abandoned Parsons after his divorce was announced and married one of Ossory’s 
cousins. ‘Is there not a singular mark of shame set upon this man, who has so little 
delicacy and feeling as to submit to the opprobrium of marrying a near relation of one 
who had debauched his wife?’505 Perhaps the only explanation of the Duke’s marriage 
was, as Junius implied in a satirical tone, that Ossory would not be likely to seduce his 
own cousin, and therefore, Grafton would not be cuckolded again: 
He marries a first cousin of the man who had fixed that mark and title of infamy 
upon him which, at the same moment, makes a husband unhappy and ridiculous. 
The ties of consanguinity may possibly preserve him from the same fate to a 
second time; and, as to the distress of meeting, I take for granted the venerable 
uncle of these common cousins has settled the etiquette in such as a manner that, 
if a mistake should happen, it may reach no farther than from ‘Madame ma 
femme’ to ‘Madame ma cousine’.506 
Besides sexual immoralities, the Duke was also condemned for his perfidy and 
betrayal of friends. ‘Was not lord Chatham the first who raised him to the rank and post 
of a minister, and the first whom he abandoned? Did he not join with Lord Rockingham, 
and betray him? Was he not the bosom friend of Mr. Wilkes, whom he now pursues to 
destruction?’507 Accusing a man of lying or betraying his companions could seriously 
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damage his credit and reputation, since loyalty and good faith had long been regarded 
as important characteristics in constructing male honour. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that Junius seriously attacked Grafton’s sexual debauchery and his lack of honesty. 
While the moral function of Junius’ letters is undeniable, we should be aware that an 
important reason lurking behind these letters was political. Junius aimed at the dismissal 
of Grafton from the position of ministry. And his real opposition to Grafton was that the 
latter arbitrarily appointed Henry Lawes Luttrell to the MP for Middlesex, rather than 
the duly elected Wilkes. Junius claimed that this appointment infringed upon the 
foundation of the law and constitutional rights and liberty of Englishmen. 508  The 
message that Junius intended to deliver was that a person who betrayed his wife and 
friends and abandoned his mistress was unreliable, dishonest, and therefore could not 
be trusted: ‘it is possible the young man may in time grow wiser, and reform; but, if 
understand his disposition, it is not of such corrigible stuff that we should hope for any 
amendment in him before he has accomplished the destruction of his country.’509 The 
public letters written by Junius successfully corroded the Duke’s reputation and made 
him unpopular enough to end his ministry in January 1770. 
While Junius exploited the Duke’s private shame for explicit moral and political 
purposes,510 other forms of print paid more attention to unusual or juicy details of the 
scandal. The Gentleman’s Magazine published two letters; the first one was believed to 
be written by Grafton to the discarded mistress, the other was Nancy Parsons’ reply. In 
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the first letter, the Duke forced Parsons to leave England and settle in the Continent, so 
that he could enter into ‘chaster connections’ with his new wife without any disturbance 
from her, and the Duke would pay for her living cost in the Continent quarterly.511 
Parsons’ reply was full of depressed discontent: ‘You inform me, in the close of your 
letter, “of your speedily entering into chaster connections.” – I am resigned! – And may 
your future lady love like me, but never meet with such returns! – May every hour of 
your life be bright – ended by prosperity.’512 Shortly after Grafton married his second 
wife, a caricature appeared in The Oxford Magazine, satirising the Duke for choosing 
the cousin of the man who had cuckolded him. (figure 1) In 1769, a fictional account of 
the sex-life between the Duke and Parsons was made public under the title Memoirs of 
the Amours, Intrigues, and Adventures of Charles Augustus Fitz-Roy, Duke of Grafton, 
with Miss Parsons. 
The final year of the 1760s and the following year witnessed a carnival of scandal 
journalism. Only several months after the completion of Grafton’s divorce trial, the 
notorious adultery case of the Duke of Cumberland with the Countess of Grosvenor 
came to light. Unlike Grafton, who was criticised mainly by political opponents for his 
public immorality and corruption, the Cumberland case, which ‘gave pleasure to the 
whole nation’, attracted much wider attention among the contemporary media.513 Soon 
after the exposure of the scandal in December 1769, The Gentleman’s Magazine 
reported that ‘An assignation at the White Hart at St. Albans, between Lady G – and a 
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Figure 1: ‘The Political Wedding’, The Oxford Magazine, July, 1769, p. 18. 
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certain great D—e, was disconcerted by the forcible intrusion of my lord’s gentleman, 
who about two o’clock in the morning burst the chamber door open, and found the lovers 
sitting together in close conversation.’ 514  The Supplement to The Gentleman’s 
Magazine for that year provided addition information about the scandal, noting that 
Cumberland disguised himself ‘in a black wig’ and presented himself in ‘an 
extraordinary appearance’ in order to make the inn’s servants believe that he was coming 
to visit ‘an eminent mad Doctor in the town’ rather than ‘the fatal cause he was 
prosecuting’. When the Earl’s men broke into the Countess’s apartment: ‘Her Ladyship 
and her Lover, were discovered seated by the fire; the Lady endeavoured to fly into a 
room… He – in his confusion having gained the outside of the door, cried, “I am not 
found in her Ladyship’s apartment.” But the people had been called upon, and 
recognized both the lady and his –, notwithstanding this little evasion.’ When the 
discovery of the adultery had been made, it was reported that the Earl drove his wife out 
of their house, deprived her of motherhood, and launched a criminal conversation 
against Cumberland.515 More unusual details were published by the press. In February 
1770, The Town and Country Magazine published the Earl’s reply to the Duke of 
Cumberland who had written Grosvenor two letters ‘proposing an accommodation with 
Lady G – ’. In his reply the Earl refused Cumberland’s shameless request, and delivered 
a message to society that he had received ‘a sense of injuries’, and would ‘bring the 
perpetrator to justice’.516 
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Indeed, compared to the early eighteenth-century scandalous publications which 
were somewhat reluctant to offer detailed description of the shame itself, it is 
noteworthy that print media in the second half of the century showed more interest in 
reporting the shameful and salacious details of the scandal, and turned the private shame 
into a public mockery and entertainment. After the ecclesiastical divorce trial and the 
criminal conversation suit were made in March and July 1770, more sensational facts of 
the scandal were dredged. A pamphlet entitled The Trial of His R.H. the D. of C. July 
5th, 1770 for Criminal Conversation with Lady Harriett G – r (1770) told readers that 
when the Earl’s brother broke open the door at the inn, ‘the D. of C. sitting on the bed-
side along with Lady G – , with his waistcoat loose, and the lady with her Dress 
unbuttoned, and her breasts wholly exposed.’ When the Duke escaped into the next room, 
he reminded others ‘to take notice’ that he was ‘not in Lady G’s Room’ and that he 
‘would take his bible oath’ to what he said.517 In July 1770 The Public Advertiser 
reported that the rooms chosen for rendezvous were usually marked with a piece of 
chalk by the Duke so that the Lady could find them, and that the Lady referred to choose 
less commodious rooms, ‘even having broken paynes in the window and otherwise out 
of Repair’. It also revealed that Cumberland ‘went under different Names, and once 
gave out that he was insane, and under the Direction of a Physician travelling with him, 
and who, upon Examination, turn’d out to be a common Porter.’518 The Gentleman’s 
Magazine provided an anecdote about the ‘mad Duke’, writing that Cumberland ‘used 
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to be called at the inns the Fool, particularly at Whitchurch, where a noise being heard 
in passing from one room to the other, it was disregarded by the people of the house; 
who said, it was only the Fool.’ 519  Love letters which was said to be written by 
Cumberland were also exposed and circulated by the press:  
I got to supper about 9 o’ clock but I could not eat, and so got to bed about 10 – I 
then prayed for you, my dearest love, kissed your dearest little hair, and laye down 
and dreamt of you; had you on the dear little coach ten thousand times in my arms, 
kissing you, and telling you how much I loved and adored you, and you seemed 
pleased; but, alas, when I awoke I found it all delusion! – no body by me but 
myself at sea.520 
Not surprisingly, the Duke’s idiosyncrasies in his trysts with the Countess, his 
mawkish and ill-written love letters, and his assertion that he would ‘take a bible oath’ 
that he was not ‘in my Lady’s room’ made Cumberland a laughing-stock and his shame 
the subject of public entertainment.521 In August 1770, The Lady’s Magazine published 
correspondence written by a female reader, who satirically praised the Duke’s service 
and sacrifice for the woman he loved: 
Though many noisy people have made a scoff at a great duke’s love-letters, yet, I 
think, he is to be had in the highest honour and esteem, for where is there one in 
twenty among you men that would undergo the difficulties he did for our sex: he 
turned squire, fool, horse-stealer, farmer, nay, and cook (for I am told he fry’ d 
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bacon and eggs at St. Alban’s); and what is still more, turned those pretty red locks 
of hair of his into a black wig. 
She then ridiculed the Duke for swearing by his bible oath: ‘But as these good men love 
only married women, the next time I trouble you will be with an article for a sober 
husband, not one of your mad sort, that break open doors, and disturb and frighten the 
gallant, to make him swear by his bible oath to a falsity.’ After mocking the Duke’s 
foolish disguising and false swearing, the correspondent then wrote a satirical poem in 
order to shame his ill-writing and his tutor Dr Charles who taught the Duke spelling: 
To my dear angel now at land, 
Her love at sea doth write; 
But first would have her understand, 
I never could indite, 
Tho’ Dr Charles, great pains he took, 
Yet I ne’er learnt my spelling book.522 
In August 1770, The Town and Country Magazine published a correspondence from a 
member of the ‘Society of Female Coterie’; it suggested that the Society would provide 
financial support to publish ‘a new ROYAL SPELLING-BOOK’ for those polite lovers 
‘who propose carrying on an amorous correspondence.’523 A month later, The Oxford 
Magazine printed a letter full of spelling and grammar mistakes, and claimed that it was 
written by Cumberland’s language tutor Dr. Charles.524 In August Bingley’s Journal 
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published a song, which ridiculed the young Duke for paying the dearest £10,000 for ‘a 
lock of her (Lady Grosvenor) dear little hair’: 
Ye Captains and Admirals mighty and brave, 
Who rear Britain’s Standard, and traverse her Wave, 
That each Cruize may prove glorious, be sure you take Care, 
To carry a Lock of her dear little Hair. 
Your future high Admiral bids you do this,  
As something to play with, and something to kiss;  
Tho’ his highness expressly does not tell you where,  
He cropt his sweet Lock of her dear little Hair. 
This Lock was the dearest that ever was found,  
No less did it cost him than Ten Thousand Pounds; 
Such a Circumstance surely may serve to declare, 
Its Right to the Title of DEAR little Hair.525 
Contemporaries did not believe that Cumberland would resolve to reform himself. 
The Public Advertiser claimed that the Duke would return to his adulterous lifestyle 
very soon: ‘We hear that Squire John, alias Squire Morgan [both were aliases that 
Cumberland had used in order to associate with Lady Grosvenor], who played the Part 
of the Fool so naturally at Whitchurch, and other Parts of the Country, has taken his 
Bible Oath that he will endeavour to divert the Town this Summer in the same Character.’ 
It therefore advised inhabitants of the town ‘receive the Squire kindly, as his little heart 
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flatters for the Approbation of the Public.’526 Similarly, The Oxford Magazine remarked 
that the Duke could have played the fool perfectly simply because he himself was a fool; 
but if a fool pretended to be wise by taking bible oath, he would be extremely awkward: 
‘I can venture to take my Bible Oath that he could have performed the character he 
appeared in to the highest perfection, without departing from his original character. 
When a man has been in one particular walk in life for twenty-five years, he cannot 
avoid being extremely awkward when he attempts to go out of it.’527 
Between 1769 and 1770, both Dukes were bombarded by the popular press. While 
it was Grafton and Cumberland who brought disgrace upon their own heads, the 
mercenary and indefatigable scandalmongers undoubtedly played a crucial role in 
exposing and spreading their shame. Publishers and writers must have profited 
handsomely from trading on both Dukes’ shame. And their readers were able to obtain 
with more detailed reports of the sensational and salacious facts of upper-class immoral 
privacies than they had ever imagined possible. The increase of sensationalism in the 
second half of the eighteenth century does not mean that the moral function of 
scandalous publications was altogether abandoned, since the reportage and comments 
centring on the Grafton and Cumberland cases functioned as trial by media, which not 
only exposed upper-class immoralities and corruption, but also made the reading public 
aware of their own moral superiority. However, the latter half of the eighteenth century 
witnessed a change in ways of representing shame in scandalous publications. If crime 
and scandal texts before the 1750s was characterised by their somewhat didactic tone, 
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which was presented in the fact that the shameful nature and consequence of 
transgression were always seriously and explicitly pronounced by writers, in the latter 
half of the century, as the Cumberland case revealed, they were becoming more satirical 
and light-hearted in tone, aiming to ridicule or shame wrongdoers rather than to make a 
direct condemnation. Highlighting the foolishness of Cumberland and making him the 
subject of public ridicule and laughing-stock, the growing satirical and entertaining 
ways of representation increased and spread the shame of the Duke, but whether these 
prints evoked a moral sense of shame among readers was nevertheless ambiguous.528 
Publisher’s greed, however, knew no bounds, nor did the reading public’s curiosity 
about the world of fashion. The 1760s and 1770s witnessed a notable increase in the 
coverage of aristocratic sexual transgressions, but it was not until the final two decades 
of the eighteenth century that, as Donna Andrew remarks, ‘the age of a mass readership 
for adultery cases had arrived.’529 Among the numerous scandals that happened during 
this period, the Richard Worsley’s case was no doubt the most sensational and notorious 
one. 530  Several facts made this sexual scandal particularly fascinating for the 
contemporary print media and reading public. For example, Sir Richard Worsley’s wife 
Seymour Dorothy Worsley was rumoured to have ‘no less than twenty-eight’ lovers.531 
In 1782, Sir Richard launched a crim. con. trial against one of her wife’s many 
paramours, George M. Bisset, a Hampshire militia officer and a neighbour of Worsley 
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on the Isle of Wight, and demanded £20,000 damages from him. However, it was 
reported that ‘the jury returned with a Verdict for the Plaintiff, giving him only One 
Shilling Damages’ due to Richard Worsley’s collusion in the adultery as a witness 
testified that in Maidstone Sir Richard ‘had absolutely raised the Defendant upon his 
Shoulders to view his naked Wife while bathing’, and that his wife ‘joined the 
Gentlemen’ and ‘they all went off together in a hearty laugh’.532 Undoubtedly, the 
unnatural incident of Maidstone quickly became the focus of print media.  
Although publications centring on Worsley’s scandal, like those of the Grafton and 
Cumberland cases, seldom mentioned the word ‘shame’ or directly taught readers ‘what 
was shameful’ as many seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century scandalous accounts 
always did, their extensive coverage and trade in the salacious and shameful details of 
the scandal did reflect a real shift in the way of representing shame. The author of a 
poem entitled Variety, or Which is the Man? A Poem dedicated to Lady W-sl-y (1782) 
represented Lady Worsley as a woman who, after long ‘pursuing luxury’ and being ‘a 
universal lover’, decided to search for real love but ‘not to stop carnal pleasures’ and 
not until she met Bisset did she feel ‘Love’s true surprise’. The author described Lady 
Worsley as a hypocrite, who was not ashamed of, but rather enjoyed, being spied upon 
by Bisset: ‘Gave him full time when mounted high, To gaze, and feast his ravish’d eye; 
That nothing should obstruct his peep, I, cautious, went but ancle deep.’533 In another 
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satirical poem entitled The Whim!!! or, the Maid-Stone Bath (1782), Lady Worsley was 
represented as a nymphomaniac, who owned ‘a Male Seraglio’ wherein she was, as the 
author wrote, ‘amidst a circle of the Apollos of all Nations’, and ‘engaged in the 
delightful ceremony, of throwing the Handkerchief!’ 534  An Epistle from L[ad]y 
W[orsle]y to S[ir]r R[ichar]d W[orsle]y Bart (1782) was even more sensational in tone. 
According to its author, Richard Worsley was the very author of his own shame, his 
wife eloped with Bisset simply because he could not satisfy his wife’s sexual appetite: 
Long time, alas! unsatisfy’d I rang’d, 
Now pleas’d with W – M, now for G – M chang’d 
At length with B – T stope, for he could give 
What from thine arms I never could receive. 
From him no teizing titillations came; 
He rais’d those passions which he well could tame. 
Dissolv’d in thrilling extacy we lay, 
Kiss’d till the morn, then curs’d the coming day. 
Oh! had you seen me on his breast recline’d; 
Lips glu’d to lips, and limbs with limbs entwin’d …535 
In the final part of the Epistle, the author also ridiculed Worsley’s habit of showing his 
naked wife to other men, and at the same time affirmed Lady Worsley’s willingness to 
exhibit her body to Bisset: ‘Without a blush I gave him time to gaze, And set his 
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youthful spirits in a blaze.’536  
The shame and scandal of Worsley also provided a rich source of inspiration to 
caricaturists. James Gillray, for example, produced several mildly erotic caricatures, 
which represented the absurdity and shamelessness of the protagonists in the 
Maidstone case, and exposed the corruption and licentiousness of Lady Worsley and 
social elites.537 Other caricatures intended to represent the moment of shame that 
Richard Worsley must have experienced in the crim. con. trial. In The Shilling or the 
Value of A P – Y C – R’s Matrimonial Honor (1782), for example, James Wallace stands 
on one side of the table and tosses Worsley a shilling, saying that ‘They would not 
believe you possess any of your contrivance for his peeping has ruined your cause’. 
Worsley, who looked too fat to be a military officer, almost faints to the ground upon 
knowing that he was awarded only one shilling damages. This was undoubtedly a 
shameful moment for the baronet; ‘O lord O lord no more than one shilling for my lost 
honour,’ Richard exclaims while dropping his cap and sward on the ground. A cluster 
of horns sprouted from his head, with each branch bearing the name of his wife’s 
paramours who had borne witness in the court. Above the scene is Lady Justice, who 
points her sword at Robert’s red military uniform, and warned that: ‘Take away that 
badge of Distinction, Shame may transfer the colour to his face.’538 (figure 2) 
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Figure 2: The Shilling or the Value of A P – Y C – R’s Matrimonial Honor, published 
by Hannah Humphrey, February 27, 1782, (BM Satires 6105). 
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The extensive coverage and representation of upper-class sexual scandal was 
familiar to contemporaries. What was new to the contemporary publishing industry 
was the use of advertisements to promote the sale of scandalous publications. The 
advertising campaign centred on Worsley’s scandal demonstrates the great social 
impact and commercial value of the shame of the superior ranks, and once again 
reflects the commodification of shame in the eighteenth-century context of print culture. 
On March 4, 1782, a puff under the guise of the news appeared in The Public Advertiser; 
claiming that the accounts of the crim. con. trial between Sir Richard Worsley and 
Captain Bisset had sold out ‘in a few Hours’ after the publication and that ‘a great 
Number of Purchasers were consequently disappointed’; it informed readers that in 
order to ‘prevent a Repetition of this Inconvenience, two Presses are now employed in 
working off a sufficient Quantity to gratify the Curiosity of the Public.’539 Before the 
publication of the satirical poem The Whim!!! or, the Maid-Stone Bath, The Morning 
Chronicle also published an advertisement and cited a sentence from Hudibras to entice 
its readers into buying that satirical poem.540 One month later, The White Evening Post 
posted another advertisement which told readers that The Whim would reveal the 
secrets of who was the real seducer in Maidstone: 
Notwithstanding a late Decision, it appears yet a matter of doubt, whether Lady 
W– seduced the Gentlemen, or they seduced her Ladyship? At any rate it is 
obvious that there was a seduction somewhere; for it is not always the case that 
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more than a score of Witnesses are ready to swear to the truth of their own 
misconduct. This matter will be best explained by a perusal of the Whim… which 
is the production of Genius, assisted by the best information.541  
In the first week of May, 1782, the publisher of An Epistle from L[ad]y W[orsle]y to 
S[ir]r R[ichar]d W[orsle]y Bart placed a set of advertisements in The Morning Herald 
and Daily Advertiser. On 1 May 1782, an item, disguised as a correspondence written 
by a high-minded reader, condemned the recently published Epistle as ‘the most 
licentious and immoral productions that has been issued from the press for some time’ 
since in this book ‘vice is painted in such specious colours, and morality and virtue so 
totally ridiculed’. This letter persuaded the audience ‘who is not totally lost to every 
degree of decency, will… by any means deign to read it.’ In the second day, The 
Morning Herald posted another advertisement, claiming that it was Lady Worsley who 
wrote this Epistle and therefore she ‘leaves us at a loss to know which we are most to 
detest: the very extraordinary supineness of the husband; or the libidinous and 
insatiable passions of the wife.’ The best puff for the Epistle was posted on 6 May. First 
lamenting that ‘the great and alarming increase of licentiousness cannot be more 
conspicuous than in the very extensive circulation, amongst all ranks, of the new 
publication, entitled an Epistle from L–y W–y to S–r R–d’, the author of this 
advertisement continued: 
The uncommon popularity of this pamphlet is infinitely to be dreaded, not only 
from the abandoned morals and severe scandal it contains, but on account of the 
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singular elegance of the language, which is so truly infatuating, that while it steals 
on the senses by the beauty of the poetry, it pictures in such irresistible colours, 
that it cannot fail rooting from the mind every sentiment of virtue and morality. 
Yet so strange is the depravity of the age, that it is no less extraordinary than true, 
that a capital bookseller, at the West end the town, has actually orders to send 500 
copies to a neighbouring kingdom – a number quite sufficient to corrupt the 
minds of all its inhabitant.542 
Obviously not everyone appreciated the Epistle and its immoral, titillating ways of 
advertisement. A reader with apparently strong moral principles complained to the 
printer of the Public Advertiser that his ‘brain is tortured with a perpetual Repetition 
of mercenary Puffs in almost every Papers of that contemptible Performance yelped an 
Epistle from Lady W – y’. The correspondent then cautioned printers and writers that 
‘a good Book will recommend itself, but a bad one require Puffing’, and argued that 
those ‘unprincipled R – s, who laugh at the good-natured Englishman’s Credulity, and 
both insult him, and pick his Pocket’ should be punished by ‘a manual 
Chastisement’.543 
That personal shame could make money was known not only by publishers, but 
also by fallen women who had lapsed from chastity or social norms. The second half 
of the eighteenth century witnessed an increase in the number of memoirs written by 
courtesans and mistresses. These autobiographies served different purposes. They 
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offered the author a chance to repent of their debauchery and beg forgiveness from the 
public and her family, to represent herself as a victim of male perfidy, to express a 
desire for virtue and vindicate her innocent nature, to mitigate the shame inflicted on 
them, and to name and shame the males who had led them to present notoriety. 
Although these memoirs offered repentance, and claimed their moral and instructive 
functions, they all capitalised on shame and were written for money.544 If a courtesan 
grew old and was unable to find a faithful keeper, publishing an autobiography, or 
simply blackmailing her former lovers and clients (who were usually those coming 
from the world of fashion) by threatening to expose their names in memoirs could be 
an effective way of bettering her economic fortune.545  Economic interest was the 
primary reason for women such as Laetitia Pilkington and Teresia Constantia Phillips 
publishing their memoirs.546 These scandalous autobiographies, which were always 
sensational in tone and popular among the reading public, constituted a part of the 
contemporary ‘shame economy’ of the publishing industry. 
The popularity of such scandalous memoirs relied on their detailed, and indeed 
sensational, representation of the shame and scandal of the fashionable world and the 
consequent voyeuristic pleasure which was delivered to the audience. When Ann 
Sheldon’s Authentic and Interesting Memoirs was published in 1788, The World posted 
an item warning that the memoirs ‘contain a very ample store of modern anecdote, and 
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a long catalogue of amorous histories, in which the principal personages of this 
kingdom will make their appearance’.547 This advertisement also listed the names of 
more than one hundred ‘big figures’, including those of the richest and most powerful 
in the kingdom, and promised readers that these persons would appear in Ann 
Sheldon’s memoir. Like many scandalous memoirists of the time, Sheldon claimed her 
writing had positive effects, but felt no shame in offering accounts of her own sexual 
transgressions and aristocratic scandals. For example, she described in detail how the 
Marquis of Granby seduced and raped Sophia, a virtuous maid and the fiancée of Mr. 
Hudson.548  She also recounted her service to Lord Grosvenor, who asked her to 
‘furnish novelties for his seraglio’, and exposed Grosvenor’s taste for women of colour 
and poor girls who were dirty and shabby in dress.549  
The increase and popularity of such scandalous memoirs in turn made their 
heroines celebrities of the time. Although their ‘honour’ or fame was gained through 
shame, it did not prevent famous harlots and courtesans or what John Cleland termed 
‘women of pleasure’ such as Kitty Fisher, Ann Sheldon, Fanny Murray and Nancy 
Parsons from being portrayed by eminent painters. 550  In the second half of the 
eighteenth century, their images were remarkably popular in London. At the price of 
one penny to one shilling, as Dabhoiwala writes, these portraits were affordable to a 
large population, and ‘allowed thousands of viewers to feel familiar, even possessive, 
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towards her.’551 Like the explosion of the press and pamphlets in reporting upper-class 
transgressions, the popularity of scandalous memoirs and their authors once again 
demonstrated the spectacular rise of scandal journalism and the commodification of 
shame. What, then, was the contemporary attitude towards scandalous prints? How did 
their barefaced representation of the shame and scandal of social elites influence the 
contemporary perception of shame? It is to these questions the next section now turns. 
 
Scandalous Publication and the Rising Culture of Shamelessness 
In her recent book Aristocratic Vice, Donna Andrew highlights the positive impact of 
the popular press, arguing that these publications not only heightened public awareness 
about fashionable vice, but also ‘fostered a growing sense of resentment and irritation 
among the public, a feeling that the lives of the great and powerful were not what they 
should be, and that reformation was necessary.’552 Indeed, the increasing coverage of 
the crim. con. cases and the spectacular rise of scandal journalism in the eighteenth 
century made contemporaries, especially ‘godly’ authors, believe that they were living 
in a society in which the fashionable males and females no longer considered adultery 
a shameful sin. In 1754 a preacher lamented that ‘the Sin of Fornication and 
Uncleanness was too much encouraged and justified by some of the greatest men in the 
Heathen World’.553 In the preface of the account of the Cumberland trial, the editor 
wrote that ‘adultery is become so fashionable, and Divorce so frequent, that it may 
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admit of some debate, in the polite world, whether the first is criminal or the latter 
dishonourable.’554 The Town and Country Magazine noted many fashionable men held 
the view that ‘a man of taste must have a mistress’ in order to establish reputation. 
Several years later, the magazine noted that for those of higher rank, love was no longer 
a reason for marriage: ‘if a man were weak enough to acknowledge that the amorous 
passion had any way influenced him in the choice of a wife, he would be laughed at by 
all his acquaintance, and held up as the butt of ridicule in every circle where the ton 
was supposed to prevail.’555 In 1780, The London Magazine wrote that adultery was 
so prevalent in high circles that ‘there may remain no distinction between the house of 
the countess and brothel.’556 Contemporaries called for severer punishment to combat 
upper-class promiscuous sexuality, but they lamented that legislators could not be 
trusted, because those sitting in parliament were ‘conscious that themselves deserve 
the lash of it’.557 
What made contemporary people particularly worried was that aristocratic 
immoralities might corrupt the lower ranks and the entire society. In 1771, an author 
under the name of ‘Civilian’ noted that ‘fashion is so favourite, so powerful, an idol, 
that few have resolution enough to restrain from bowing down at the shine of 
idolatry.’558 Another book published in 1771 remarked that ‘when the Rulers have no 
Bars either of Shame or legal Restraint, their vicious Examples excite a much more 
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general Imitation throughout the slavish Multitude, than the evil Precedents of 
Individuals can occasion in a Common-Wealth.’559 In March 1786, The Times likewise 
claimed that ‘the example of the great is more prevalent than any laws… if we look 
into the families of the nobility and opulent gentry, we seldom find an example, the 
imitation of which is not dangerous. Their servants are almost proverbially idle, lazy, 
[and] profligate.’ 560  The scandal journalism that shaped popular anxieties and 
resentment of aristocratic vice in turn ‘created repeated demands for positive action’.561 
Thus, the eighteenth century saw a significant increase in the publication of sermons, 
conduct books, treatises, pamphlets and countless newspaper commentaries, which 
aimed to redress upper-class immoralities and their harmful social influences. Some of 
them emphasised the importance of religion in curbing sexual laxity, while others 
proposed the application of severer and more enforceable punishments. Many asserted 
that ‘the great and wealth’ should set ‘the virtuous example’ to the society. Some 
publications aimed to reinforce ‘the powerful restraint of shame’ and particularly 
inculcate female readers with ‘bashfulness and modesty’. Others pointed out that it was 
those ‘nominal’ and ‘indifferent’ husbands that led to female infidelity, and thus urged 
that ‘the husbands should be honest themselves’.562  
While moralistic publications from different perspectives expressed ideas about 
                                                             
559 John Andrews, Reflections on the too Prevailing Spirit of Dissipation and Gallantry; Shewing 
Its Dreadful Consequences to Publick Freedom (London, 1771), p. 54. 
560 The Times, 27 March, 1786. 
561 Andrew, Aristocratic Vice, p. 42. 
562 For example: The Times, 27 March, 1786; Maurice Morgann, A Letter to My Lords the Bishop, 
on Occasion of the Present Bill for the Preventing of Adultery (London, 1779), pp. 48-9; Francis 
Foster, Thoughts on the Times, but Chiefly on the Profligacy of Our Women, and It’s Causes (London, 
1779), pp. 70-1; The Times, 1 September, 1789; The Town and Country Magazine, August 1777, pp. 
407-8; The London Magazine, June 1780, p. 255. 
210 
 
the way of combating fashionable vice, the popular press and news pamphlets insisted 
that in order to discourage upper-class corruption, shaming wrongdoers through 
exposing their transgressions were necessary. In 1761, The London Evening Post 
argued for its legitimacy of criticising immoral upper figures: ‘admonitions well 
founded are of great Use, and appear no where so properly as in News-Papers; which 
passing through many Hands, have the best Chance of producing sometimes or other, 
a good Effect.’563 In a correspondence addressing to the Town and Country Magazine, 
the author, quoting Alexander Pope’s words that ‘people who were not afraid of being 
wicked, were ashamed of being made ridiculous’, praised the shaming function of its 
Tête-à-Tête series.564 Another author argued that infidelity ‘is a Crime so scandalous’ 
that it ‘behoves every one to lend his Assistance in exposing those equally dangerous 
and ignominious Consequences that necessarily flow from the shameful and guilty 
connivance’.565 In Trials for Adultery: or, the History of Divorces, Being Select Trials 
at Doctors Commons, For Adultery, Fornication, Cruelty, Impotence, a multi-volume 
collection of crim. con. accounts published in 1779, the editor claimed that ‘this 
publication may perhaps effect what the law cannot: the transactions of the adulterer 
and the adulteress will, by being thus publickly circulated, preserve others from the 
like crimes, from the fear of shame, when the fear of punishment may have but little 
force’.566 Perhaps the most explicit expression of advocating print as a mechanism for 
shaming particular wrongdoers comes from The Devil Divorced (1782), in which the 
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author asserted that ‘this work is meant as a kind of satire, not altogether on the vices 
of the age, but rather of individuals… My principal aim has been to arraign and lash 
their vices, and at the same time to ridicule and expose their follies’. Responding to the 
opinion that ‘a man may both lash the vices, and laugh at the follies of the age, without 
descending to personalities’, the author of The Devil Divorced refuted that ‘this would 
be, for the most part, unattended with the desired effect’, because: 
Many there are who persist in the course in which they have entered, merely 
because their evil practices are hid from the eye of the world. Many there are, 
who, in private, or with a chosen few, scruple not to doing things, of which, in a 
public assembly, they would speak in terms of the utmost abhorrence… I am not 
without hopes that this exposition of them may be attended with some salutary 
effects. My desire throughout is to serve the cause of good manners and virtue, 
and to put vice to the blush.567 
In a society where aristocrats and social elites who had indulged in illicit 
behaviours could often evade prosecution or harsh punishment, trial by journalism 
provided a potential, and perhaps the only effective, tool to curb and discipline upper-
class vice. The popular press and pamphlets functioned as a court of public opinion. 
By placing the wicked in ‘a literary pillory’, they exposed and shamed the wrongdoers 
among social betters. Thus in 1791 when Lord Chief Justice Lloyd Kenyon vowed that 
if any prosecutions against gambling ‘are brought before me, and the parties are justly 
convicted whatever may be their rank, or station in the country, though they should be 
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the first ladies in the land, they shall certainly exhibit themselves in the Pillory’, all 
eyes turned to Albinia Hobart, Countess of Buckinghamshire, and her friend Lady 
Sarah Archer, who were notorious gamblers of the time. 568 Albinia and Archer were 
convicted of running a faro table and cheating. But due to their aristocratic status, both 
of them were merely fined. Two noble ladies who had escaped from being punished by 
the pillory were nonetheless pilloried by the press. In James Gillray’s Faro's Daughters, 
or The Kenyonian Blow up to Gamblers, Albinia and Archer were depicted standing in 
the pillory under the shower of rotten eggs, dead rats, and vegetables thrown by the 
mob. On the platform of the pillory was attached a notice which read ‘Curing for 
Gambling, published by Lord Kenyon in the Court of King’s Bench.’ (figure 3) This 
caricature exhibited the vices of the aristocracy, and shamed not only two of the most 
notorious ‘Faro’s daughters’, but also the cowardly, if not hypocritical, Lord Kenyon. 
Donna Andrew is obviously right in arguing for the positive role of the popular 
press in combating aristocratic vice and promoting moral reform, but what she fails to 
consider is the other side of the coin of scandalous publications – their unabashed 
concentration on shame and vice and the consequent social anxieties over the loss of 
the moral sense of shame. While it is true that many scandalous accounts condemned 
upper-class corruption and claimed their moralising function, we should be aware that 
most of them capitalised on sensationalism and were produced as a product of 
commercial entertainment. Indeed, many scandalous publishers and writers were 
neither radically critical, nor interested in reforming the world. Satirical artists did not 
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Figure 3: James Gillray, Faro's Daughters, or The Kenyonian Blow up to Gamblers, 
published by Hannah Humphrey, May 12, 1796, (BM Satires 8876). 
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aim to influence the common people or to subvert the monarchical principle; as Vic 
Gatrell argues, their caricatures which exposed princely transgressions were created 
mainly for elite or sophisticate’s consumption.569 Although scandalous and satirical 
prints could shame wrongdoers and arouse popular objections to the fashionable vice, 
it would be wrong to assume that the reading public had always experienced, or been 
inculcated with, the moral sense of shame. Nobody would have missed out reading the 
titillating details that followed the didactic preface of these publications, and it is true 
that what fascinated readers was not moral instruction, but the voyeuristic thrill these 
prints offered. All of this suggests that scandalous publications did not offer readers a 
coherent way of thinking about shame, and that their influence was double-edged. The 
rise of scandal journalism in the eighteenth century brought a new way of representing 
shame, in which, as has already been alluded to in the previous sections, the details of 
conventionally shameful matters, which early modern writers had long been ashamed 
to mention, were becoming the main subject of representation. This changing way of 
representing shame in turn gave rise to growing criticisms of scandalous and satirical 
prints, and aroused anxiety regarding their potentially negative social impact. 
The changing way of representing shame in the eighteenth century is evidenced 
by the remarkable increase of sensational and pornographic elements in scandalous 
prints. As we have already seen, Edmund Curll’s mercenary and unscrupulous 
publishing activity and his publications of the infamous impotence, adultery, and 
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divorce cases of noble couples promoted the initial increase of sensationalism in the 
first half of the eighteenth century. But it was not until the latter half of the century that 
sensationalism and eroticism became the main features of scandalous publications. 
Publishers and writers continually boosted their moral and instructive intentions, but 
they were all preoccupied with a shame economy. It is clear that many of them were 
not ashamed to advertise the entertaining purpose of their books, or to make detailed 
description of the upper-class sexual transgressions, which seventeenth-century and 
many early eighteenth-century writers were ashamed, or dared not, to write about. Thus 
the author of The Midnight Spy, or, a View of the Transactions of London and 
Westminster (1766) claimed that he ‘presumes to offer the following sheets to public 
notice, not doubting of their tendency both to instruct and entertain, which are the 
principal ends of all literary productions.’570 In 1773, The Covent Garden Magazine 
told a story about how selfish parents ruined their daughters by marrying them to old, 
aristocratic libertines. Despite its critical and moralistic purpose, the account 
nevertheless put a special emphasis on representing sexual matters. When the 
protagonist, Huron, a young visitor to London, was seduced by a prostitute – the victim 
of arranged marriage – and entered her bedroom: 
She clasped me in her arms, pressed her breast to mine, and kissed me a hundred 
times. She threw herself upon the bed! – I was all on fire; she was warmer if 
possible. Never did the thirsty earth drink the rain with so much pleasure as she 
did the effusions of love. One while she lay as if she had been dead; at another, 
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she practised such wantonness as would astonish the most amorous of our 
women.571 
In view of the obscene content of Nocturnal Revels: or, the History of King’s-Place, 
and other Modern Nunneries (1779), a two-volume account of the London’s top 
brothels and the anecdotes of their aristocratic clients, its editor was ‘sensible that 
[readers] are very far from being a rigid Cynic, and that you can relax the brow of 
Severity’.572 Another blunt editorial comment came from John Cleland, who justified 
the publication of Memoirs of a Women of Pleasure, a notoriously pornographic novel, 
by claiming that ‘the greatest men, those of the first and most leading taste, will not 
scruple adorning their private closets with nudities, though, in compliance with vulgar 
prejudices, they may not think them decent decorations of the stair-case or saloon.’573  
Worse still is the tendency that in the latter half of the eighteenth century many 
publishers of scandalous prints openly defended and advocated conventionally 
shameful sexual transgressions such as prostitution and adultery. A typical example 
comes from Harris’s List of Coven-Garden Ladies, an erotic annual directory and 
advertisement of prostitutes working in Georgian London. In 1789 its editor, without 
any sense of shame, claimed: ‘why shall the victims (prostitutes) of this natural 
propensity, the volunteers of Venus, the fairest of creation, be hunted like outcasts from 
society, be perpetually griped by the hand of petty tyranny? Do they not sacrifice their 
health, their lives, nay their reputations, at the altars of love and benevolence?’574 The 
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content of Harris’s List was unsurprisingly bawdy and obscene. The 1764 entry offered 
a salacious account of Miss Wilmot and her sexual encounter with George III’s brother, 
the Duke of York: 
He gazed on her a while with eyes of transport and fondness, and gave her a 
world of kisses; at the close of which, in a pretended struggle, she contrived 
matters so artfully, that the bed-cloaths having fallen off, her naked beauties lay 
exposed at full length. The snowy orbs of her breast, by their frequent rising and 
failing, beat Cupid's alarm-drum to storm instantly, in case an immediate 
surrender should be refused. The coral-lipped mouth of love seemed with kind 
movements to invite, nay, to provoke an attack; while her sighs, and eyes half-
closed, denoted that no farther resistance was intended. What followed, may be 
better imagined than described; but if we may credit Miss W-lm-t's account, she 
never experienced a more extensive protrusion in any amorous conflict either 
before or since.575 
The crim. con. trial accounts in the final decades of the eighteenth century turned 
into a form of erotica. This period witnessed the publication of several epoch-making 
collections, including the seven-volume Trials for Adultery (1779-81), the two-volume 
A New and Compleat Collection of the Most Remarkable Trials for Adultery (1780), 
and the remarkably twelve-volume The Crim. Con. Biography, or Celebrated Trials in 
                                                             
can be found in, for example, Elizabeth Campbell Denlinger, ‘The Garment and the Man: Masculine 
Desire in “Harris's List of Covent-Garden Ladies,” 1764-1793’, Journal of the History of Sexuality, 
vol. 11 (July, 2002), pp. 357-94; Hallie Rubenhold, The Covent Garden Ladies: Pimp General Jack 
the Extraordinary Story of Harris's List (Stroud, 2005). 
575 Harris’s List (1764). The similar, barefaced representation of sex could be found in Nocturnal 
Revels, vol. 2, pp. 128-9. 
218 
 
the Ecclesiastical and Civil Courts for Adultery and other Crimes Connected with 
Incontinency (1789). These publications, as well as many trial accounts in the popular 
press and pamphlets, were characterised by particular interest in sexual matters. Their 
publishers and writers no longer treated sex as something unfit for description as their 
predecessors had done in the first half of the century. Even judges were accused of 
being ‘the worst pornographers’: ‘if the witness had not described a doubtful situation 
with sufficient accuracy, magistrates never wearied of digging out the most obscene 
details by plying the often very naive witness with questions.’576 With the help of the 
lewd justices, writers and publishers would of course not be ashamed to offer lurid 
details in their publications. Thus, the testimony given by a bricklayer in the crim. con. 
trial between Mr. Foley and the Earl of Peterborough was recorded and published 
verbatim by the author of The Life and Amours of Lady Ann F-l-y:  
[H]e first heard Lady Ann cry out, two or three times, ‘O dear! you hurt me!’ 
which induced him to look that way; and, going towards the pales, he look over 
them, and saw Lord Peterborough and Lady Ann together. That his Lordship had 
Lady Ann round the middle, and that her Ladyship’s coats were up; and, at the 
same time, he saw her Ladyship’s naked legs and thighs round Lord 
Peterborough’s hams; and her arms round his Lordship’s neck.577 
A more undisguised representation of sex can be found in the narrative of the life and 
trials of the notorious nymphomaniac: Mrs. Elizabeth Draper. It was recorded that after 
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Mrs. Draper married her husband, a rich merchant who was unfortunately impotent, 
she ‘took intense pleasure in watching the mating of mares and stallions’, and soon 
after that ‘she began to lead a dissolute life’. Mrs. Draper was charged of seducing over 
a dozen of men, including her apprentice, coachman, postilion, neighbours and her 
husband’s friends during her seven-year marriage. One of her victims, William Penfold, 
a young apprentice, testified at the trial: ‘the next Sunday being alone with her in the 
same room after dinner, she kissed him, put her hand to his breeches and unbuttoned 
them, and asked him to enjoy her, and pulled up her petticoats; he then at her desire 
had carnal knowledge of her, and committed adultery with her.’ Prurient 
representations of Mrs. Draper’s sexual adventures continued in the rest of the account, 
even noble rhetoric, which had always been used as a splendid disguise or defence of 
the sensational content, was omitted.578 It is evident that the late eighteenth-century 
publishers of scandalous prints began to treat didactic messages as something tedious 
and redundant. For example, the editor of The Cuckold’s Chronicle omitted moral 
instructions, claiming that his object was to ‘supply an inexhaustible fund of 
amusement, and afford a species of relaxation, conveying more instruction for the use 
of domestic life, than the most austere dogma of morality can offer’.579 In another trial 
account, the editor remarked that ‘there has been so much morality in the course of this 
trial, through the channel of the counsel’s speeches, and the judge’s charge, that 
anything more of that kind would be superfluous’.580 
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While scandalous literature was not ashamed to offer the prurient details of sexual 
transgressions, while writers and publishers were not ashamed to openly defend 
unchaste and sexual liberty, and while the editor of Harris’s List was not ashamed to 
celebrate that ‘what was formerly seen in the eyes of our world a disgrace, is now 
considered pleasure, delightful, and honourable’, it would be not surprising to find that 
readers seemed not ashamed to devote their time and money to obtain scandalous and 
pornographic prints.581 If we look back to the mid-seventeenth century – a period when 
the popular press and scandalous publications remained undeveloped, and 
Protestantism and moralising prints played a dominant role in shaping contemporary 
ideas about sex – we would see how far the public notion of shame had changed in the 
late eighteenth century. In January 1668 Pepys considered buying a book for his wife 
but gave up because he found the book too ‘bawdy’ and ‘lewd’. Pepys seemed unable 
to resist the temptation and on 8 February, he returned to the booksellers on the Strand 
and bought that ‘idle, rogueish book, “L’escholle des filles”’, but resolved to burn it as 
soon as he had read it, because he felt that ‘it may not stand in the list of books, nor 
among them, to disgrace them if it should be found.’ The next day after he had dinner 
with friends, Pepys stayed in his chamber, read this lewd book ‘for information sake’, 
masturbated, and finally burned it since ‘it might not be among my books to my 
shame’.582 
But it seemed that people in the late eighteenth century did not scruple to read 
scandalous and erotic publications. And it is evident that the growing sensationalism 
                                                             
581 Harris’s List (1788), p. 164. 
582 Pepys, Diary, 8 and 9 February, 1668. 
221 
 
in prints made the sense of shame as something contemporaries were losing rather than 
gaining. ‘The most scandalous literature in London’, remarked a German visitor, 
‘consists of the reports of Crim. Con. and Divorce Cases which are printed without 
expurgation. No book is asked for so frequently in the lending library, and the editions, 
reprints and extracts from them prove their popularity.’583 Fashionable periodicals 
such as The Town and Country Magazine were popular among both London and 
provincial readers. Women and young girls constituted the main readership of its 
scandalous Tête-à-Tête column. In a correspondence addressed to the editor of The 
Town and Country Magazine, ‘Astrea Brokage’, a teenage girl of Bristol, said that she 
liked deciphering the dashes in each month’s Tête-à-Tête as a means of alleviating the 
boredom of her confinement in a boarding school. In Goldsmith’s comedy She Stoops 
to Conquer, the provincial Mrs Hardcastle claimed that reading ‘every Tête-à-Tête 
from the Scandalous Magazine’ made her ‘enjoy London at second-hand’.584 By the 
end of the eighteenth century, as Dabhoiwala observes, lewd prints were so accessible 
that even schoolgirls and rural clergymen were able to obtain pornographic materials 
that represented ‘naked men and women in carnal connection with each other; in 
different situations, standing, lying, sitting, all of the most indecent kind’.585 
The increase of scandal prints and the unblushing audience gave rise to anxieties 
over the negative influences of scandalous publications. Beneath these anxieties was a 
real fear that readers who had indulged themselves in such prints would one day lose 
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their sense of shame, and turn into shameless rakes or harlots as the figures they had 
read.586 Moralists complained that ‘Adultery and elopements constitute a material part 
of our news, and, being commonly retailed with numerous and minute circumstances, 
help to inflame the passions, and abate our horror for the crimes. No paragraphs are 
more greedily read than those which relate to business of this kind’.587 The author of 
The Evils of Adultery and Prostitution (1792) attributed the increase of sexual 
debauchery in the late eighteenth century to the rise of sensationalism in prints. He 
claimed that the popularity of scandal news in the popular press produced ‘shameless 
and barefaced’ readers, who in turn made publishers believe that in order to 
accommodate the tastes of a mass audience, it was necessary to ‘pollute their pages 
with the relation of lewdness and debauchery’. The author lamented that even ‘the most 
chaste and the best regulated’ newspapers were compelled to give scandalous reportage 
a place, otherwise ‘a number of their readers would consider the omission as a great 
defect, and might be tempted to withdraw their encouragement’. In order to reverse this 
trend and to suppress the lewd and immoral prints, the author appealed to the power of 
the law: ‘The courts of law certainly have some power to prevent these publications… 
and certainly the legislature ought to interfere to prevent the great injury done to the 
morals of the people.’588 
Other forms of scandalous genres such as novels were also coming under attack. 
Contemporaries worried that novels centring on the sexual intrigues of fashionable 
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society would lure lower-class males and females into imitating their decadent social 
betters and make them immune from the moral sense of shame. In 1779 Francis Foster, 
a moral writer, complained that ‘Novels are full of warm Descriptions, run entirely on 
the subject of Love, convey very loose Ideas and represent vicious Characters’. He 
argued that ‘Novels should never enter the Doors for they give wrong Turns of 
Thinking, lead young Minds to form absurd Ideas of Characters, to expect to meet with 
those, which do not exist, and to act romantically, in order to Copy the Painting that is 
drawn out of Nature.’589 The author of Free Thoughts on Seduction, Adultery, and 
Divorce (1771) compared novels to ‘the school of gallantry’, which taught readers 
‘impudence’ and deprived them of the ‘natural modesty of the sex’.590 The author of 
The Evils of Adultery and Prostitution (1792) lamented that ‘the example of men of 
rank and fortune, the prodigious increase of novels and of the loosest kind, all help to 
render men familiar with these vices, and to abate the horror we should entertain against 
such practices.’ Readers who became ‘devoid of all sentiments of justice and honour’, 
as the author claimed, would ‘make no scruple in confessing their criminal connections, 
and feel no shame in acknowledging their lewdness.’ 591  In 1799, Hannah More 
criticised novels for making ‘those crying sins so familiar, and the wickedness of them 
so disguised, that even innocent girls get to lose their abhorrence, and to talk with 
complacency of things which should not be so much as named by them’.592 
The second half of the eighteenth century also witnessed growing attacks on 
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graphic satires. As a major genre of print that had been heavily involved in scandal 
journalism, satirical prints were always condemned for spreading immoralities and 
producing shameless readers. One could easily tell at a glance the differences of 
satirical prints before and after the mid-eighteenth century. In William Hogarth’s 
decades, satires had explicit moral purposes, they seldom targeted particular 
individuals nor gave detailed descriptions of sex. But during the second half of the 
eighteenth century, and especially in its closing decades, the contrary became their very 
features. 593  Although mainly produced for middle- and upper-class consumption, 
caricatures exhibited at the printshop windows were available to be seen by a wide 
range of people. The audience, as Vicesimus Knox wrote, ‘loiter at a window, with a 
burden on their backs, and gape, unmindful of their toil, at the comical productions of 
the ingenious designer.’594  Moralists feared that caricature shops, which blatantly 
exhibited scabrous matters such as filth, nudity, the sexual organs, and upper-class 
promiscuous activities, would publicise vice rather than chastise it.595 ‘As to these here 
print shops’, a character in a novel thus complained, ‘I see no manner of use they are 
of, except to make people spend their time in gaping at what does not belong to them; 
our legislature would do well to consider their pernicious effects – the morals of our 
youth may well be degenerated, when such scenes of immorality are daily presented to 
their view.’596 
Contemporary writers condemned satirical prints for abusing their ability as a 
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weapon of shame, and claimed that satires were losing their morally corrective function 
and degenerating into ridiculous burlesque and commercial entertainment. As critics 
observed, many satirists and caricaturists shamed what they should not shame, such as 
virtue, religion, personal appearance, and the reputation of the great and innocent, and 
at the same time failed to shame what they should have done: immorality, vice and 
crime. ‘Wit and satire, originally intended to benefit mankind, by correcting their vices 
and follies, are so egregiously misapplied’, wrote an essayist in the 1790s, ‘caricature-
makers direct their satire more against virtuous than even vicious characters…and too 
often ridicule personal defects or the unavoidable misfortunes of human nature. Thus 
wit and humour degenerate into buffoonery, – lose the effect they would otherwise have 
of correcting the vicious, – and only serve to wound the bosom of virtue, and to deprive 
those of their peace of mind who sensibly feel the pinion of the world.’597 Similarly, 
Knox charged satires with their malevolent and slanderous purposes: ‘Hogarth is 
certainly worthy of imitation, as an excellence; and of honour, as having been made a 
vehicle of great good to society… his imitators have not reached his excellence in art, 
they have scarcely aimed at his morality, but have abused their petty talents in lowering 
everything great and venerable.’ Knox also condemned caricaturists for ridiculing 
personal deformity and clergymen, and claimed that such satires were ‘so ungenerous’ 
that would ‘not only injure the public… but cruelly invade the peace of families, and 
distress the bosom of an unoffending individual.’ He therefore urged satirists to 
‘confine their ridicule to vice and villainy’, so that they would ‘add to the praise which 
                                                             
597 The Ranger, A Collection of Periodical Essays (Brentford, 1795), vol. 1, p. 170, 172. 
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is due to them, as men of skill and genius, the praise of benevolence, and the virtue of 
doing good in their generation.’598 
Like scandalous pamphlets and the popular press, satirical prints constituted an 
integral part of contemporary shame economy and contributed to the commodification 
of shame. While it would be wrong to deny the critical and moral functions of satires, 
we should be aware that in the second half of the eighteenth century, it was the desire 
for profit, rather than the ‘pure love of virtue’ or the ‘honest detestation of vice’ that 
became the primary reason for producing satires.599 No matter whether an individual 
deserved to be publicly humiliated, or whether the ridicule served to chastise vice and 
promote virtue, as long as the incidence was sensational enough, it would be the subject 
of satires. As the author of The Folly and Guilty of Satyrical Slander (1763) observed, 
these ‘base and disingenuous’ artists, by pretending to so ‘service to the Cause of 
Virtue’, ‘picked up private Scandal, and, with proper Improvements and 
Embellishments, have published and circulated the Faults and Failings of particular 
Persons possessed of many good Qualities’ for commercial and entertaining purpose.600 
Another author condemned satirists for ‘picking up invidious anecdotes of domestic 
misfortune and private imprudence’, and ‘murdering the human reputation for 
bread’.601 An artist recalled how he worked for a publisher and scraped a living as a 
caricaturist:  
                                                             
598 Knox, Winter Evenings, vol. 1, pp. 142-3. 
599 John Tottie, The Folly and Guilt of Satyrical Slander (Oxford, 1763), pp. 16-7. 
600 Ibid., pp. 2-17. 
601 Literary Liberty Considered (London, 1774), pp.14-7, 25. Also see C.D. Piguenit, An Essay on 
the Art of News-Paper Deformation, in A Letter to Mr. William Griffin, Printer and Publisher of the 
Morning Post (London, 1775). 
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In his service my duty was to write palpable puns, ready for his use, and to 
ornament his rooms with caricatures on subjects of his own choice; to gain 
articles of scandal for his evening’s entertainment; and to mimic everything 
which ought to have been revered and admired. Thus, those talents which might 
have made me eminent in a profession, are employed within the walls of a 
loathsome prison, in etching caricatures of the human race, and ridiculing the 
miseries of my fellow creatures, to gain a precarious subsistence, by the sale of 
them to the print shops.602  
Once again, this evidence suggests that the real motive for producing and publishing 
scandalous literature was profit rather than moralising, and it indicates why such prints 
became so scandalous in the eyes of its opponents. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the rise of scandalous publication and its implications for 
the culture of shame in the long eighteenth century. Between the mid-seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries, printed materials about crime were characterised by their 
explicit moralising and didactic purposes. Criminal accounts in this period targeted 
general vice more than the particular perpetrator or transgression, and aimed to 
inculcate readers with a notion that shame was the very nature and unavoidable result 
of crime. In the eighteenth century, criminal publications expanded, and became more 
interested in reporting sexual transgressions of the fashionable world. The rise of 
                                                             
602 The Ranger, vol. 1, pp. 178-82. 
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scandal journalism was paralleled by a gradual change in the ways of representing 
shame. The sensational and prurient facts of one’s shame became a subject worthy of 
detailed description. Publishers and writers continually claimed their moralising 
intentions, but their noble rhetoric always functioned as a splendid disguise of, or 
excuse for, the real sensational content and the entertaining purpose of their prints. 
Scandalous publications would not develop without capitalising on shame.  
Entrepreneurs of the publishing industry such as Edmund Curll and his successors must 
have profited greatly through turning the private shame of elite figures into news 
merchandise and putting them on the reading market. Inquisitive readers purchased 
these news products to satisfy their seemingly insatiable curiosity for the private lives 
of their social betters. In this burgeoning culture of print, shame became a commodity 
of great commercial and entertainment values. Scandalous publications did bring 
personal shame to the surface to be more accessible than ever before, and heighten 
public awareness of and aversion to upper-class corruption, but they also played a 
counter-reformative role. The increase of scandalous publications and sensationalism 
to some extent promoted a culture of shamelessness, in which conventionally shameful 
matters such as sex and nudity were represented by publishers, and could be easily 
accessed and freely talked about by unblushing readers. In the second half of the 
century, satirical prints were abusing and losing their ability as a powerful shaming 
weapon, and descended to a form of erotica and ludicrous entertainment. All of these 
reveal a print culture which was continually criticised by anxiety-ridden writers, and at 
the same time exploited and enjoyed by unashamed publishers and readers. 
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Chapter Five 
Rethinking Shaming Punishments: Ideas, Ideologies, and Problems 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have explored how people experienced, interpreted, and 
represented shame in a secular context in the long eighteenth century. They 
demonstrated the predominantly socially-constructed nature of shame in the contexts 
of polite society and the publishing industry, and showed how the moral characteristic 
of shame had become more ambiguous under the influence of the rise of polite culture 
and scandalous publications. The present chapter considers shame as social and legal 
practices, and explores the culture of shame from the perspectives of crime and 
punishment. It provides a further example which shows the importance of social factors 
in interpreting and deciding shame, and the ambiguity of the moral and disciplinary 
power of shame. A phenomenon which has been neglected by historians, namely why 
the pillory – the most typical form of shaming punishment – primarily targeted offences 
relating to sexual depravity, marital disloyalty, and various deceitful and fraudulent 
doings, is the key to understanding shame in the judicial context. In order to answer this 
question, I offer an analysis of the correlation between concepts of infamy and shame 
in both legal and civil contexts, and of the interaction between the popular judgement 
of shame and the official shaming sanction. I then analyse the problems and crisis 
encountered by eighteenth-century shaming punishments, and examine the 
contemporary discussions about shaming sanctions and the role of shame in the broader 
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penal system. In this chapter, I pay less attention to the individual experience of shame; 
instead, I adopt an intellectual and theoretical approach, and focus mainly on pamphlets 
and books written by legal writers and commentaries published in newspapers and 
magazines. I argue that there existed an implicit causal relationship between the nature 
of crime and the form of punishment in the early modern penal context. More 
specifically, the use of shaming techniques were not indiscriminate; crimes that were 
‘infamous’ or ‘shameful’ in the eyes of the populace were more likely to incur shaming 
penalties. However, in the eighteenth century, and particularly in London, the infliction 
of shame on offenders whose transgressions were not customarily deemed ‘infamous’ 
or ‘shameful’ degraded public shaming into a violent, pointless, and counter-productive 
exercise. The excessive and stigmatising use of shaming techniques could not evoke a 
moral sense of shame, it was said, but might create hardened and indifferent criminals 
and spectators. The debate over such views made shame a heated subject. 
Commentators still regarded shame as an important part of the penal system. What they 
were really concerned with was how to effectively use shame to punish and reform 
offenders, without turning them into shameless monsters.  
 
The Patterns of Shaming Punishments: A Brief Overview 
Our first question is, what were shaming punishments? In pre-modern Britain, shame 
occupied a central place in the penal regime; it was exploited by both the authorities 
and communities as a means for regulating personal conduct and punishing individuals 
who offended legal and social norms. The drunkard was locked in the stocks, the 
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dishonest shopkeeper and perjurer were set in the pillory, adulterer clad in a white sheet 
confessed sins in the church, all of them were shamefully exhibited in public, ridiculed 
by the crowds, and had to bear their shame for an even longer time after the punishment. 
Shame was equally associated with other forms of penalty, including not only the 
severest and most spectacular sanction, public hanging, but also those involving a 
relatively small amount of publicity such as imprisonment and indoor whipping.603  
While virtually all penalties entailed an element of shame, modern historians are 
inclined to identify some non-capital, publicly implemented judicial sanctions such as 
public penance, the stocks, the pillory, branding, carting, and public whipping as 
‘shaming punishments’. This conceptualisation is based on the idea that shame was not 
only a method, but also a primary goal of punishments. Through exposing an offender 
to the public and labelling him or her as a deviant unworthy of trust or respect, shaming 
punishments aimed to damage the reputation of the culprit, and also served to deter 
spectators and potential offenders, and ensure consent among the populace to the 
communal and legal norms.604  Early modern legal writers identified shame-based 
                                                             
603 Although capital punishment aimed to deprive the criminal of life, the sanction pronounced the 
infamous and shameful identity of the criminal. As Blackstone asserted, ‘sentence of death… sets a 
note of infamy upon him (offender)… He is then called attaint, attinctus, stained or blackened. He 
is no longer of any credit or reputation. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, vol.4 (London, 1783), p. 380. Besides, as we have already seen in the previous chapter, 
condemned criminals should confess in shame and remorse before the public execution, and the 
spectators were expected to be impressed by the shamefulness of criminals and their death. Besides, 
imprisonment also entailed shame. According to Paul Griffith, early modern Londoners regarded 
Bridewell as ‘a place of shame’ that left prisoners with ‘long-lasting stains’. Paul Griffiths, Lost 
Londons: Change, Crime, and Control in the Capital City, 1550-1660 (Cambridge, 2008), p. 214. 
Other discussions of the link between shame and death penalties can be seen in, for example, 
Muravyeva, ‘Litigating for Shame and Dishonour’, p. 22; Nash and Kilday, Cultures of Shame, pp. 
11-2; Randall McGowen, ‘The Body and Punishment in Eighteenth-Century England’, Journal of 
Modern History, vol. 59 (1987), pp. 651-79; Foucault, Discipline and Punish, esp. part one. 
604 J.A. Sharpe, Judicial Punishment in England (London, 1990), pp. 19-24; J.M. Beattie, Crime 
and Courts in England, 1660-1800 (Oxford, 1986), pp. 461-9, 490-2; Frank McLynn, Crime and 
Punishment in Eighteenth-century England (London, 1989), chapter 15, especially see pp. 280-5; 
Jody Greene, ‘Public Secrets: Sodomy and the Pillory in the Eighteenth Century and Beyond’, The 
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penalties in a similar way. John Stow, for example, included ‘pillorizing, carting, riding, 
whipping’ in a list of what he called ‘customary punishments of shame or pain or 
both’.605  William Blackstone claimed that ‘whipping, hard labour, the pillory, the 
stocks, and the ducking-stool’ are punishments that ‘consist principally in their 
ignominy’.606 According to Jeremy Bentham, although ‘a certain degree of infamy or 
disrepute is what necessarily attends on every kind of punishments’, ‘the stocks, the 
pillory, and the carcan’ are ‘ignominious punishments’ because they ‘reflect a much 
larger portion of infamy than others’.607 
Historians have discussed pre-modern public shaming punishments at length, but 
it is worth reviewing the patterns and characteristics of such punishments before we can 
look further into their logic and underlying ideology.608 Public penance, which was 
commonly imposed by the church courts, was ‘a punishment of the ignominious kind’ 
that depended entirely upon public exhibition without the infliction of physical pain.609 
It commonly took place in the parish church during Sunday service; offenders had to 
stand or kneel within sight of the congregation, clad in a white sheet, and have a paper 
                                                             
Eighteenth Century, vol. 44, 2003, pp. 203-32; Marianna Muravyeva, ‘Vergüenza, Vergogne, 
Schande, Skam and Sram, Litigating for Shame and Dishonour in Early Modern Europe’, in Judith 
Rowbotham, Marianna Muravyeva and David Nash (eds), Shame, Blame and Culpability, Crime 
and Violence in the Modern State (London, 2013), pp. 17-31, esp. pp. 21-2, 28; Nash and Kilday, 
Cultures of Shame, esp. chapter 4, pp.68-87; Martin Ingram, ‘Shame and Pain: Themes and 
Variations in Tudor Punishments’, in Simon Devereaux and Paul Griffiths (eds), Penal Practice and 
Culture, 150-1900: Punishing the English (London, 2004), pp. 36-62; Robert Shoemaker, ‘Street of 
Shame? The Crowd and Public Punishments in London, 1700-1820’, in Penal Practice and Culture, 
p. 232. 
605 John Stow, A Survey of the Cities of London and Westminster: Containing the Original, Antiquity, 
Increase, Modern Estate and Government of Those Cities, vol. 1 (London, 1720), p. 257. 
606 Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 376. 
607 Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment (London, 1830), pp. 228-9. Carcan was an iron 
collar used for punishing blasphemers in mediaeval and early modern period. 
608 For an overview of the patterns of pre-modern public and shaming punishments, see Sharpe, 
Judicial Punishment in England, pp. 19-24, 47–9; Ingram, ‘Shame and Pain’, pp. 37-62; William 
Andrews, Old-Time Punishments (London, 1890). 
609 Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment, p. 406. 
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listing details of their offence in capital letters attached to their forehead. They were 
also expected to atone for their sins with sorrow and tears, and seek the forgiveness of 
God and neighbours. For the culprit, doing penance was no doubt a moment of shame. 
The intensity of shame and infamy was largely decided by the degree of publicity; as 
Bentham said, ‘the larger or smaller concourse of spectators will render the punishment 
more or less severe.’ 610  However, penance was arguably not mainly designed to 
humiliate offenders. The use of shame was associated with the reformative nature of 
the sanction. The church authorities aimed to invite wrongdoers to feel shame because 
they regarded this emotion as a prerequisite for reformation and reintegration with the 
community and church, a notion that reflects the religious sense of shame as has been 
discussed in the first chapter. 
While public penance emphasised the invitation for offenders to feel shame, other 
shaming penalties attempted to humiliate them more directly. A traditional form of this 
sort was the stocks, a restraining device made by wooden boards with holes between 
them, whereby culprits, usually drunkards and petty thieves, were fixed and publicly 
exposed. Another punishment that entailed humiliation was to put offenders in a cart or 
on horseback, and to parade them around busy streets and markets like a form of ‘riding 
skimmington’.611 In order for the culprit to feel maximum shame, signs and symbols 
                                                             
610 Ibid., p. 407. 
611 For the history of ‘riding skimmington’ and ‘rough music’, see E.P. Thompson, Customs in 
Common, (London, 1991), ‘Rough Music Reconsidered’, Folklore, vol. 103 (1992), pp. 3-26; 
Martin Ingram, ‘Ridings, Rough Music and the Reform of Popular Culture’, Past and Present, vol. 
105 (1984), pp. 79-113, ‘Scolding Women Cucked or Washed: A Crises in Gender Relations in Early 
Modern England’, in J. Kermode and G. Walker (eds.) Women, Crime and the Courts in Early 
Modern England (London, 1984), pp. 48-80, ‘Shame and Pain: Themes and Variations in Tudor 
Punishments’, In Griffiths and Devereaux, Penal Practice and Culture, 1500-1900 , pp.36-62; Nash 
and Kilday, Cultures of Shame, chapter 1 and 2. 
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were always employed. John Stow recorded that Richard Dichar, who was convicted 
for running brothels, was ‘put into a cart, cloathed in a party-colour’d coat, and so 
drawn through the publick streets of the City, with the sound of basons and bells and 
other noises to expose the more to mockery and shame’.612 In 1556, ‘bawds and whores’ 
who were carted in London were ‘taken naked together’. 613  Being stripped could 
intensify the severity of shame, but so could being clothed in symbolic ways, especially 
when the offender had a higher social standing. In 1563, Dr. Langton, convicted of 
taking ‘a Bed with two Young Wenches at once’, was ordered to wear ‘a Gown of 
Damask lined with Velvet, and a Coat of Velvet, and a Cap of the same, but having a 
blue Hood pinned over his Cap which was a Customary Mark of Guilt’ when he was 
parading in cart through Cheapside on a market day.614  This sanction was clearly 
intended to shame Langton – by advertising the doctor’s superior status but also his 
offence through the use of a ‘blue hood’, the ritual satirised his corrupted, hypocritical 
character, making him appear ridiculous, and publicly rendering him infamous. 
Shaming punishments could be rendered more severe by combining public 
humiliation with physical pain. The ducking stool, a device used to dip the offender in 
water, and the branks (or ‘scold’s bridle’), commonly an iron mask with a spur to hold 
the tongue, were exclusively employed to chastise scolding women or female offenders 
who violated patriarchal or moral rules.615 A more frequently used corporal shaming 
                                                             
612 Stow, A Survey of the Cities of London, vol. 2, p. 317. 
613 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 258. 
614 Ibid, vol.1, p. 258. 
615 Anne-Marie Kilday recently discusses the scold’s bridle and its link to shame in the context of 
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‘Hurt, Harm and Humiliation: Community Responses to Deviant Behaviour in Early Modern 
Scotland’, in Rowbotham, Muravyeva, and Nash (eds), Shame, Blame, and Culpability, pp. 124-40. 
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punishment was that of branding. Clergyable felons were burned on the thumb as proof 
of a first conviction so that they could not escape from a severer sanction once being 
captured again. As the mark on the thumb was difficult to see, the effect of shame was 
limited. However, when the stamp was made on the cheek or forehead, branding 
became a sentence of humiliation for life. In certain crimes, branding was obviously 
seen as a carefully designed shaming weapon. William Prynne, a puritan lawyer, 
convicted of seditious libel in 1634, was sentenced to be ‘branded in the forehead, slit 
in the nose, and ears cropt’, because the shame would force Prynne, as a member of the 
Privy Council said, to ‘get a perriwig, which he now so much inveighs against’.616 At 
the end of the seventeenth century, branding was often used to stigmatise, rather than 
simply to mark off offenders. The 1699 Shoplifting Act ordered that branding should 
be made on the ‘most visible part of the left cheek nearest the nose’, but facial branding 
lasted for only seven years before it was banned in 1706, since people were anxious 
that a visible, indelible mark of infamy on the cheek would create hardened, shameless 
criminals.617  
Whipping was also regarded as shameful, especially when it was carried out in 
public. Public whipping was systematically used to penalise a variety of crimes such as 
vagrancy, assault, and theft. The offender was usually tied to ‘the cart’s tail’ and 
whipped along busy streets in order to attract the biggest crowds and to intensify the 
effect of shame. For the same reason, the culprit would be whipped near the scene of 
                                                             
616 T.B. Howell (ed.), A Complete Collection of State-Trials, and Proceedings for High Treason, 
and Other Crimes and Misdemeanours, vol. 3 (London, 1816), p. 585. 
617 Beattie, Crime and the Courts, p. 490. 
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the crime, or the residence of the offender or victim. The requirement that male and 
female offenders should be stripped to the waist during punishment also served to 
increase the power of shame. In July 1708, Mary Price, convicted of ‘a notorious 
conspiracy, fraud, and misdemeanour’, was ordered to be ‘stripped naked from the 
middle upwards, and publicly whipped at a cart’s tail from the Savoy Gate, in the Strand, 
to Charing Cross, until her body be bloody’.618 As Ingram says, ‘in a society in which 
clothes were so important as a mark of status and identity, being stripped in public was 
clearly intended to humiliate.’619 
The pillory was a typical form of shaming punishment. This was a set of stocks 
fixed to the top of a post, whereby the prisoner was exhibited with his hands and head 
confined within holes on a board. In order to guarantee the severity of shame, offenders 
were required to remove their hat, carry a placard to proclaim the offence, and stand in 
the market place or places related to the nature of the crime for one or two hours at 
noon. The success of the pillory relied on the cooperation of the crowd; it functioned as 
a powerful shaming weapon only if the audience expressed sentiments of shame and 
anger at the culprit. (figure 4 and 5) While judicial authorities employed the pillory as 
a means of pure humiliation without inflicting additional corporal pain, it was the crowd 
of onlookers who decided on the intensity of shame and pain imposed on the offender. 
Thus, in 1719 Mary Terry and Elizabeth Bourne pilloried at Charing Cross for ‘keeping 
notorious bawdy houses’ were ‘treated with the highest resentment of the mob in 
                                                             
618 W. J. Hardy (ed.), Middlesex County Records, Calendar of Sessions Books 1689-1709 (1905), 
p. 72. Accessed at British History Online: http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=66125#s5. (MCR: CSB hereafter) 
619 Ingram, ‘Shame and Pain’, pp. 56-7. 
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Figure 4: ‘Waller Pelted to Death by the Mob’ as depicted in The Newgate Calendar: 
comprising interesting memoirs of the most notorious characters who have been 
convicted of outrages on the laws of England since the commencement of the eighteenth 
century, eds, Andrew Knapp and William Baldwin (4 vols, London, 1824-8, vol. 1, p. 
313). This illustration shows the highwayman and perjurer John Waller being pelted by 
the enraged crowd when he was standing in the pillory for giving false information to 
the court in 1732. It was recorded that Waller was killed in the pillory by Edward Dalton, 
whose brother was sentenced to death because of Waller’s perjury. The details of the 
trail and punishment of John Waller can be seen in the next section of this chapter, and 
The Newgate Calendar as shown above. 
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Figure 5: Trying and Pilloring of the Vere Street Club (1810). Accessed at Rictor 
Norton’s online source: ‘The Vere Street Coterie’, The Gay Subculture in Georgian 
England. Updated 28 May 2012 http://rictornorton.co.uk/vere.htm. This illustration 
depicts the spectacular scene of the pillory of members of the Vere Street club being 
severely pelted by a furious crowd when they were in the pillory. 
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showers of rotten eggs and dirt’.620 The mob justice at the site of the pillory would even 
threaten the life of the prisoner if his or her crime evoked public fury. On 3 April, 1763, 
‘a man stood in the pillory at Stratford for sodomy was killed by the populace.’621 In 
some circumstances, however, the popular attitude would sometimes work in the 
offender’s favour. It was recorded by Weekly Journal that in August 1718 ‘Robert 
Harrison, tried and convicted the last Sessions at the Old Baily, for crying out King 
James for ever, stood in the pillory at White Chappel, and one man throwing dirt at him, 
the mob obliged him to go down on his knees, to ask him forgiveness, and several gave 
him money’.622 If the officials failed to correctly judge the popular mood, the shame 
intended for the culprit would backfire on the authorities. A celebrated example of this 
was the pillory of Daniel Defoe, who was pelted with flowers while standing in the 
pillory on account of having published a satire The Shortest Way with the Dissenters in 
1701.623 
From this brief overview of early modern shaming penalties, it is clear that the 
dimension of shame was two-fold: it not only functioned as a means of punishment, but 
was intended to be the very purpose of it. A certain degree of violence could intensify 
the severity of shaming, but physical pain was insignificant or, if more accurately, 
secondary to the humiliation and shame that the authorities intended to inflict on 
offenders. What made shaming punishment distinctive was that it aimed to publicise 
the infamy of offenders and to damage their reputation more than to impose physical 
                                                             
620 Weekly Journal, or, British Gazetteer, 27 June, 1719. 
621 The Gentleman’s Magazine, 3 April, 1763. 
622 Weekly Journal, or, Saturday’s Post, 2 August, 1718. 
623 David Nash and Anne-Marie Kilday have discussed the case of Daniel Defoe and its correlation 
with shame in detail, see Nash and Kilday, Cultures of Shame, pp. 81-7. 
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pain. In this sense, of the forms of shaming punishments, the pillory could be regarded 
as the most typical one. It was not only a punishment that ‘promised a kind of pure 
humiliation and exhibited the extraordinary power of shame as a penal weapon’, but 
essentially a quasi-official, negotiated form of justice that ‘allowed a number of 
important messages to be exchanged between authority, miscreant and onlookers’.624 
This means that in the pillory, one could discern the differences between popular and 
elite perceptions of what constituted shame and crime. The following section, therefore, 
focuses primarily on the pillory, and aims to explore motives and ideologies behind 
it.625 It will examine what kinds of crimes were more likely to be punished by the 
pillory, and how public shaming was linked to the infamous nature of crime and 
contemporary notions of shame. 
 
Shaming Those Shameful: Ideologies of Shaming Punishments 
The pillory had long been used to punish offences associated with fraud and cheating. 
In London, for example, of the 225 sentences involving punishment by the pillory made 
by the court of the Old Bailey between 1674 and 1800, 139 were directed against crimes 
of deception, among them 52 forgeries, 43 frauds, and 43 perjuries.626 Indeed, deceitful 
                                                             
624 Greene, ‘Public Secrets’, p. 211; Nash and Kilday, Cultures of Shame, p. 69.  
625 Besides the characteristics of the pillory as mentioned before, another reason for researching the 
pillory is that it is a punishment which was systematically and constantly used throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Other forms of shaming sanctions such as ecclesiastic penance, 
the stocks, the branks, the ducking stools, and carting were rarely used by the middle of the 
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of public whipping, the purpose of carrying out the punishment in public was more likely to deter 
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626 Old Bailey Proceedings Online (www.oldbaileyonline.org, version 7.1, April 2013). Tabulating 
punishment subcategory against offence subcategory where verdict category is guilty and 
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practices by shopkeepers and tradespeople, such as bakers who gave bread short weight, 
butchers who sold rotten meat, or weavers who did not return cloth of honest weight, 
were customarily punished by the pillory as early as the Middle Ages.627 In 1560, a 
person selling ‘meazle bacon’ at market was sentenced to ride ‘with his face toward the 
horse tail’ and to stand in the pillory the next day with ‘two great pieces of his meazle 
bacon over his hear, and a writing set up, showing his crimes’.628 Perjury was a major 
form of deception that was regularly punished by the pillory till the punishment was 
formally abolished in 1837. It was a crime that could arouse a high degree of public 
indignation since perjury was perceived by contemporaries as nothing short of 
deliberate murder, especially in the eighteenth century, where so many offences were 
punishable by death.629 Thus perjurers like John Waller, who was convicted of false 
accusation for the sake of reward, could expect little mercy at the pillory. It was 
recorded that when Waller was placed in the pillory, ‘the mob began to pelt him in a 
most outrageous manner; and he had not continued there above eight minutes before 
they pulled down the pillory… As he lay on the ground, they stamped so hard upon his 
body that they broke his ribs, and he had certainly been trampled to death.’630 Although 
murder in the pillory was rare, popular attacks on perjurers, especially within the 
metropolis of London, were not uncommon throughout the eighteenth century. In 1728, 
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George Cotton set in the pillory at Charing Cross for ‘wilful and corrupt perjury’ was 
‘severely pelted by the populace’.631 On 18 April 1752, Lingard, a perjurer sentenced 
to stand on the pillory near St George’s Church in Southwark, was ‘severely pelted with 
mud, stones, and sticks’ and ‘cut in the left side of his head, and the blood run down his 
face’.632  In 1785, Richard Cope stood in the pillory at Charing Cross for ‘falsely 
charging a gentleman with attempting to commit an infamous crime’, and was ‘severely 
pelted by the populace’.633 Despite general hostility to perjury, it is worth noting that 
the crowd had its own understanding of justice in deciding whether to pelt the cheat on 
display. In 1748, John Everett was ‘severely pelted’ at the pillory in the Hay-Market for 
‘uttering false and counterfeit money’; on the same day, however, Samuel Duck ‘was 
not pelted by the mob’ when he was standing on the pillory at Charing Cross for ‘wilful 
and corrupt perjury’.634 
Deceitful practices such as fraud and forgery also attracted shaming punishments. 
Fraud was an offence that included, as John Beattie writes, cheating at games in order 
to obtain money, or pretending to be a servant or employee sent to collect goods from 
a shop or warehouse.635 Forgery was a specific form of fraud, carried out by means of 
‘the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man’s 
right’. 636  Both crimes could incur a variety of punishments, such as fines, 
imprisonment, and mutilation or disfigurement, but they were more often used in 
                                                             
631 London Evening Post, 30 July, 1728; for similar case, see London Evening Post, 3 August, 1728. 
632 The Gentleman’s Magazine, vol. 22, p. 190. 
633 The Times, 11 April, 1785. 
634 Whitehall Evening Post, or London Intelligencer, 23-5 July, 1748. 
635 Beattie, Crime and the Courts, pp. 190-1. 
636 Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 247. 
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combination with the pillory. In 1650, captain Nicholas Greenway was set in the pillory 
in the new palace yard at Westminster with his right ear being cut off, for, as the paper 
set upon the pillory indicated, ‘forging warrants, and counterfeiting hands to bills of 
exchange, whereby he with others hath procured three thousand pounds.’ In the 
following week, Greenway stood on the pillory near the old Exchange, where he lost 
his left ear. He was then sent to the House of Correction for one year of hard labour.637 
In May 1695, Reginald Bucknall, convicted of ‘forging and publishing a letter of 
attorney, and the will of Jacob Jacobson’, was fined, put in the pillory three times, and 
confined in New Prison. 638  Like perjury, fraud and forgery could evoke popular 
resentment and violence. In 1756, Richard Fielding ‘met with rough treatment from the 
populace’ when he was standing on the pillory in Smithfield. His crime was ‘defrauding 
a country girl of a box, wherein was contained 7 l. in money, and clothes to the value 
of 9 l.’.639 Throughout the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, public shaming 
rituals against frauds, perjurers and counterfeiters were regularly staged.640  It was 
believed by contemporaries that as a Justice of the Peace claimed, ‘the pillory is the 
punishment for the cheat.’641 
The use of the pillory and other shaming techniques to penalise sexual crimes was 
also prevalent in early modern society. Crimes involving brothel-keeping, the attempted 
                                                             
637 Several Proceedings in Parliament (1694), 28 March, 1650 – 4 April, 1650, issue 27, p. 382. 
638 MCR: CSB/521, p. 41. 
639 London Evening Post, 6 March, 1756. Other examples see The Times, 7 January, 1785. 
640 Although forgery legislation was becoming severe from the Glorious Revolution, McGowen 
argues that ‘the vast bulk of this legislation resulted in very few prosecutions’, and the death 
sentences ‘seem to have been selected to make a signal example of some notorious offender.’ 
Randall McGowen, ‘“Making the ‘bloody code”? Forgery legislation in eighteenth-century 
England’, in Norma Landau (ed.), Law, Crime and English Society, 1660-1830 (Cambridge, 2004), 
pp. 135-7. 
641 Howell (ed.), A Complete Collection of State-Trials, vol. 5, p. 418. 
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rape of children and homosexuality would almost invariably lead to outbreaks of 
hostility among the crowd. In 1747, a woman convicted of ‘keeping a disorderly house 
and seducing young women and girls’ was ordered to stand in the pillory facing the 
French Change in Monmouth Street, and was ‘severely pelted by the populace’.642 In 
January 1750, a man was attacked in the pillory by the raging mob for ‘assaulting with 
an intent to ravish a girl of eight years old’.643 There were more reports of popular 
assaults upon sodomites. A sailor named George Briton sat in the pillory on the market 
place in Portsmouth for ‘attempting to commit, on the body of a boy under twelve years 
of age, the heinous and detestable sin of sodomy’ was, according to the Whitehall 
Evening Post on 18 March 1749, ‘pelted so much the first few minutes, that the 
Constables were obliged to get a Guard of Soldiers to prevent him from being killed by 
the Mob, who were so much exasperated against him, especially the Sailors, who threw 
eggs, turnips, oranges, lemons, apples, and several stones besides Mud and other 
Filth.’644 In 1762, a clergyman, who had been ‘greatly esteemed by all his neighbours’ 
was treated by the populace ‘with great severity’ when standing on the pillory in the 
market-place of Lincoln city for a sodomitical attempt.645 In the same year, the crowd 
almost killed a 60-year-old sodomite at the pillory, as Gentleman’s Magazine reported: 
The populace fell upon the wretch, tore off his coat, waistcoat, shirt, hat, wig, and 
breeches, and then pelted and whipped him till he had scarcely any signs of life 
left; he was once pulled off the pillory, but hung by his arms till he was set up 
                                                             
642 Whitehall Evening Post, 28 November – 1 December, 1747. 
643 Ibid., January 4-6, 1750. A similar case sees 2-4 August, 1750. 
644 Ibid., 16-8 March, 1749. 
645 Gentleman’s Magazine, vol. 32, p. 386. 
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again, and stood in that naked condition, covered with mud, till the hour was 
out.646  
These examples indicate that the judicial authorities considered popular violence to be 
a somewhat premeditated or acceptable part of the pillory when dealing with 
homosexual offenders. It seems that officials were certain that ‘the justice of the 
sentence would be fully accepted by the crowd around the pillory’, and that ‘only the 
infliction of shame through the participation of the community as a whole could both 
prevent and cure this most public of secret crimes’.647 Although the murder of two 
sodomites Theodosius Read and William Smith in the pillory in 1780 drove Edmund 
Burke to give a speech in parliament proposing its abolition, the authorities continued 
to expose sodomites to the reaction of the crowd. Popular violence around the pillory 
continued sporadically in the following decades. In 1810, for example, Cook and Amos, 
two sodomites from the Vere Street coterie, were severely pelted by a furious crowd 
with ‘mud, dead cats, rotten eggs, potatoes, and buckets filled with blood, offal, and 
dung’; after the ignominious exhibition in the pillory, it was recorded that both of them 
‘were so thickly covered with filth, that a vestige of the human figure was scarcely 
discernible’.648 (figure 5) 
Why, then, were the above-mentioned crimes more likely to incur the sanction of 
the pillory? In order to understand this phenomenon, it is worthwhile looking at the 
                                                             
646 Ibid., p. 549. 
647 Beattie, Crime and Courts, p. 466; Greene, ‘Public Secrets’, p. 224. 
648 The Times, 28 September, 1810. For the history of the Vere Street Gang, see R. Holloway, The 
Phoenix of Sodom, or the Vere Street Coterie (London, 1813) and Rictor Norton’s online source 
‘The Vere Street Coterie’, The Gay Subculture in Georgian England. Updated 28 May 2012 
http://rictornorton.co.uk/vere.htm. 
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characteristics they share. These offences appear at first sight very diverse, ranging 
from various forms of deception and slander to sexual crimes. However, we should 
keep in mind that the use of the pillory was by no means random or indiscriminate; 
rather, it was closely connected with the nature of crime and contemporary perceptions 
of it. Offences mostly connected to the pillory clearly possessed similar features, and 
perhaps the most suggestive feature was that these crimes were customarily deemed 
‘infamous’ and ‘shameful’ by the law and the community.  
In pre-modern Britain, as well as in other parts of the Europe, a wide range of 
misdemeanours and felonies were subject to legal infamy, but the judicial authorities 
were inclined to associate infamy with deception and sexual crimes.649 Edward Coke 
and Blackstone claimed that people convicted of perjury should be punished with 
‘perpetual infamy’, imprisonment, fines and infamous punishment such as the pillory. 
Meanwhile, any person who ‘by cheating at play shall win any money or valuable things 
shall be deemed infamy, and suffer corporal punishment as in case of wilful perjury’.650 
The English legal writer Thomas Edlyne Tomlins (1762-1841) in his The Law-
Dictionary wrote that ‘treason, forgery, perjury, or subornation thereof, and all offences 
                                                             
649 According to the book Fama: The Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe, in 
medieval Spain, sexual transgressors such as ‘prostitutes, pimps, and men who submitted to anal 
intercourse’ and those who ‘gave false testimony’ or ‘deceived others in business dealings’ or 
‘tampered with the will of a dead person’ were marked with infamy. In medieval France, where 
reputable (bonne renomee) people were required to be ‘reliable, truthful and respectful of the rights 
of others’; failure to confirm these rules by doing fraudulent practices would lead to the loss of good 
name (mal renomés) and incur public humiliation. In the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries Italy, 
those who committed crimes such as prostitution, pimping, adultery, bigamy and sodomy were 
pronounced infamous by law (infamia iuris). See Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail (eds), 
Fama: The Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe (New York, 2003), chapter 4, 5; 
Antonella Bettoni, ‘Fama, Shame Punishments and the History of Justice in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries’, in Shame, Blame and Culpability, p. 34. 
650 Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the laws of England (London, 1788), pp. 
158, 259; The Third Part (London, 1797), pp. 162-8; Blackstone, Commentaries, vol.4, pp. 138-9, 
172, 247. 
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which involve the charge of falsehood’, and crimes ‘in cases of barratry, praemunire, 
bribery of witnesses, or conspiracy at the suit of the king to accuse another of a capital 
offence, and for fraudulent gaming’ should be marked guilty with infamy.651 From time 
to time, infamy and shame were used to describe sexual offences, especially those 
relating to sodomy and buggery. Coke wrote that ‘buggery is a despicable and 
abominable sin amongst Christians’; Blackstone, likewise, stated that sodomy was ‘the 
most detestable’ and ‘the infamous crimes against nature, committed either with man 
or beast’.652 People who were sentenced as guilty of infamy had to suffer a series of 
legal disabilities; for example, they were prevented from becoming a juryman, making 
an accusation, or giving testimony in court. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
legal writers tried to narrow the list of offenders who were disqualified from testifying 
as a witness down to cheats only, arguing that ‘unless a man be put in the pillory, or 
stigmatized, for crimen falsi, as for perjury, forgery, or the like, it infers no blemish on 
his attestation’.653 It is no coincidence that offences clustered around deception were 
more likely to incur infamy, and on that basis, legal incapacity. Underlying this was a 
contemporary perception that people committing such crimes demonstrated themselves 
to be unreliable and could not be trusted. 
For the populace, similarly, few figures were more infamous than cheaters, traitors 
and sexual offenders. Unfaithful husbands or wives betrayed their spouses. Notorious 
bawds seduced young women into prostitution. Frauds, forgers and dishonest 
                                                             
651 Sir Thomas Edlyne Tomlins, The Law-Dictionary: Explaining the Rise, Progress, and Present 
State of British Law (London, 1820), vol. 2, witness I and II. 
652 Coke, The Third Part, pp. 58-60; Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 215. 
653 William Eden, Principles of Penal Law (London, 1771), p. 55. 
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shopkeepers obtained money and valuable things by cheating. Perjurers, slanders and 
corrupted informers betrayed their neighbours and deceived the justice in making false 
accusations. Sodomy was regarded by the law and populace as an abominable, 
disgusting and infamous crime, since it was ‘so unnatural and unmanly’ that it could 
‘vitiate the morals of the whole community’.654 While virtually all types of crime 
against property and persons would lead to public abhorrence and indignation, popular 
sentiment about ‘infamous crimes’ was not altogether the same as their sentiment about 
other offences. Although people convicted of crimes such as theft, assault, robbery and 
homicide would equally forfeit their reputation and incur infamy, we should be aware 
that popular sentiments toward these violent crimes were more likely to involve feelings 
of fear and anxiety, because they directly put people at risk of property loss and physical 
injury. In contrast, offences such as prostitution, adultery, sodomy and a variety of 
deceptions had been customarily despised as acts of baseness, vileness and depravity; 
popular sentiment about these crimes involved apparent moral judgement, and was 
associated with feelings of distaste, contempt and shame. What evoked public disgrace 
and the community’s disdain for cheaters, traitors, and sexual malefactors was their 
vicious or immoral intentions and the dishonourable way in which they carried out 
offences. More importantly, these crimes threatened not only the safety of individuals, 
but also the cohesion, stability, and reputation of the whole community. Licentious 
conduct on the part of married persons violated the basic moral values, and threatened 
the established marriage institution. Hoarding, speculation and dishonest tricks in trade 
                                                             
654 The Morning Post, 14 April, 1780; William Cobbett (ed.), Parliamentary History of England, 
vol. 21 (London, 1814), p. 389. 
249 
 
damaged the rules of day-to-day business. Perjured informers disturbed peaceful 
coexistence within the community. Forgery offended the reputation and machinery of 
systems of authority. Offences relating to homosexuality not only challenged the law 
of human nature, but were in danger of infecting the rest of the population. These crimes 
entailed less violence, but they scandalised the name of the entire community, and 
threatened the homogeneity of values and the principles of mutual trust between person 
and person – aspects which were fundamental to the preservation of moral order, social 
integrity, and the economic interests in the commonwealth. In comparison with violent 
and property crimes, these offences more directly questioned the culprit’s morality and 
his or her qualification as an honest, trustworthy member of the community. In a society 
where good morals and creditability were so important in shaping one’s reputation, it 
is not strange to see that people engaging in sexual and fraudulent acts were most 
frequently esteemed infamous. 
A miscreant who was deemed infamous by the community would be isolated as a 
deviant and common nuisance, lose his or her good reputation, and become an object 
of public reproach. An infamous identity was not automatically created by one’s bad 
conduct; rather, as we have seen, it was the product of the community’s judgement. 
Infamy was socially constructed, and could be conceived as a communal knowledge of 
or a ‘public talk’ about one’s ill character that was formed by, and disseminated within, 
the community.655 Committing ‘infamous crimes’ could always lead to a social scandal, 
and a high level of individual notoriety. Identifying an offender as infamous, or 
                                                             
655 Fenster and Smail (eds), Fama, pp. 3-4, 10. 
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describing his or her offences as ‘notorious’, ‘ignominious’, ‘disgusting’, ‘despicable’ 
and ‘abominable’ was thus not merely an expression of a general sense of disapproval, 
but a practice that reflected a deeply rooted sense of shame. This practice, in a social 
and psychological context, drew a distinction between two opposite groups within the 
same community: on the one hand was the unpopular or ‘abnormal’ minority, and on 
the other, the honest or ‘normal’ majority. This division evoked a painful sense of shame, 
which was experienced by the culprit knowing that he or she had been seen as a 
disgraceful person in the eyes of others. Here, the emotion of shame was socially 
constructed, and intimately involved an awareness of a damaged social identity of the 
self. Moreover, shame was a collective condemnatory sentiment toward the offender, 
experienced and expressed by the populace which was scandalised and shocked the 
offender’s ‘infamous crimes’. In this sense, shame could be seen as a synonym for 
infamy: that is, being infamous was seen as intrinsically the same as saying that an 
individual was shameful. Both words represented a popular moral judgement, carried 
out by the community to describe and condemn those of bad reputations. 
While both the authorities and the communities were able to sanction an offender 
as ‘infamous’, an important question remained, namely how popular judgement 
influenced, and interacted with, the authorities in making decisions about judicial 
sanctions. In other words, what was the relationship between the popular expression of 
shame and the official use of shaming punishments? We know already that public 
support was crucial for the success of shaming penalties. At the pillory, the populace 
was called upon to provide an audience and expected to participate in it by 
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demonstrating their hatred and opprobrium at the culprit. It required a decision made 
by the judicial authorities not only to represent the popular perceptions of the crime, 
but also to act in accord with the norms of the community. As Jody Greene puts it, ‘the 
authorities turned to the pillory only in cases where they believed they could rely 
completely on the community’s cooperation with the system of social and moral norms 
on which this branch of the penal system relied.’656 This means that while the legal 
authorities had the ultimate power to make decisions regarding the pillory, it was the 
popular judgement – the judgement that sentenced infamy and dishonour of a 
crime/criminal according to communal moral values – that legitimised and strengthened 
the administration of the formal punishment. Community involvement in labelling an 
action or a person as infamous or shameful thus played a crucial role in the official 
sentencing process. In this way, as the historian Judith Rowbotham claims, shame 
expressed by the populace ‘describes essentially emotionally grounded and publicly 
revealed moral judgements that are invoked to add texture to a legal decision, aiding 
the explanatory and justificatory processes that are an essential part of the law’s public 
performativity [and]… bringing both the legal and the societal – or popular moral – 
elements to a point of agreement.’657 
Jeremy Bentham, in his The Rationale of Punishment, discussed the correlation 
between the communal sanction of infamy and official shaming punishment in great 
detail, arguing that the popular identification of someone as infamous – a practice which 
                                                             
656 Greene, ‘Public Secrets’, p. 212. 
657 Judith Rowbotham, ‘The Shifting Nature of Blame: Revisiting Issues of Blame, Shame and 
Culpability in the English Criminal Justice System’, in Shame, Blame and Culpability, pp. 65-9. 
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he termed ‘the moral sanction’ – was the basis for judicial decisions. For Bentham, the 
punishment of moral sanctions was an informal one; it was essentially a public 
disapproval of those who violated the established moral values, implemented 
‘altogether by the persons to whom it belongs ultimately to dispense it, unassisted and 
uncontrolled by the political’.658 People convicted of any offence which the community 
was accustomed to mark with displeasure would naturally suffer the punishment of 
moral sanctions, and incur a certain degree of infamy.659 In order to bid for popular 
support and guarantee the power of shaming punishments, Bentham stressed that the 
judicial authorities should consider and respect the moral sanction made by the 
populace.660 Here Bentham’s trust in the moral sanction was largely attributed to its 
‘certainty’ – a characteristic which not only made the moral sanction a barometer of 
public opinion, but made its ‘punishment’ an immediate and inescapable consequence 
of committing any infamous act. As Bentham put it, in a passage that discussed the 
significance of the extra-legal, community-based form of justice: 
[The moral sanction] receives a degree of force which is often wanting in the 
political sanction, form the certainty of its action. There is no offending against 
it with impunity – an offence against one of the laws of honour, arouses all its 
                                                             
658 Bentham did not elaborate on the specific patterns of the punishment belonging to the moral 
sanction. Instead, he described the consequences caused by these punishments; these were, for 
example, ‘he has forfeited his reputation, his honour, his character, his good name; that his fame has 
been tarnished; that his honour, his character, or his reputation has received a stain; that he stands 
disgraced; that he has become infamous; that he has sunk under a load of infamy, ignominy, or 
disgrace; that he has fallen into disgrace, into disesteem, into disrepute; that he has incurred the ill-
will, the aversion, the contempt of the neighbourhood, of the public; that he is become an object of 
aversion or contempt.’ All of these expressions reflected the social nature of the moral sanction, 
illustrating that infamy and shame were the purpose and the natural consequence of the community 
judgement. See, Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment, pp. 213-5. 
659 Ibid., p. 242. 
660 Ibid., pp. 237-8. 
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guardians. The political tribunals are subjected to a regular process, they cannot 
pronounce a decision without proof, and proofs are often defective. The tribunal 
of public opinion possesses more liberty and more power; it is liable to be unjust 
in its decisions, but they are never delayed on that account. Trial and execution 
proceed with equal steps, without delay or necessity for pursuit. There are 
everywhere persons ready to judge and to execute the judgement…. Thus…the 
punishments of the moral sanction…by the certainty of their operation, their 
frequent recurrence, and their accumulation, from the number of those who have 
authority to inflict them, possess a degree of force which cannot be despised by 
any individual, whatever may be his character, his condition, or his power.661 
Besides stressing the importance of society’s role in the process of making 
decisions on shaming punishment, Bentham further argued that moral sanctions were 
advantageous in preventing crime and reforming offenders. The person that violated 
the communal rules and became infamous in the eyes of others would always 
experience a strong feeling of shame: 
I have done an immoral act: I am discovered…. I feel the painful sense of shame, 
the pain of ignominy; I experience, in a word, the characteristic evil of the moral 
sanction as the punishment of my misbehaviour. This sense of shame stamps the 
marks of guilt upon my deportment. This being the case, either out of despair I 
avoid my acquaintance, or else I put myself in their way. If I avoid them, I by that 
means already deprive myself of their good offices: If I put myself in their way, 
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the guilt which is legible in my countenance, advertises and increases their 
aversion: they either give an express denial to my request, or what is more 
common, anticipate it by the coldness of their behaviour. This reception gives 
fresh keenness to the sting of shame.662 
For Bentham, this painful sense of shame was important because it functioned as a 
powerful means of deterrence. When a man was marked with infamy, ‘he can only refer 
the evil he experiences to its true cause; the more sensible he is to shame, the more he 
will fear to increase it: he will become either more prudent that he may avoid detection, 
or more careful to save appearances, or he will in future submit to those laws which he 
has been unable to break without suffering.’663 Offenders sentenced to infamy by the 
community would not necessarily suffer the official punishment, for the moral sanction 
itself could in some cases function as an effective means of reforming and chastising, in 
the form of either collective contempt or more elaborate community actions, such as 
public humiliation and ‘rough music’. However, in most cases, the culprit subjected to 
judicial shaming punishment should first or spontaneously be deemed to be infamous 
and shameful by society. The societal decision on the shamefulness of an action or a 
person was an authentic indicator of public mood, based on which the authorities could 
assume that the pillory and other forms of shaming punishment would receive wider 
acceptability amongst the populace. As the extra-legal sentence of infamy was crucial 
to the justification and the success of official shaming sanctions, Bentham thus argued 
that ‘the punishment of infamy or forfeiture of reputation’ derived its origin from the 
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moral sanction.664 
Having discussed the correlation between the popular judgement of infamy and 
the official shaming punishments, we can now explore why both the community and 
judicial authority were inclined to shame ‘infamous’ offenders. As crimes of an 
infamous and shameful nature were generally acts that violated communal moral norms 
and peaceful coexistence within the community, dealing with these crimes was often 
regarded as a public affair. People convicted of infamous crimes would incur infamy. It 
was the mark of the public disapprobation which deprived the convict of all 
consideration in the eyes of his fellow citizens, of the confidence of his country, and of 
that fraternity which existed between members of the same society.665 The judicial 
authorities felt the need to deprive the reputation of infamous offenders because they 
were deemed to be unworthy of it. Moreover, the infliction of the pillory was designed 
as a degradation ceremony that officially and publicly pronounced or, more accurately, 
re-confirmed forfeiture of reputation of the convict, making his or her ignominy and 
the shameful crime – the knowledge which circulated before only in the courtroom or 
within the immediate circle of the culprit’s relatives and neighbours – a matter of much 
wider public record. In this process, we can find a causal and symbolic link between 
the nature of the crime and the form of punishment: the person who was no longer 
considered to possess a reputation should, indeed, be exposed to suffering from its loss. 
In a word, the infamous/shameful crime deserved the infamous/shameful penalty. 
                                                             
664 Ibid., pp. 222-3. 
665 Voltaire Cesare Marchese Di Beccaria, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (London, 1767), 
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The behaviour of onlookers at the location of the pillory is another area where we 
may identify this symbolic link between the shameful crime and the associated 
shameful punishment. Pelting by the crowd was a usual scene at the pillory. Sometimes 
spectators would throw stones and bricks in order to express their severest hostility to 
the offender, yet in most cases, the traditional missiles that people needed at the site of 
the pillory were mud, excrement, rotten eggs, decayed vegetables and dead animals. In 
contrast to stones and bricks, filth and dirt were clearly seen to be powerful weapons of 
shame. Pelting with such disgusting things as rotten refuse should not be merely 
understood as a presentation of indignation, but an action that represented deliberate 
attempts by members of the community to disgrace and stigmatise offenders, reflecting 
a very strong sense of shame felt by the crowd toward those who had committed 
‘infamous’ and ‘shameful’ crimes. Cockburn claims that ‘popular culture in the early 
modern era endorsed the notion of retributive justice’.666 Indeed, for contemporaries, 
the punishment – no matter whether it was initiated by law or by the populace – should 
represent the content and nature of crime; just like the physical pain applied to those 
who committed violent crimes, individuals who acted despicably should be subject to 
degradation. In this degradation ceremony, filth and dirt gained symbolic and 
explanatory importance. People perpetrating shameful crimes were seen as polluted and 
debased, and might contaminate the reputation of the whole community. The visible 
stains of rotten eggs, animal blood and excrement covering the faces of offenders on 
display may thus be seen not only as a metaphor of loss of beauty and a shameful sign 
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of their defiled, corrupted souls, but also as the retaliation that these miscreants 
deserved for engaging in impure or filthy actions, and tarnishing the reputation of the 
community. 
Another reason for shaming ‘infamous’ criminals by means of the pillory was to 
make public the fact of what had been implemented before only in secret – an idea 
which, again, represented the close correlation between the nature of the crime and the 
form of the punishment.667 In comparison with corporal shaming punishments such as 
the ducking stool, public whipping, and facial branding, the pillory could be seen as a 
kind of pure humiliation. Without considering the capricious physical violence 
produced by the crowd of onlookers, the severity of the pillory depended entirely on 
the level of publicity. Secretiveness was a striking feature of ‘infamous’ and ‘shameful’ 
crimes. As we have already seen, offences relating to fraudulent dealing, confidential 
trickery and sexual immorality were commonly carried out in a furtive or deceitful 
manners, which made these crimes not only dishonourable and shameful in the eyes of 
contemporary people, but also potentially difficult to detect and prevent. In seeking to 
bring to light the offender and his or her hidden indecency, the judicial authorities 
assumed not only that the spectators would be more scandalised by the offender whom 
they had trusted before, but that the criminal standing in the pillory would suffer a very 
intense sense of shame and ruined reputation. 
A more practical intention of publicising the insidious and deceitful miscreant was, 
                                                             
667  The meaning of ‘secret’ was twofold. On the one hand, it referred to offences that were 
implemented ‘in the dark’, in a furtive way or in private places, in the hope of escaping observation 
from others. On the other hand, it related to acts that were carried out by deceitful and fraudulent 
means, which made the criminal nature of acts uneasy to discern. In many cases the two categories 
overlapped with each other. 
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as Beattie claims, to make the culprit’s identity known, so as to forewarn potential 
victims.668 A good example of this intention may be seen from the judicial authorities’ 
uncompromising insistence on the public exposure of homosexual offenders.669 Early 
modern people agreed that sodomy was so dangerous and seductive that, in order to 
prevent this epidemic vice from polluting the morals of the whole society, its name and 
detail were not fit to be mentioned in legal proceedings or press accounts. Like his 
predecessor Edward Coke, who suggested that ‘the shamfull sin of Sodomy’ should not 
be named,670 Blackstone felt himself unable to name this crime in English: 
I will not act so disagreeable a part, to my readers as well as myself, as to dwell 
any longer upon a subject, the very mention of which is a disgrace to human 
nature. It will be more eligible to imitate in this respect the delicacy of our English 
law, which treats it, in its very indictments, as a crime not fit to be named; 
‘peccatum illud horribile, inter christianos non nominandum’.671 
Similarly, in his short essay concerning the public prosecution and punishment of 
sodomites, Daniel Defoe advised the British legal authorities to imitate the Dutch to 
‘make both the Trials and Punishments of such sort of Criminals to be done with all the 
Privacy possible’, for ‘the open Trials of such Cases are accompany’d with so many 
publick Indecencies, such immodest and obscene Expressions, as are both offensive to 
the Ears of the Virtuous, and serve but to excite and gratifie the corrupted Appetites of 
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the Vicious’.672 Despite the fact that both legal authorities and social commentators 
agreed that details of sodomy should be better kept secret from the populace, 
punishments associated with sodomy were continually carried out in front of the 
multitude throughout the period, in the form of either public execution or open 
exhibition in the pillory.673 Public exposure was designed to humiliate violators and 
deter the crowd, but an even more important motive was to set convicts apart from the 
populace, reflecting an assumption that only if insidious deviants were widely known 
and isolated by the inhabitants, would innocent people be prevented from becoming a 
victim in the future. In her research on punishing early modern homosexual offenders, 
Jody Greene argues: 
The only way to stop the epidemic is to bring the remaining populace together to 
condemn and to shame, to stamp the offenders with the enduring mark of their 
difference. By so doing, of course, the persistence of sodomy is assured, since 
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those designated sodomites now have nothing to lose by continuing on in their 
monstrous ways, cut off as they are from any possibility of returning to the ranks 
of the population at large.674 
A person guilty of lesser offences might be merely sentenced to give bonds to guarantee 
future good behaviour or pay fines to repair the damage they had done to neighbours. 
But for ‘infamous crimes’, especially those implemented in darkness such as sodomy 
and fraud, if punishments were not carried out in public, or if offenders were merely 
punished by fines or indoor treatment, we may speculate that many inhabitants would 
still be unaware of the existence of potentially dangerous offenders, that violators would 
escape from a devastating loss of reputation, and that while the punishment was over, 
incorrigible miscreants might return to their former careers without worrying about 
being recognised by others. In this sense, therefore, the real intention behind the 
insistence on exhibiting infamous offenders was that the perpetrator should be set apart 
forever as a person ‘polluted and debased’ that ‘not fit to be trusted, but to be shunned 
and avoided by all creditable and honest men’.675 
Some historians assert that one objective of public shaming punishments such as 
the pillory was to pave the way for repentant offenders to get back into the fold of the 
community again. For example, Nash and Kilday claim that ‘shame punishments 
demonstrated that [offenders] had lapsed from community, but could be restored to it 
with remarkable swiftness’, without providing evidence of reconciliation between the 
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inhabitants and the person being pilloried.676 But this section presents a less sanguine 
view. In fact, many examples reveal that in the contemporary mind, offenders exhibited 
in the pillory could not purge the stigma attached to them, and that they would be 
socially and psychologically rejected by both the communities and the authorities as 
outcasts disqualified from bearing testimony in court, and unsuitable to do business with 
or be employed.677  
In 1725, in a discussion about whether or not to keep Mary O’ Bryan bound over 
on account of suspected theft, one person said that Bryan was ‘an old offender and was 
pilloried at Charing Cross in the late Queen’s reign for forgery’, even if this punishment 
was more than 10 years ago.678 In another case, when James Boswell said that he 
observed a gentleman standing in the pillory was ‘not dishonoured by it’, Samuel 
Johnson replied ‘Aye, but he was, Sir. He could not mouth and strut as he used to, after 
having been there. People are not willing to ask a man to their tables who has stood in 
the pillory’.679 In 1785, The Times commented that ‘the punishment of the pillory 
consists in the perpetual disgrace it reflects upon the culprit, who is thereby marked like 
Cain, that all mankind may avoid him’.680 This evidence indicates that the real intention 
and the actual consequence of the pillory was not to reintegrate, as many historians have 
suggested, but rather, to banish and excommunicate. 
To sum up, committing infamous crimes directly rendered the convict infamous, 
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and this constitutes a primary reason for the infliction of shaming penalties. The logic 
of the early modern penal code was that crimes or criminals of an infamous/shameful 
nature deserved an infamous/shameful punishment. As Antonella Bettoni says, ‘a 
failure to maintain fama by a failure to behave honestly opened up the individual to the 
“infamy” of shame punishment in what was, for contemporaries, a well-defined 
process.’681 The infamous nature of a crime could be defined either by the court on the 
basis of state-imposed law, or by ordinary people according to local discipline, but we 
should not draw a sharp line between judicial infamy and the popular one. On the one 
hand, as ‘the infliction of ignominious punishment is an appeal to the tribunal of the 
public’, public opinion could not be ignored by legal institutions.682 On the other hand, 
the incorporation of popular views through verdicts manipulated by local juries and 
judges meant that most early modern criminal punishments represented a broad popular 
consensus.683 Both officials and the populace found deception and sexual offenses to 
be particularly infamous and shameful, because these crimes were immoral in nature 
and potentially dangerous to the stability of the whole society. Inflicting shaming 
penalties like the pillory formally confirmed the infamy of the culprit, and symbolically 
shifted the burden of shame to him, making the offender responsible for violating shared 
moral values and damaging the reputation of the community. It also alerted local 
inhabitants to the existence of previously hidden miscreants in their midst, and in doing 
so, prevented them from suffering potential injury in the future. Therefore, the use of 
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shame as a penal weapon was not random; rather, it reflected a notion that the form of 
punishment should always fit the nature of the crime. In his Principles of Penal Law 
(1771), William Eden, latter the first Baron of Auckland and a British diplomat, made 
it clear that: 
Corporal punishments, immediately affecting the body, and publickly inflicted, 
ought to be infamous in the estimation of the people; so should degradation from 
titles of honor, civil incapacities, brandings, and public exhibition of the offender: 
all which penalties should be applied with great caution, and only to offences 
infamous in their nature.684 
‘Shaming those shameful’, as this section demonstrates, reflected the tradition and 
ideology of the administration of shame-based penalties. However, judicial authorities 
also awarded public shaming such as the pillory for offenders whose crime was not 
ordinarily among those that created shame or infamy in the eyes of the populace. As we 
shall see in the next section, the excessive use of shaming techniques and inflicting 
shame on customarily less- or non-shameful offences not only sparked public protests 
and violence, but also undermined the legitimacy and power of shaming sanctions. 
 
The Dilemma of Shaming Punishments 
In the early modern period when theories of penology had yet to develop, shaming 
punishments such as the pillory demonstrated themselves to be a powerful restraint on 
individual conduct.685 The fear of shame and potential physical injury imposed by the 
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audience made the pillory both a dreadful punishment and a deterrent. Many convicts 
spoke of their dread of the ‘ignominious punishment of the pillory’, and pleaded for 
other chastisements in order to avoid it. In 1731, for example, the notorious bawd 
‘Mother Needham’ said that what most affected her was the terror of standing in the 
pillory. In 1738, Katharine Smith, who was found guilty of wilful and corrupt perjury 
against persons for selling spirituous liquors, ‘begged for any chastisement rather than 
the pillory.’686 Some offenders even attempted suicide since they were unable to bear 
the brunt of the shame inflicted by the penalty. It was also recorded that a sentence to 
the pillory threw a gentleman convicted of sodomy ‘into despair, and so great was his 
dread of the pillory that the night before the sentence was to be put in execution, he 
took poison’.687 Although public shaming always faced the danger of failure if the 
populace sympathised with the prisoner, or disagreed with the verdict, disorder at the 
site of the pillory was not frequent before the eighteenth century. Martin Ingram claims 
that far from ‘appearing a risky proposition’, shaming punishments in the Tudor period 
‘seem to have positively recommended themselves to the higher authorities as a means 
of bidding for popular support by associating crimes against the state with crimes 
against the commonwealth.’ 688  Beattie argues that popular resistance to public 
punishments was ‘rarely demonstrated or expressed’, and that ‘little disapproval 
appears to have surfaced in the late seventeenth century concerning the punishment of 
the mainstream offenses against property and against the person dealt with at the assizes 
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and quarter sessions.’689 The absence of disorder around the pillory could be seen as a 
result of the authority’s respect for the tacit, yet generally understood principle that 
shaming punishments should be directed at offences which were considered by the 
populace as shameful and infamous in nature. 
But the pillory was not without problems. Magistrates had the ultimate authority 
to inflict shame on an offender according to the state-imposed law without considering 
whether the verdict was in accord with the community’s standards. Antonella Bettoni 
argues that ‘shame punishments are badly suited to such a top-down system because 
they entail a high degree of active community participation in resolving the issue.’690 
Although Bettoni’s viewpoint is primarily based on the legal history of continental 
Europe, her proposition rings somewhat true, particularly when the judicial authority 
punished political or religious dissidents through public shaming such as the pillory. In 
contrast to moral or violent crimes, some ideologically-motivated transgressions – 
notably illegal publication or speaking seditious words against a public figure or the 
government – were not always seen as ‘shameful’ or ‘infamous’ in the eyes of the 
populace as long as such offences did not violate the moral values of the local 
community or represented a local custom or a contested public will. According to David 
Nash and Anne-Marie Kilday, the pillory was ineffective in punishing ideological 
opponents of political and religious authorities not only because spectators might 
symphysis and support the prisoners and turn punishment into an anti-judicial victory, 
but also due to the fact that ideological dissenters always presented themselves as 
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undeterred or unmoved by shame the punishment intended to inflict.691 Thus, in 1637, 
the Puritan minister Henry Burton, who was convicted of writing seditious pamphlets 
against Archbishop William Laud and the Church, was unyielding and unafraid when 
he was standing in the pillory at Westminster, without showing any sign of shame or 
guilt for the charge and punishment imposed on him. It was recorded that when Burton 
was set in the pillory, he said to the crowd:  
I stand here to undergo the Punishment of a Rogue, yet except to be a faithful 
Servant to Christ, and a loyal Subject to the King, be the Property of a Rogue, I 
am no Rogue. But yet if to be Christ’s faithful Servant, and the King’s loyal 
Subject, deserve the Punishment of a Rogue, I glory in it, and I bless my God, my 
Conscience is clear, and is not stained with Guilt of any such Crime as I have 
been charged with. 
The audience was moved by his word; they sent Burton a cup of wine and asked about 
how he felt, to which Burton replied ‘never better’. Before having his ear cut off, Burton 
made an impassioned speech: ‘I hid not my face from shame and spitting, for the Lord 
God will help me, therefore shall I not be confounded; therefore have I set my Face like 
a Flint, and I know that I shall not be ashamed.’692 One year later, John Lilburn, another 
well-known puritan of the time, was tried in the court of Star Chamber for publishing 
seditious books, and sentenced to be whipped with two hundred stripes with both hands 
tied to the rear of an ox cart, stand in the pillory for two hours, and be imprisoned until 
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he admitted his guilty. Like Burton, Lilburn refused to acknowledge the conviction, and 
apparently felt no shame for the public shaming inflicted upon him. When Lilburn was 
standing in the pillory, he ‘scattered some forbidden books among the people’, and 
‘addressed the people, affirming his innocence’. His speech ‘met hearty sympathy from 
many of the assembled multitude gathered near the spot’, and received ‘applause 
instead of derision’ from the crowd.693  
Besides political and religious dissenters, it was evident that the pillory and other 
forms of punishments were ineffective in chastising offenders convicted of what 
historians termed ‘social crimes’ such as smuggling.694 In a trial of a smuggler, as The 
Gentleman’s Magazine recorded in 1753, when a justice gravely declared that ‘the 
Smuggler was as great, if not a greater Criminal, than a Highwayman’, the convict 
seemed not at all convinced by it, replying that ‘A Smuggler only steals, or rather 
conceals what is truly his own, as being fairly purchased by him for a valuable 
Consideration; whereas the Highwayman takes by Violence what belongs to another. 
For which reason he could not help thinking that he ought to have been treated with a 
little more lenity.’ The smuggler had good reason to justify his transgression and refute 
the verdict; as he stated, ‘Since I and my Family must be ruined by this Sentence, I will 
speak what I think upon it: the High Taxes make Living dear, dear Living ruins Trade, 
the Ruin of Trade puts many upon robbing and stealing, and robbing and stealing brings 
them to the Gallows.’695 The offender’s words represented the voice of some 20,000 
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full-time smugglers out of a population of eight millions in England at the time.696 High 
levels of import and export duties, coupled with the profits gained from smuggling, 
provided an excuse to commit this crime. It was common to see that in many sea-coast 
villages, a large proportion of population were engaged in this business, and, in the 
struggle with authorities, inhabitants shielded each other in order to protect their 
common interest. Moral values and local customs were influenced by social-economic 
situations. If a legally-culpable behaviour was supported by the local populace at large, 
the convict and inhabitants would not, and indeed had no reason, to feel ashamed about 
it. 
In spite of smuggling being an offence that could severely damage the trade and 
revenue of the state, contemporary writers distinguished smugglers from morally 
corrupted offenders, arguing that smuggling was a crime not among those that 
transgressed against ‘natural justice’. Adam Smith, for example, claims that a smuggler 
was ‘a person who, though no doubt highly blameable for violating the laws of his 
country, is frequently incapable of violating those of natural justice, and would have 
been, in every respect, an excellent citizen had not the laws of his country made that a 
crime which nature never meant to be so.’ Smith treated those who took a high moral 
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tone on contraband with scorn, saying that ‘to pretend to have any scruple about buying 
smuggled goods would in most countries be regarded as one of those pedantic pieces 
of hypocrisy.’697  Since many contemporary writers like Adam Smith realised that 
smuggling was not always deemed infamous by the populace, they doubted whether 
shamed-based punishments would be the proper choice to chastise smugglers. Thus, 
Beccaria argued that ‘smuggling is a real offence against the sovereign and the nation; 
but the punishment should not brand the offender with infamy, because this crime is not 
infamous in the public opinion. By inflicting infamous punishments, for crimes that are 
not reputed so, we destroy that idea where it may be useful.’ Beccaria explained why 
smuggling was not seen as infamous in the eyes of the populace: ‘I answer, that crime, 
which men consider as productive of no bad consequences to themselves, do not interest 
them sufficiently to excite their indignation.’698 David Hume also doubted ‘whether 
infamy ensues on the undergoing of punishment, though in itself ignominious, such as 
whipping or the pillory, if it happen that this has been inflicted for an offence not of an 
infamous nature.’ He agreed with Beccaria’s argument that an infamous penalty was 
not suitable for non-infamous crimes or popular accepted acts, claiming that ‘the crime 
is the act of the pannel [accused criminal], and the stain of infamy must attach to him, 
if such is the natural character of his crime’.699 
Another problem of shaming punishments (and public execution), which was 
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similar to the problems of contemporary scandalous publications as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, is that in the eighteenth century, and especially in London, they were 
losing their power to arouse the moral sense of shame in the audience. In 1695 a 
pamphlet writer accompanied his female friends to watch a public execution of a man 
who was convicted of the murder of his wife. ‘We got as near the gallows as we could, 
and heard and saw all that past’, he wrote, ‘and when the cart drew off, the women in 
our coach ask’d, is this all?’ The ladies’ insensitive and callous words shocked the writer, 
who thus lamented ‘Hanging is nothing at all… it do’s not deter the People; ‘tis made 
a kind of Jest, a Game, a Rendezvous of Mob, Shouting and Hallowing, a sort of Holy-
day, at least an Idle-Day’.700 Similarly, in a letter sent to The Gentleman’s Magazine in 
1737, the author recollected that his friends invited him to watch ‘some exquisite Rope-
dancing’, and promised him that he would be ‘satisfied with the Entertainment’. When 
the author was surprised to find that it was a public hanging, his friend said: ‘O, you 
will have Reason to thank me for bringing you hither, the Comedy is to begin 
immediately.’701 
In his An Enquiry into the Causes of the Frequent Executions at Tyburn (1725), 
Bernard Mandeville urged that public execution be kept in order and solemnity, so that 
not only should the condemned prisoner be ‘in a deep Sense of Sorrow, with all the 
Signs of a thorough Contrition, and the utmost Concern; that either Silence, or a Sober 
Sadness’, but also that the spectators ‘should be grave and serious, and behave 
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themselves with common Decency, and a Deportment suitable to the Occasion.’702 
However, he observed that the public execution had degenerated into ‘a carnival’ or ‘a 
species of festive comedy’, where the last vestiges of solemnity and the sense of shame 
had evaporated. 703  Cheaters, pickpockets and prostitutes did their business in the 
floating multitudes of the procession all the way from the Newgate to Tyburn. For those 
undisciplined armies Mandeville recorded that: 
As they have no particular Enemies to encounter, but cleanliness and good 
manners, so nothing is more entertaining to them, than the dead carcasses of dogs 
and cats, or, for want of them, Rags, and all Trumpery that is capable of imbibing 
Dirt. These, well trampled in Filth, and, if possible, of the worst sort, are by the 
Ring leaders, slung as high and as far as a strong Arm can carry them, and 
commonly directed where the Throng is the thickest: Whilst these ill-boding 
Meteors are shooting thro’ the Air, the joy and Satisfaction of the Beholders is 
visible in every Countenance and Gesture; and more audibly express’d by the 
great Shouts that accompany them in their Course; and, as the Projectiles come 
nearer the Earth, are turn’d into loud Laughter, which is more or less violent in 
Proportion to the Mischief promis’d by the Fall. And to see a good Suit of Cloaths 
spoiled by this Piece of Gallantry, is the tip-top of their Diversion, which they 
seldom go home without enjoying.704 
It is clear that the spectators were not deterred, and that their sense of shame for the 
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crime and the shameful punishment failed to be evoked. Instead of giving a warning, 
public execution hardened onlookers, encouraged what it aimed to deter, and descended 
to a counter-productive exercise, in which even ‘the best disposed Spectator’ could 
seldom ‘pick out any thing that is edifying or moving.’705 The disorder at the site of 
the gallows observed by Mandeville was not unusual in eighteenth-century London. In 
his An Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers (1751), Henry Fielding 
wrote with great disappointment: 
[The design of public execution] was to add the Punishment of Shame to that of 
Death… but to unite the Ideas of Death and Shame is not so easy as may be 
imagined… I will appeal to any Man who hath seen an Execution, or a Procession 
to an Execution; let him tell me… whether the idea of Shame hath ever intruded 
on his Mind? Much less will the bold daring Rogue who glories in his present 
Condition, inspire the Beholder with any such Sensation.706 
In contrast to public execution, the pillory required the active involvement of the 
spectators. People were not only called upon to witness, but allowed to throw dirt, 
excrement, and rotten eggs at the culprit. However, it is evident that in eighteenth-
century London the authorities began to lose their control over the site of the pillory.707 
Popular violence leading to injury and even death of prisoners or spectators were 
familiar to contemporary Londoners. The suffering of John Lowther, a woollen draper 
and ‘sodomite’, at the pillory in Cornhill was a typical example. According to the 
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London Evening Post on 15 October 1761, the prisoner was well protected and received 
little injury from the crowds during the first half hour; however, the mob eventually 
over-powered the officers, and ‘got on the Pillory, and tore his Great Coat, and almost 
all his Cloaths off his Back; and one Fellow turned him round in the Pillory so violently, 
that had the Board over his head not been loose, his Neck Must have been broke; he fell 
down, and lay for some Time as dead, but they reared him up, and set him on again.’708 
Were the violent actions of spectators a real demonstration of their resentment and 
opprobrium for the culprit? While it is difficult to tell what the audience had in mind 
when they were watching the punishment, we do know, at least, that many of them who 
rushed to the pillory were driven by curiosity or entertainment, rather than righteous 
indignation. As the report on the pillory of John Lowther revealed: ‘the concourse of 
People on this Occasion was the greatest ever known, The Windows and Balconies 
were full of Spectators, and there were some Hundreds of People on the Top of the 
Exchange, who paid Sixpence each, to gratify their Curiosity.’709 In another case, when 
William Holdbrook stood in the pillory in Bloomsbury Market in 1719 for attempted 
sodomy, The Original Weekly Journal reported that he was severely pelted with rotten 
eggs, cucumbers and dead cats, and that ‘the mob had certainly murdered him could 
they have got him in their power, for a hackney coach was tore to pieces that took him 
up to carry him to Newgate.’710 We should not deny that many spectators were ashamed 
of, and enraged by, the pilloried culprit, especially when the offender was guilty of 
                                                             
708 London Evening Post, 15 October, 1761. 
709 Ibid. 
710 The Original Weekly Journal, 25 July, 1791. 
274 
 
infamous offences such as sodomy. However, not all violence was evoked by shame 
and anger. In the pillory of Holdbrook, Richard Burg observes that ‘the tormentors were 
more entertained than enraged by the would-be sodomite.’711 
It is also evident that many people who engaged in the violence at the site of the 
pillory simply wished to satisfy their bloodthirsty appetites. What attracted them was 
the opportunity for pelting and injuring, and failure to do so could lead to great 
disappointment. A French tourist recalled that one day when he passed by the Seven 
Dials in London, he found that ‘the place was crowded with people, waiting to see a 
poor wretch stand in the pillory.’ After being told that the punishment was deferred for 
another day, the rabble, ‘provoked at this disappointment, vented their rage upon all 
that passed that way, whether a-foot or in coaches; and threw at them dirt, rotten eggs, 
dead dogs, and all sorts of trash and ordure, which they had provided to pelt the unhappy 
wretch.’712 When Eagan, a thief-taker, was stoned to death at the pillory in Smithfield 
in 1756, The Gentleman’s Magazine condemned what it saw as a taste for blood, rather 
than resentment of the crime that tempted the spectators to kill the prisoner:  
[T]he mob is ever disposed to worry any thing that is thrown into its reach, and 
find just the same pleasure in battering a malefactor to death, as in the destroying 
of any unhappy animal. It is not so truly the greatness of the crime which inflames 
them, as the scent of carnage; and now, by one murther, they have got a taste for 
blood, it is high time that they should be considered as dogs of that carnivorous 
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property, and that no more victims should be exposed to their resentment.713 
Before exploring the contemporary debate about the shaming punishments and the 
judicial concept of shame, let us summarise the main problems according to the 
examples we have already seen. The pillory did not always have the desired effect on 
both offenders and onlookers, especially when it was used to punish ideological 
dissenters, and offenders who were customarily not ‘infamous’ in the eyes of the 
populace. Even when the pillory was applied to generally hated, shameful crimes, it is 
evident that both convicts and onlookers usually presented themselves as being 
unashamed of the crime and humiliation the offender suffered; sometimes they even 
took justice into their own hands and turned the pillory into a triumph. A more serious 
problem regarding the shaming sanctions and other public punishments in the 
eighteenth-century London was the repeatedly staged brutality and violence in the arena 
of the pillory and the gallows. These problems made not only shaming punishments, 
but also the concept and the use of shame within the penal system a major subject of 
legal debates. What we find, from comments in the press, pamphlets, and influential 
works written by theorists, is the contemporary uneasiness about the abuse of shaming 
punishments and the anxiety about their destructive effects on the minds of both 
offenders and spectators.  
 
Debating Shame in a Judicial Context in the Long Eighteenth Century 
One of the most frequent complaints against the early modern penal system, of which 
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the shaming punishment constituted an important part, was the disproportion between 
crime and punishment. A proportional sanction meant that the punishment should be 
decided according to the nature and severity of crime. In 1727, an anonymous pamphlet 
argued that punishments should be ‘adapted to the quality of the offences, and clothed 
with the same character; so a Distinction of Crimes, and consequently of Punishments, 
into capital and non-capital, is reciprocal, dependent, and necessarily ally’d’. 714 
Montesquieu, in his widely disseminated book The Spirit of Laws, argued that in a 
liberal society ‘criminal laws derive each punishment from the particular nature of the 
crime, There are then no arbitrary decisions; the punishment does not flow from the 
capriciousness of the legislator, but from the very nature of the thing’. 715  He 
categorised crimes into four groups, these being ‘species prejudicial to religion’, ‘to 
morals’, ‘to the public tranquillity’, and ‘to the security of the subject’, and argued that 
moral offences, especially those relating to sexual misbehaviours or what he termed 
‘the violation of public or private contingency’, deserved ‘shame, public infamy, 
expulsion from home and society, and all such punishments as belong to a corrective 
jurisdiction’. According to the principle that ‘the punishment ought to proceed from the 
nature of the thing’, Montesquieu wrote that crimes that disturbed the public tranquillity 
should be inflicted by punishments ‘relative to this tranquillity’, including 
‘imprisonment, exile, and corrections’; while for violations of the public tranquillity 
and at the same time the security of the subject, ‘a kind of retaliation’ was needed.716 
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Here Montesquieu did not directly discuss shame in particular. But a significant 
implication was that the use of shame and humiliation as a penal weapon should not be 
indiscriminate, but rather directed at offenders against morality.  
While Montesquieu argued that the decision of punishment should be in accord 
with the nature of crime, other writers such as Cesare Beccaria added that the nature of 
the crime was decided by a collective opinion or what he termed ‘universal morality’ 
rather than law or reason, and that the sanction of infamy could be applied only if the 
crime was infamous and shameful in the eyes of the populace, otherwise the power of 
shame would be undermined and the sanction would damage the authority of the law: 
It is necessary that the infamy inflicted by the laws should be the same with that 
which results from the relations of things, from universal morality, or from that 
particular system, adopted by the nation, and the laws, which governs the opinion 
of the vulgar. If, on the contrary, one be different from the other, either the laws 
will no longer be respected, or the received notion of morality and probity will 
vanish… If we declare those actions infamous, which are in themselves 
indifferent, we lessen the infamy of those which are really infamous.717 
Beccaria’s argument affirmed the socially constructed nature of the concept of 
shame and shaming sanctions, and denied the state monopoly over the power of 
defining and inflicting shame. Like Beccaria, many legal writers of the period began to 
challenge the traditional beliefs that ‘the idea of shame will follow the finger of law’, 
and that ‘whatever species of punishment is pointed out as infamous, will have the 
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effect of infamy’. They argued that although the judicial authorities could mark an 
individual with infamy by awarding an infamous punishment, ‘it is the crime that 
creates the infamy, and takes away a man’s competency, and not the punishment for it; 
and it is absurd and ridiculous to say it is the punishment that creates the infamy.’718 
For William Eden, infamous punishments should be applied only to offences that were 
infamous in their nature. He wrote that ‘there are two kinds of infamy, the one founded 
in the opinions of the people respecting the mode of punishment, the other in the 
construction of law respecting the future credibility of the delinquent: the law of 
England was erroneous, when it declared the latter a consequence of the punishment, 
not of the crime.’719 
Another area of concern over shaming punishments was that they produced too 
much violence and brutality. In 1731, the Irish legal writer Sollom Emlyn argued that 
the pillory was a punishment designed to expose the offender to shame and infamy, and 
to mark him out to the public as a person that should be shunned and avoided by all 
creditable and honest people. However, he observed that the pillory had degenerated 
into a life-threatening punishment: ‘it is indeed a surprizing neglect that no effectual 
cares has hitherto been taken to suppress these practices, especially considering the 
fatal consequences which have sometimes endured from them, even to the loss of the 
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poor Man’s Life.’ Emlyn therefore argued that the law should take the responsibility to 
protect the prisoner who is in the custody of it from any injurious treatment.720 Half a 
century later, when William Smith, a ‘sodomite’, was killed in the pillory in Saint 
Margaret’s Hill in Southwark in 1780,721 Edmund Burke gave a speech in parliament 
proposing that the pillory, a punishment which he described as the ‘awkward and ugly 
instrument’, should be abolished. According to Burke, the pillory should be ‘a 
punishment of shame rather than of personal severity’, but ‘it had been rendered an 
instrument of death, and that of the worst kind, a death of torment’. Like Emlyn, Burke 
argued that the purpose of the pillory, even when it was used to chastise ‘the most 
detestable’ crime of sodomy, was to ‘expose them to public reproach and contempt’, 
rather than ‘to popular fury, assault and cruelty’. Although Burke’s bill failed to pass, 
his speech aroused sympathy among the audience sitting in the House, who agreed that 
‘proper care must be taken’ to guarantee the pillory was justly used and kept in order.722 
Unsanctioned violence and even death at the site of the pillory continued in following 
decades after Burke’s speech, but the clamour for abolishing the pillory grew louder 
and determined. Thus, in a short pamphlet entitled Observations on the Punishment of 
the Pillory (1814), the author complained: 
They [the mobs] are permitted to heighten the sentence, to change its nature, and 
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to avenge the transgression of the law by a violent infraction of its most obvious 
principles. A man who has merely been deemed worthy of an open disgrace, 
whose crime is only termed by the gentle name of a misdemeanour, is given up 
to the fury of the populace to be pelted until he is nearly expiring. They are to 
punish him according to their good pleasure. His ultimate judges are those who 
never heard his trial, who know nothing of the evidence on which he was 
convicted, and are wholly incapable of coolly estimating the magnitude of his 
offence. And not only are they entirely ignorant of the merits of the cause thus 
summarily brought under their cognizance, but liable to be blinded by prejudice, 
and wrought up to a frenzy by unhallowed passions. The law wisely gives them 
an opportunity of revenging all their private wrongs, of gratifying all their low 
malignities, and of embodying their untutored prejudices in deeds which may 
possibly be fatal to their victims.723 
Besides criticising the brutality of the pillory, writers also worried about the 
negative effect of shaming punishments on the mind of both culprits and spectators. 
They claimed that the frequent and stigmatising use of shaming techniques would exert 
a long-lasting shame on male and female offenders, which might not only destroy their 
self-identity and esteem, separating them as an outcast of society, but also make them 
hardened and lose all sense of shame. In 1700, Ned Ward, after watching a young 
female flogged in the Bridewell, wrote that the punishment could do nothing but create 
many whores. Ward argued against whipping female offenders not only because it is ‘a 
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shameful Indecency for a Women to expose her Naked Body to the Sight of Men and 
Boys’, but also due to the fact that the shame imposed on offenders ‘is never to be 
wash’d off by the most reform’d Life imaginable, which unhappy stain makes them 
always shun’d by Vertuous and Good People, who will neither entertain a Servant, or 
admit of Companion under this Disparagement’, and that, in the end, the abandoned 
female would be ‘drove into the hands of Ill Persons, and forc’d to betake herself to 
bad Conversation, till she is insensibly Corrupted, and made fit to all Wickedness’.724 
Similarly, at the end of the eighteenth century, the ducking-stool, which was still used 
in many local communities, was regarded as an improper punishment for female 
offender because, as a judge said, it ‘would rather harden than cure her, and that if she 
were once ducked she would scold on all the days of her life.’725 
Indeed, an overwhelming sense of shame and complete shamelessness were two 
opposite results of shaming penalties, but there was no insurmountable barrier between 
them: a stigmatised person found himself an outcast of society would always become 
insensitive to shame. Stephen Payne Adye, an English military officer, in his well-
known pamphlet Treatise on Courts Martial, to which is added an Essay on Military 
Punishments and Rewards (1769) warned that ‘to fix a lasting, visible stigma upon an 
offender, is contrary both to humanity and sound policy. The wretch, finding himself 
subjected to continual insult, becomes habituated to his disgrace, and loses all sense of 
shame’.726 Branding was a punishment that always led its victim to shamelessness. As 
                                                             
724 Edward Ward, The London-Spy Compleat (London, 1700), pp. 11-3. 
725 George Roberts, The Social History of the People of the Southern Counties of England in Pat 
Centuries (London, 1856), p. 157. 
726 Stephen Payne Adye, A Treatise on Courts Martial, Also an Essay on Military Punishments and 
Rewards (4th edition, London, 1797), p. 260. 
282 
 
William Eden argued: 
In any case, to affix a lasting, visible stigma upon the offender, is contrary both 
to humanity and found policy. The wretch finding himself subjected to continual 
insult, becomes habituated to his disgrace, and loses all sense of shame. It is 
impossible for him to form any irreproachable connection; for virtue, though of 
a social nature, will not associate with infamy.727 
Therefore, Eden suggested legislators that ‘the stamp of ignominy is intrusted to their 
disposal; and let them use with economy and discretion, this best instrument for the 
promotion of virtue, and the extirpation of vice.’728 Adye and Eden’s argument that 
shaming punishments would produce hardened criminals and destroy their senses of 
shame was repeated by an American legal writer, Benjamin Rush. However, what made 
Rush’s short tract An Enquiry into the Effects of Public Punishments upon Criminals 
and upon Society (1787) distinctive from other works of the period is that he discussed 
the effectiveness of public punishments from the perspective of human psychology, 
with particular attention to the interactions between public penalties and human 
emotions. According to Rush, ‘all public punishments tend to make bad men worse, 
and to increase crimes, by their influence upon society.’ 729  It is because public 
sanctions ‘leave scars, which disfigure the whole character; and hence persons, who 
have suffered them, are ever afterwards viewed with horror or aversion.’730 In this 
regard, public sanctions associated with infamy would destroy ‘the sense of shame, 
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which is one of the strongest out-posts of virtue’:  
A man who has lost his character at a whipping-post, has nothing valuable left to 
lose in society. Pain has begotten insensibility to the whip; and shame to the 
infamy. Added to his old habits of vice, he probably feels a spirit of revenge 
against the whole community, whose laws have inflicted his punishment upon 
him; and hence he is stimulated, to add to the number and enormity of his 
outrages upon society. The long duration of the punishment, when public, by 
increasing its infamy, serves only to increase the evils that have been 
mentioned.731 
Besides discussing the negative impact of public corporal punishments upon the 
psychology of offenders, Rush also examined how offender’s emotions during the 
punishment affected the minds of the spectators. He argued that people who were 
punished by shame would show more ‘fortitude, insensibility, or distress’, but all of 
these sentiments were injurious to the audience and the judicial authorities. If the 
criminal displayed fortitude and bravery, the senses of shame and indignation that the 
crowds were expected to feel would give way to admiration and praise. ‘Insensitivity’ 
would diminish the terror of punishment, and lead spectators who had secret guilt to 
imitate insensitive criminals so as to ‘seek an end of their distresses in the same 
enviable apathy to evil’. ‘Distress’ shown by the criminal was also harmful because it 
produced sympathy among the audience and made the spectators ‘secretly condemn 
the law which inflicts the punishment’ 732  Rush’s analysis explained why public 
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punishments always failed to evoke the audience’s feelings of shame, contempt, and 
indignation toward the culprit, and why judicial punishments should not be 
implemented in public. In this regard, Rush claimed that ‘the gallows, the pillory, the 
stocks, the whipping-post, and the wheel-barrow will be connected with the history of 
the rack and the stake, as marks of the barbarity of ages and countries, and as 
melancholy proofs of the feeble operation of reason, and religion, upon the human 
mind’.733 
Perhaps the most impassionate criticism of the pillory for its destructive effect 
upon the sense of shame was from Talfourd, an early nineteenth-century pamphleteer. 
He regarded shame as an emotion which ‘always connected with something that is 
virtuous’ and ‘one of the last of our nobler feelings which forsakes us in the depths of 
iniquity’ that every legislator should be most anxious to preserve. According to 
Talfourd, the pillory was not only useless to those already hardened, but also 
devastating to an innocent or a petty offender who ‘has any remnant of character to 
lose, or any virtuous emotion clinging to his heart’. In the latter situation, as Talfourd 
wrote: 
No matter how trivial his crime – how deep his anguish – how sincere his 
penitence – how elevated his capacities – he reads, or thinks he reads, contempt 
in the faces of all with whom he converses, and believing himself incapable of 
becoming respectable, he relaxes all his efforts, and crushes his impulses to virtue. 
He is defiled with a stain which even his innocence, if subsequently brought to 
                                                             
733 Ibid., p. 37. 
285 
 
light, could not wash away. 
In this sense, the punishment of the pillory was not just brutal but ‘exceedingly 
unequal’, since it could do nothing but create indelible shame and infamy, which in 
turn compelled its victim to ‘disarm the sufferer of his most sacred defence against the 
pollutions of the world’, and ‘strike the ingenuous blush of modesty from his cheek for 
ever.’ Therefore, Talfourd condemned the pillory as being ‘the preparation for the 
scaffold’.734 
Contemporary concern about shame in a judicial context was not confined merely 
to public or shameful punishments. Eighteenth-century people observed that the 
sanction of imprisonment, though it involved few element of shame and publicity, 
could also render criminals hardened and callous to all sense of shame. William Fuller, 
an imposter and false accuser, recorded what he had seen during imprisonment. 
Prisoners ‘glory in their Shame’, wrote Fuller, ‘I remember there was a Lad of about 
Eighteen Years old, committed for a very small Misdemeanour, and was lodg’d with 
the Thieves, he was so taken with their Brags of Roguery, and easy picking of Pockets, 
that he said there, he would follow the Trade as soon as he came out.’ Fuller was 
surprised to see that during Prayer time prisoners ‘swear, and tell bawdy Stories’, and 
one of them even put ‘his Excrement in another Prisoner’s pocket’.735 The increasing 
application of imprisonment over the course of the eighteenth century was paralleled 
by growing anxieties about its deleterious effects upon the minds and morals of 
offenders. In 1759 The London Magazine complained: 
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The misery of gaols is not half their evil, they are filled with every corruption 
which poverty and wickedness can generate between them… In a prison the awe 
of the publick eye is lost, and the power of the law is spent; there are few fears, 
there are no blushes. The lewd inflame the lewd, the audacious harden the 
audacious.736 
Some writers pointed out that female offenders were more likely to be contaminated, 
and become shameless in the prison. In his Mild Punishments Sound Policy (1778), 
William Smith wrote: ‘shame is a powerful passion; and in the infancy of vice a woman 
retains some sense of it; but in a gaol she soon loses all ideas of shame or decency, that 
guard which nature has planted round virtue. Modesty is forcibly driven out of the 
female heart, and she is laid open to shameless and abandoned impurity.’ Smith 
regarded prison inmates who were ‘more hardened in iniquity’ as a serious threat to the 
reformation of a female prisoner, because ‘by their lewd and blasphemous arguments, 
and by making her the butt of their ridicule, soon stifle those pious thoughts and 
virtuous resolutions, and drag her back to the pit of destruction.’737 
Despite their continual criticism of shaming punishments and the harmful effects 
of judicial sanction upon the moral sense of shame of individuals, contemporaries did 
not completely deny the value of shame in the penal system. In fact, attitudes towards 
shame were not unanimous in the eighteenth century. In order to increase the terror of 
punishment, conservative writers proposed that shame should be used in combination 
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with pain and torture. For example, in his An Essay to Prevent Capital Crimes (1731), 
George Ollyffe, seeing that ‘little concern or fear is produced even at the very time of 
Execution’, argued that death penalties should be attended with more lasting torment, 
so as to create a far greater sense of awe. As regards shame-based punishments such as 
branding, Ollyffe complained that ‘the old way of marking criminals by burning in the 
hand or face has been so easily tore or cut out’; therefore he proposed that criminals 
‘should have a slit burnt by an hot pair of Shears in one of their Ears’. Only in this way, 
would the irremovable stigma ‘answer the purposes of Terror beyond the Marks before 
used’.738 In correspondence to the Gentleman’s Magazine in 1750, an author proposed 
castration for sexual offenders, arguing that ‘pain and ignominy in this life will operate 
much more strongly upon them, than the distant apprehensions of death’. The author 
also suggested that it was necessary to burn a capital C on the cheek of felons, so that 
‘their contemptible, infamous circumstance would be known to everyone they meet’.739 
Besides proposing to increase the severity of shaming punishments, some writers 
argued for the rational use of shame, proposing that shame-based sanctions should 
match the specific nature of the crime, and aim to not only effectively punish but also 
reform offenders. For example, in 1737 the London Magazine advised that idle villains 
should be sentenced to cleaning the streets, ‘distinguish’d by a Chain about the Middle 
and one Leg, follow’d by a smart Driver, who would allow them no idle Minutes.’740 
Labouring in chains in front of the public was obviously shameful, but it was considered 
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to be a proper means of reform; as another writer William Webster claimed in 1750: 
‘few People can get above all Sense of living in publick Shame; and hard Labour is the 
most dreadful Thing in the World to Persons habituated to idleness.’ Since people could 
see examples of offenders confined daily to a disgraceful and laborious life, as Webster 
wrote, the punishment ‘might make a great many think how an honest Maintenance in 
a State of Freedom, and in an useful Way, who are now a Nuisance and a Terror to the 
Publick.’ For Webster, the reformation of offenders should be the outcome of 
punishments and the goal of all legislators.741 William Smith also pointed out that 
‘evils are best remedied by their contraries’, arguing that ‘idleness and its bad 
consequences will be most effectually punished and prevented by labour and 
confinement, joined with shame, which is the next in degree; for the example of 
suffering guilt… will have a much better effect than the terror of immediate death’. 
According to William Smith, physical infliction was not the first option of punishment; 
it could be used only if shame was insufficient to chastise and reform offenders. Here, 
we can see that shame still played a very important role in judicial punishment, and 
should be rationally used according to the specific nature and severity of crimes and the 
goal of reformation.742 
According to the same principle, Montesquieu argued that shaming punishments 
were suitable for chastising army deserters and other military offenders. He saw death, 
a traditional punishment for desertion, as being ineffective because ‘a soldier, 
accustomed daily to venture his life, despises the danger of losing it’. Therefore, 
                                                             
741 William Webster, A Casuistical Essay on Anger and Forgiveness (London, 1750), pp. 64-5. 
742 Smith, Mild Punishments Sound Policy, pp. 39-40. 
289 
 
Montesquieu regarded branding as a better way of punishments because it is nature that 
a soldier always cherished their honour and feared shame and humiliation.743 Stephen 
Payne Adye also applauded the great value of shame used by the military. He claimed 
that ‘shame alone works reformation sooner than severer punishments’, and that 
exposing an offended soldier to public shame by ‘degrading him from a higher rank to 
a lower’ or ‘marking him stand all supper time’ was an appropriate and effective way 
of disciplining soldiers. 744  The advocacy of shaming penalties was, according to 
Foucault, not a reflection of the ancient idea of symmetric vengeance, but rather a 
representation of a quite different mechanism. In this mechanism there existed ‘a sort 
of reasonable aesthetic of punishment’, which was presented in the idea that, in order 
to prevent crimes and reform offenders, punishments should be designed to ‘smash the 
mainspring that animates the representation of the crime, and weaken the interest that 
brought it to birth’.745 In this sense, public shaming was more effective than physical 
pain when it was used to chastise those, for example, who were proud of vanity. As 
Beccaria argued, ‘painful and corporal punishments should never be applied to 
fanaticism; for being founded on pride, it glories in persecution. Infamy and ridicule 
only should be employed against fanatics.’746 
I would like to conclude this section by looking at Jeremy Bentham’s discussion 
on shame in his famous The Rationale of Punishment (1827). Although this book was 
completed in the early nineteenth century, its arguments to a large extent reflected the 
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general attitudes towards shame held by the eighteenth-century commentators we have 
just examined. To begin with, like earlier writers such as Beccaria and William Eden, 
who argued for the socially constructed nature of shame, and opposed the state 
monopoly on defining and inflicting shame, Bentham also pointed out that ‘shame did 
not follow the finger of the law’, and that ‘whatever the legislator professes to 
disapprove of, the people will disapprove too, is going a degree too far’. 747  For 
Bentham, there was always disagreement as to what constituted shame between the 
public and the state, and the populace could reject the legitimacy of the sanction of 
infamy made by the government if they believed that the sanction failed to agree on the 
nature of the offence. Political libel was an offence that always aroused such 
disagreement since the populace would not look upon a libeller as infamous especially 
when they believed the libeller’s act was just. And, as Bentham wrote, ‘it is so much 
the worse’ if judges punished a libeller at all events without considering whether his 
libel is true or false, moderate or immoderate.748 By taking the examples of Shebbeare, 
Williams and Beckford, who were sentenced to stand in the pillory for the conviction 
of libel but applauded by the audience, Bentham claimed that ‘the legislator ought never 
directly to oppose public opinion by his measure, by endeavouring to fix a stain of 
ignominy upon an act of the description of those in question.’749 
Moreover, Bentham regarded shame as an important disciplinary weapon against 
crime, and a virtuous emotion that every judicial punishment should make the effort to 
                                                             
747 Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment, p. 245, 248. 
748 Ibid., p. 247 
749 Ibid., p. 248. 
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evoke and protect. Bentham acknowledged that ‘ignominious punishments are like 
those engines which are apt to recoil, and often wound the hand that unadroitly uses 
them’, but he fervently claimed that if they were ‘skilfully managed, what important 
services may they not be made to render!’750 How, then, might people be protected 
from the danger of shaming punishments backfiring? Bentham, like most of eighteenth-
century writers, argued that combining the use of shame and pain was 
counterproductive not only because it was ineffective in making offenders ashamed of 
their transgressions, but also due to the fact that it could risk the danger of making 
culprits hardened and shameless. For Bentham, an ideal shame-based sanction should 
be a pure public exhibition, without inflicting any physical pain. As he wrote, 
‘punishments to which the highest degrees of infamy are understood to be annexed, one 
can scarcely find any other suffering which they produce.’751 In addition, Bentham 
argued that the only way to ‘produce any additional degree of infamy’ was not by 
inflicting more physical pain on the offender, but by ‘taking extraordinary measures to 
make public the fact of the offence’ or by ‘bestowing on the act in question some 
opprobrious appellation: some epithet, calculated to express ill-will or contempt on the 
part of him who uses it.’752 In order to prevent offenders who were punished by public 
shaming from being refused by the society and becoming callous to shame, Bentham 
argued that the target of shame should be the offence, rather than the offender – a fairly 
advanced argument in his period as well as our own, and which could be seen as a 
                                                             
750 Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment, pp. 237-8. 
751 Ibid., p. 229. 
752 Ibid., p.242. 
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pioneer for the modern theory of ‘reintegrative justice’:753 
It is of importance to lighten as much as possible the load of infamy he has been 
made to bear. The business is to render infamous not the offender, but the offence. 
The punishment undergone, upon the presumption of his being reclaimed, he 
ought not, if he is returned into society, to have his reputation irretrievably 
destroyed. The business is, then, for the sake of general prevention, to render the 
offence infamous, and, at the same time, for the sake of reformation, to spare the 
shame of the offender as much as possible.754 
As with eighteenth-century commentators, Bentham opposed branding, in 
particular, when the punishment was used ‘only to mark a conviction of a first offence, 
and to render the individual recognisable in case of a relapse’. Instead, Bentham 
suggested that the mark should be better ‘impressed upon some part of the body less 
ordinarily in view’, whereby the offender ‘will be spared the torment of its infamy, 
without taking away his desire to avoid falling again into the hands of justice’.755 He 
also complained about the negative effect of prison upon the morale of criminals: 
‘instead of rendering a delinquent better’, wrote Bentham, prison would only ‘make 
him worse… and obliterate the sense of shame in the mind of the sufferer: in other 
words, it produces insensibility to the force of the moral sanction.’756 However, unlike 
some eighteenth-century writers such as William Webster and William Smith, Bentham 
argued that public hard labour renewed shame day by day and might ‘render the 
                                                             
753 See introductory chapter, p. 10. 
754 Ibid., p.135. 
755 Ibid., p. 88. 
756 Ibid., p. 121. 
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individuals more depraved than the habit of working tends to reform them’, because, as 
Bentham wrote, ‘it is probable that after the notoriety of this disgrace, nobody in the 
country would like to hold communication with or to employ them.’757  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with a review of patterns and characteristics of shaming penalties 
in early modernity, illustrating how shame was used as a disciplinary weapon to chastise, 
deter and reform offenders. It then investigated the motives and ideologies behind the 
application of the pillory. By discussing the concept of ‘infamy’ in the contemporary 
legal and civil contexts, I argue that the use of the pillory was not random; behind it 
was an often unspoken but shared social and legal tradition that shaming penalties 
should direct at offenders who were customarily deemed ‘shameful’ or ‘infamous’ in 
nature. Offences associated with sexual immoralities, marital disloyalty, and various 
kinds of deceitful and fraudulent doings were particularly infamous and shameful in the 
eyes of contemporaries, and constituted the majority of crimes punished by the pillory. 
The pillory formally confirmed the shameful identity of culprits, shifted the burden of 
shame offenders created back to themselves, and warned the community about the 
existence of a hidden and potentially dangerous criminal in its midst. Shameful crimes 
deserved shaming punishments; however, if shame was used to punish offences which 
were customarily not regarded as ‘shameful’ or ‘infamous’ such as smuggling and 
political or religious libel, the punishment would always be at risk of failure. In the 
                                                             
757 Ibid., p. 166. 
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eighteenth century, the pillory and other forms of shaming penalties encountered a crisis. 
The repeatedly staged popular violence at the site of the pillory undermined the power 
of shame and the authority of law. It is also evident that the public shaming rituals 
increasingly found themselves unable to effectively evoke the moral sense of shame 
among offenders and the audience. These problems discredited shaming sanctions, and 
made shame a subject of contemporary legal debate. Eighteenth-century writers argued 
against the excessive and stigmatising use of shame, but they did not deny the 
essentiality of shame as a part of punishment and the broader penal system. What 
contemporary commentators were mostly concerned with was how to effectively utilise 
shaming techniques to punish and, more importantly, to reform offenders, without 
turning them into shameless and hardened monsters. Thus, this chapter demonstrates 
the moral significance and the socially-constructed nature of the sense of shame in the 
context of law and punishment. In addition, it once again indicates that shame was 
something that needed to be used carefully or reformed in order to prevent the danger 
of being abused. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
 
One of the major inspirations for this research project came from the modern non-
historical study of shame. In the past few decades, the majority of psychologists, 
philosophers and anthropologists dedicated to shame have been inclined to define it as 
a morally problematic, harmful, and social emotion. This pessimistic view of shame 
has nevertheless come under criticism in recent years. In Defense of Shame: The Faces 
of an Emotion (2011), one of the latest multi-disciplinary studies in this area, brings 
together authors who rightly demonstrate the great moral value of shame; but they go 
from one extreme to the other, arguing that shame is entirely an individual, autonomous 
emotion, immune to social opinion and values.758 While scholars on both sides have 
deepened our understandings of shame, I argue that their static and all-or-nothing mode 
of explanation oversimplify the potentially complex and dynamic concept of shame. 
Indeed, as this thesis has shown, in early modern Britain the emotion of shame was 
social as well as personal, morally virtuous as well as morally irrelevant or even bad. 
Moreover, shame was more than just an emotion; it could be a lasting and collective 
mental psyche, an outcome of moral judgement, a transgression or scandal, a device of 
judicial punishment, and even a commodity of great commercial and entertainment 
values. 
In contrast to modern scholars who claim that shame is a socially constructed and 
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morally bad emotion, I argue that shame was experienced and interpreted by 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Protestants as a private, moral emotion. Religious 
shame was a feeling arising from an apprehension of personal sins and spiritual laxity, 
and also a continual psychological state of unworthiness and self-abasement. In most 
cases, shame was self-imposed through self-examination and prayer in everyday 
spiritual life. Even if a person’s sin or backsliding was not exposed to the public, he or 
she would still experience intensive shame and confusion because Protestants believed 
that the omniscient God and his watchman in the human soul, conscience, could 
discover all hidden sinful thought, word and deed. Of course, this does not mean that 
social judgement did not play a part in arousing shame. Sermon preaching, public 
penance, and supervision between Christians within Godly communities all functioned 
as important means of evoking and inculcating shame. However, religious writers were 
inclined to regard shame exerted by outside or social judgements as secondary or 
potentially problematic, and stressed that genuine, penitential shame should be a private 
emotion, experienced through diligent introspection and sincere repentance. 
Despite being a painful emotion, shame was wholeheartedly embraced by early 
modern Protestants, and was regarded as a means and sign of piety. In order to keep a 
holy life, the pious not only kept a watchful eye on sins, and brought shame to 
themselves whenever they committed any sinful behaviour, but also clothed themselves 
with humility and acknowledged their lowliness of status. Early modern Christian men 
and women recorded in diaries their feelings of shame for their impiety and their 
willingness to be abased in order to purge the soul and walk with God. Clergymen and 
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ministers urged people to fill themselves with deep sorrow and shame, arguing that an 
outpouring of shame was a precondition for receiving redemption. They also regarded 
the sense of shame as a powerful moral restraint which severed to resist temptation and 
sins, and a means of promoting virtue. Besides, religious writers emphasised the 
necessity of abasing the self and maintaining humility of the heart, and regarded this 
continual inward state of shame and humiliation as a weapon against the passion of 
pride and a prerequisite for the receiving of grace of God. In this sense, therefore, shame 
was not only a basic religious emotion, but constituted a crucial part of the Protestant 
psyche. 
However, the sense of shame varied according to different religious groups. Unlike 
Calvinists who believed that only a limited number of people could be saved and that 
the elected could not experience the salvation in this world, Quakers argued that ‘Christ 
has come to teach His people himself’ and the Kingdom of Heaven could be 
experienced immediately by all. Convinced Quakers believed that they were 
superseded by Christ, and had entered into a state of perfection which was even more 
perfect than that of Adam before the fall. The denial of self-will and the idea of 
perfectionism made convinced Quakers believe that they had no sin to be ashamed of, 
and provided them with a power to overcome feelings of shame and to go naked for a 
sign. But this state of shamelessness was transient, since perfect Quakers had to go on 
living in such a depraved world and faced the danger of temptation and sin. Therefore, 
as with other Protestants of the times, Quakers still regarded shame as an important 
moral faculty against sin, and self-humiliation and lowliness as the right disposition to 
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maintain holiness and preserve the inner grace of God. Like seventeenth-century 
Protestants, eighteenth-century Methodists embraced shame through self-examination 
and prayer. But it is noteworthy that Methodist preachers devoted much attention to 
evoking and instilling shame in their followers. While their emotional preaching had to 
some extent made shame an externally-imposed emotion, critics of Methodist 
enthusiasms re-emphasised the private nature of shame, arguing that truly sincere 
devotional affections such as shame, fear, and regret should be felt through self-
introspection, rather than outside enforcement. Despite nuanced understandings of 
shame among Protestant groups, the idea that spiritual shame was a private, moral 
emotion witnessed little change. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
the evangelical revivalists continually emphasised the moral nature of shame and the 
importance of self-examination as a means of evoking and embracing this holy emotion. 
In a more secular and social context, the contemporary senses of shame were 
complex, and in many respects different from religious understanding. The thesis has 
demonstrated that the eighteenth-century enlightenment and politeness elevated social 
factors to a place of significance in interpreting and experiencing shame. Philosophers 
and enlightenment writers identified shame as a socially constructed emotion. The 
social construction of shame was theorised by David Hume and Adam Smith who, in 
developing the theory of sympathy, argued that shame was a feeling which relied on the 
presence of others or social judgements and communication. Like religious writers, 
philosophers analysed in this thesis advocated the moral value of shame in promoting 
virtue and manners and in resisting vice. However, the emotion of shame was not 
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without problems; it also became a target of refinement in polite society. Polite and 
conduct writers saw excessive modesty, bashfulness and low self-esteem as impolite 
and reflections of a false sense of shame, and advised their readers to reject such 
behaviour because an overly shamefaced, humble disposition not only impeded polite 
sociability, but also exposed a person’s weakness and blocked the path to gaining a 
good reputation in polite society. Here we find that shame could be an emotion 
irrelevant to morality when it referred to a timid, diffident psychology. We also find that 
dispositions such as self-abasement, lowliness, and humility, which had long been 
considered as the essential parts of the religious sense of shame, were coming under 
attack in polite society. In addition, this thesis has shown that the moral basis and power 
of shame was under threat from some of the more superficial and materialistic facets of 
polite culture. The culture of politeness promoted modern sociable living and material 
consumption, which in turn made many contemporaries believe that a person’s 
appearance, dress, and wealth, as well as admiration by others, were the very foundation 
for gaining a reputation. This distorted sense of honour had a direct impact on the 
understanding of shame. Thus, while conduct writers repeatedly emphasised the 
fundamental role of moral virtue in shaping the right senses of shame and honour, they 
nevertheless observed that there were many people who feared the shame of being 
counted unfashionable. This debate about true and false notions of shame shows that it 
was not always a moral and positive emotion; rather, under the influence of eighteenth-
century polite culture shame was at risk of being reduced to a morally superficial, or 
even bad conception. 
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Shame was not just an emotion; it could be turned into news products for moral, 
commercial and entertainment purposes. The immense expansion of print in the long 
eighteenth century brought shame, news of which had earlier circulated only in the 
courtroom or the immediate circle of the wrongdoer’s neighbours, to a much wider 
public domain. Criminal prints between the mid-seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries were characterised by their explicit moralising and ideological functions. 
Although sensational and didactic elements always coexisted in criminal accounts, their 
authors placed greater emphasis on moral implications than the lurid details of shame. 
The fact of a transgression was often represented as an exemplary basis for moralising, 
which aimed to teach readers that shame was the very nature and unavoidable end of 
crime, and the importance of keeping a moral sense of shame and a watchful conscience 
in order to prevent sinning and ruin. While crime and scandalous prints served to 
heighten public awareness and the abhorrence of errant individuals, we should be aware 
that they could not always succeed in inculcating a moral sense of shame in readers. 
Rather, as we have seen, the rise of scandalous publications in the eighteenth century 
reflected, and to some extent contributed to, a culture of shamelessness. Publishers and 
writers discovered the commercial and entertaining values of the personal shame of 
social elites. They invested much effort in representing the sensational and titillating 
aspects of upper-class sexual transgressions, and regarded moral instruction for their 
readers as a subordinate concern. Scandalous publications could not develop without 
capitalising on shame; it was in this context that shame became a commodity. Focusing 
on the most sensational details of the scandals of the high and mighty, and turning their 
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shame into ‘news merchandise’, publishers and writers profited handsomely. And it is 
evident that what fascinated readers was the voyeuristic thrill, rather than the alleged 
moral messages offered by these accounts. The rise of scandalous prints made the 
private lives and vice of upper class figures more accessible than ever before, and their 
immoral sexual behaviours a topic that could be freely talked about by unabashed 
readers. The extensive, shameless exploitation of sensationalism, as many 
contemporary writers stated, not only undermined the moral power of prints and 
reduced them to a form of erotica and entertainment, but weakened readers’ moral sense 
of shame toward issues that they should have treated with abhorrence and shame. 
By considering shame as both a communal moral sanction and a device of judicial 
punishment, this thesis has demonstrated the social and moral characteristics of shame 
in the early modern judicial context, and has again indicated that shame was something 
that should be carefully deployed in order to prevent the danger of it being abused or 
weakened. The social dimension of shame was reflected in the means and purpose of 
punishing offenders. By exposing a criminal to the public and labelling him or her as 
infamous and unworthy of trust or respect by the community, shaming punishments 
aimed to damage the reputation of the culprit, and to impress the shamefulness of both 
the offender and sanction on spectators, in order to deter them from committing similar 
crimes in the future. The judicial authorities were clear that the success of shaming 
penalties relied on the co-operation of the audience, and that such support depended on 
popular attitudes toward the offence and the manner of punishment. The application of 
official shaming punishments was not indiscriminate; as we have seen, crimes which 
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were customarily deemed ‘shameful’ or ‘infamous’ by the populace – those relating to 
sexual immorality, marital disloyalty, and kinds of cheating or fraudulent behaviours – 
were more likely to incur shaming penalties. The close connection between the nature 
of offence and the form of punishment not only shows that shame as a disciplinary 
action was a product of negotiation between the authorities and the communities, but 
also indicates the significance of mutual trust and social co-operation within a 
community in shaping popular understanding of shame. It also shows the great impact 
of this socially-constructed sense of shame on the decision-making process of judicial 
punishment. However, if the judicial authorities inflicted shame on persons whose 
offences were not commonly ‘shameful’ or ‘infamous’ in the eyes of the populace, the 
public shaming was at risk of failure. In the eighteenth century, and particularly in 
London, the repeated popular violence and celebration of offenders at the site of the 
pillory made public shaming penalties and the role of shame in the broader penal system 
a subject of heated debate. Reformist writers criticised the excessive and stigmatizing 
use of shaming techniques, complaining that it not only led to disorder and violence, 
but also turned offenders and spectators into hardened and callous monsters. Despite 
the continual criticism of shaming punishments, many commentators still regarded 
shame as a crucial part of the penal system, and paid more attention to questions of how 
to use shame to chastise and reform offenders effectively, and prevent them from 
becoming inured to shame. 
Overall, the thesis has made a contribution to existing scholarship on shame by 
arguing that shame was by no means a static or one-dimensional concept, as has often 
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been implied by modern scholars. I have demonstrated that in the early modern 
religious context shame was primarily a self-imposed, private emotion felt through self-
examination and repentance. Spiritual shame was not (merely) an instantaneous 
emotion, but also a lasting disposition towards humility and self-abasement. Yet while 
religious shame was a sentiment concerned with personal salvation, in more secular and 
social contexts, especially in the eighteenth-century contexts of politeness, print, and 
judicial administration, shame was always interpreted and experienced as a socially 
constructed or externally imposed emotion concerned with a person’s public honour or 
reputation. The distinction between religious and secular senses of shame thus not only 
refutes the sweeping and over-simplified position that shame is entirely a social 
conception, but also denies the recent overcorrecting argument that shame is a 
completely autonomous emotion. Moreover, this thesis has also demonstrated that early 
modern contemporaries regarded shame as something of great moral value. Religious, 
conduct and legal writers repeatedly emphasised the significance of internalising a 
moral sense of shame. They regarded shame as a sign of penitence and piety, an inward 
restraint that kept people away from sin and vice, a positive factor that stimulated self-
examination and reform, and an important means to define and enforce codes of 
behaviour and shared social or legal values. However, shame was not always just a 
positively moral phenomenon. As we have seen, shame could be morally-irrelevant and 
even harmful to personal reputation and polite sociability when it was expressed as a 
timid, awkward emotion. In addition, social, commercial, and judicial factors which 
emerged in the eighteenth century could also undermine the moral basis and power of 
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shame, and reduced it to a morally superficial and even bad emotion. Thus, this thesis 
has on the one hand denied the traditional explanation of shame as something 
detrimental to both individuals and the society, and on the other hand, has revealed that 
the moral characteristics of shame were not immutable, but something which faced the 
danger of being abused and weakened.  
Another contribution of this research is that it has broadened the scope of current 
historical research on shame. As we have seen in the first chapter, the study of shame 
thus far undertaken by medievalists is confined predominantly to the themes of chivalry, 
Christianity, and the (female) body. Research on early modern shame is even more 
limited in scope and amount. Besides Gail Kern Paster’s exploration of the relationship 
between shame and the body in the light of humoral medical theory, the majority of 
works – including recently published monographs such as Nash and Kilday’s Cultures 
of Shame (2010) and the edited volume Shame, Blame, and Culpability (2013) – 
associates shame predominantly with a social practice and disciplinary weapon rather 
than an emotion, and examines it primarily in the contexts of law and social control. 
Therefore, this thesis, by examining shame through the lens of religion, politeness, print 
culture, and punishment, and treating it as an emotion, a sense of honour, a moral 
judgement, an entertaining commodity, and penal weapon, has deepened our 
understanding of the cultures of shame in early modern Britain, and added new themes 
which might be illuminating for future research. Moreover, this thesis has shown that 
these contexts in which shame has been explored are not isolated from each other. 
Examining shame from different perspectives not only allows us to draw a picture of 
305 
 
the general cultures of shame, but helps us to see how the meanings of shame within 
different historical contexts connected and conflicted with each other. 
Moreover, this thesis has offered new perspectives from which to enlighten and 
deepen our understanding of other historical themes. In particular, while historians of 
religious psychology have paid much attention to melancholy, despair and madness, 
and regard them as the distinctive characteristic of early modern Protestant or Puritan 
psychology, I have sought to demonstrate that shame was a basic religious sentiment 
and part of the Protestant psyche. Moreover, in contrast to Donna Andrew who applauds 
the disciplinary nature and moral utility of scandal journalism, my research has 
presented a less sanguine view of the role of eighteenth-century print culture, arguing 
that the rise of scandalous and satirical publications, together with their extensive 
exploitation of sensationalism and eroticism, abused the shaming power of prints and 
weakened contemporaries’ moral sense of shame. This increase in shamelessness thus 
challenges Norbert Elias’s famous conception of a ‘civilising process’, which suggests 
that the medieval and early modern period witnessed an increase in shame, disgust, and 
repugnance as a means of self-restraint and social refinement. 
Last but not least, this research has contributed to the burgeoning field of the 
history of the emotions.759 In particular, it testifies to the validity of the experimental 
concepts of ‘emotional regime’ and ‘emotional community’ proposed respectively by 
William Reddy and Barbara Rosenwein. Reddy defines an ‘emotional regime’ as ‘the 
set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and ‘emotives’ that express 
                                                             
759 For the general introduction of this burgeoning research field, see Jan Plamper, The History of 
Emotions: An Introduction (Oxford, 2015). 
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and inculcate them’, and argues that such a regime aims to regulate and control people’s 
ways of feeling and their emotional life.760 ‘Regime’ is indeed a strong term; according 
to Reddy, it means a dominant norm of emotional life, and also reflects a set of 
enforcement machinery, which is operated by powerful authorities or institutions, and 
functions as a means to marginalise, punish, or exclude people who fail to conform to 
the prescriptive ways of feeling. Thus, in the early modern religious context shame 
clearly represented and stood at the very heart of an ‘emotional regime’, in which the 
religious authorities – the church, clergymen, and preachers – urged people to embrace 
devotional feelings of shame in everyday life, and warned that if they failed to do so 
they would be damned by God. Shame as a constitutive part of an ‘emotional regime’ 
can also be seen in judicial and penal contexts, in which the legal authorities and 
criminal writers put much effort into inculcating people with a notion that shame was 
the nature and the end of crime; urging offenders to confess with deep sorrow and shame; 
and impressing on spectators at the site of the pillory the shame of the offenders being 
punished.  
While each historical context examined in this thesis possessed dominant or 
publicly shared emotional norms or ‘styles’, we might see some of these ‘emotional 
styles’ as reflections of what Barbara Rosenwein would label ‘emotional communities’, 
rather than Reddy’s ‘emotional regimes’. According to Rosenwein, ‘emotional 
communities’ are ‘groups of people animated by common or similar interests, values, 
and emotional styles and valuations’. In contrast to ‘emotional regime’, different 
                                                             
760 William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling. A Framework for the History of Emotions 
(Cambridge, 2001), p. 129.  
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‘emotional communities’ could coexist simultaneously. Besides, an ‘emotional 
community’ has less compulsory and coercive elements, and its member might even 
‘feel quite comfortable’ with the norms of his or her community’.761 According to 
Rosenwein’s theory and the findings of my research, it is arguably true that eighteenth-
century polite society can be seen as something constituted by different ‘emotional 
communities’, while members of one ‘community’ regarded politeness as an inward 
refinement reflecting moral virtue, and treated immoral manners with a sense of shame, 
persons from another ‘community’ blushed for virtuous behaviour and feared the shame 
of being counted unfashionable. ‘Emotional communities’ can be also found in the 
context of eighteenth-century print culture. Thus, while in a ‘community’ there were 
high-minded readers and writers who complained about the growth of sensational 
publications and the consequent problems of shamelessness, in another ‘emotional 
community’ we find that many booksellers, writers, and readers were clearly not 
ashamed to represent, read, or talk about conventionally shameful matters such as 
sexual misbehaviours. 
I have sought to investigate contemporary meanings of shame in different 
historical contexts, and to outline the main characteristics and trends of early modern 
cultures of shame. However, as is often the case, the restricted time and word limit for 
a doctoral thesis makes this study lead to more questions than answers. In the third and 
fourth chapter I discovered the growth of a ‘false’ and morally-superficial sense of 
                                                             
761 Jan Plamper, ‘The History of Emotions: An Interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, 
and Peter Stearns’, History and Theory, vol. 49 (2010), p. 253, 256; Barbara H. Rosenwein, 
‘Problems and Methods in the History of Emotions’, Passions in Context, vol. 1 (2010), p. 32. 
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shame by examining observations and criticisms from contemporary moral and conduct 
commentators. It would be worth making a further study of the mental world of 
individuals such as fops, macaronis, and readers, in order to see how they felt and 
thought about fashion and the scandalous prints that they encountered or the behaviour 
in which they indulged. In the fifth chapter I demonstrated the causal relationship 
between ‘shameful’ crime and ‘shameful’ punishments. Since I made my argument 
mainly by adopting theoretical and intellectual approaches, in future research it would 
be worth exploring popular attitudes and sentiments toward different crimes by using 
materials such as ballads and local court records, and investigating the cultural 
meanings of languages such as ‘filth’, ‘cleanliness’, and ‘disgust’, in order to explore 
their connections with the concept of shame. Researching these questions would shed 
additional light on why some sorts of offence were more ‘shameful’ and ‘infamous’ 
than others in the eyes of community, and why ‘shameful’ crimes were more likely to 
incur ‘shameful’ penalties. 
In addition to the historical contexts examined in this thesis, there are new and 
potentially valuable areas that merit further research. For example, it might be worth 
considering at more length whether Britain witnessed a secularisation of shame over 
the long eighteenth century.762  Researching this question would shed light on the 
                                                             
762 This is a complex question, however. To begin with, ‘secularisation’ assumes that for a very long 
period of time, shame was a religiously-constructed concept. However, my research implied that 
religion might have never played a hegemonic role in deciding the natures and meanings of shame. 
While religious shame was a moral emotion concerning personal salvation, shame in a secular or 
social context was mainly concerned with a person’s social reputation. The fact that Christians could 
not live in complete isolation from society or social opinion means that spiritual shame and secular 
shame were both important sentiments which could co-exist all the time. The complexity of this 
question is also reflected in the fact that while in the eighteenth century social and secular factors 
were elevated to a place of significance in deciding and evoking shame, shame as an essential 
religious emotion was to some extent enhanced by the eighteenth-century evangelical revival. 
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interactions between the religious and secular notions of shame, and the change and 
continuity of the broader culture that shaped these notions.763 Moreover, given the fact 
that contemporaries’ understandings of shame might have varied dramatically 
according to their gender, social rank, profession, and location (i.e. urban vs rural, 
public space vs private space), and that the emotion of shame was closely connected 
with activities such as homosexuality, duelling, and suicide, researching shame in these 
specific contexts and themes would deepen our understanding of how shame was 
experienced and interpreted by different individuals and groups of people in early 
modern Britain. In essence, this thesis represents one of the first in-depth studies of 
early modern British cultures of shame, but more importantly, it is hoped that it will 
illuminate and open up future historical research in this extraordinarily rich, but under-
studied field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
763 With regard to the change and continuality of the cultures of shame beyond the eighteenth 
century, it would be worth exploring how the nineteen-century social and religious movements 
worked to re-imposed older notions of shame and moral norms. Indeed, the scandalous literature 
was not a permanent feature of print culture but, as Vic Gatrell’s study of visual print culture 
suggests, a temporary trend that was extinguished by Victorian attitudes. The relationship between 
Victorian and Georgian mind-sets is therefore ripe for further research.  
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